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Chapter 1
Biosecurity for Synthetic Biology 
and Emerging Biotechnologies: Critical 
Challenges for Governance
Benjamin D. Trump, Marie-Valentine Florin, Edward Perkins, 
and Igor Linkov
1.1  An Introduction to the Dual-Use Nature 
of Emerging Biotechnology
Synthetic biology uses engineering-based modeling and building techniques to 
modify existing organisms and microbes or to construct them from scratch. The rate 
of development and research related to synthetic biology for both industry and aca-
demia has increased over the past two decades (Ahteensuu 2017), with applications 
in medicine (new vaccines, delivery of therapeutics, and treatments), energy (biofu-
els), environmental remediation, food production, and general industry (detergents, 
adhesives, perfumes) (Evans and Selgelid 2015; Gronvall 2015).
While synthetic biology heralds advances in these fields, its techniques could 
also be adapted for malicious purposes and used by terrorist organizations, rogue 
actors, or hostile nations to create dangerous pathogens, invasive organisms, or 
other disruptive biological agents (Yeh et al. 2012). Such potential makes synthetic 
biology a dual-use research area of concern (DURC) since the same techniques can 
be used to benefit or harm people, animals, environments, or nations (Getz and 
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Dellaire 2018). Indeed, there have been 35 confirmed cases of biological weapons 
deployment between 1970 and 2014 (Franconi et  al. 2018). Thus far, the use of 
advanced biotechnologies for weapons production has mostly been pursued by 
state-actors. However, synthetic biological weapons are expected to become a larger 
concern as the field advances and they become increasingly adopted by malicious 
sub-state or non-state actors (Gronvall 2018).
Synthetic biology raises the possibility that pathogenic bioweapons could be 
designed, developed, and deployed in new ways that diverge from the disease- 
causing characteristics of naturally occurring pathogens (NAS 2018). Traditionally, 
only known pathogens found naturally in the environment, such as B. anthracis and 
Y. pestis, were developed as biological weapons because of the inherent infectious 
characteristics that readily enabled such organisms to serve as weapons. However, 
as synthetic biology continues to expand its capabilities to create and modify bio-
logical weapons, there is an increasing need for biosafety and biosecurity assur-
ances for humans, animals, plants, and the environment. To cope with threats arising 
from synthetic biology’s dual-use nature, biosecurity is needed to prevent, detect, 
and determine the source of biological attacks.
Biological weapons created from synthetic biology represent a new and unique 
threat space. Potential threats from synthetic biology include increased pathogen 
transmissibility between and within species in addition to resistance to established 
treatments. Synthetic biology can be used to engineer normally benign microbes 
that produce toxic biological compounds or re-build extinct or hard-to-obtain patho-
gens from scratch (NAS 2018). The main biotechnologies of concern in the near 
future (over the course of the next decade or so) are projected to be oligonucleotide 
synthesis, DNA assembly (assembling multiple smaller fragments of oligonucle-
otides into the desired larger sequence), and genetic modification (editing, deleting, 
and inserting desired sequences into targeted sites of a genome). Harm may also 
arise through the purposeful use of these techniques to disrupt human and environ-
mental systems. Malevolent use, but also negligent use (misuse) of synthetic biol-
ogy techniques, require two circumstances: (a) the spread of information, techniques, 
or knowhow to utilize synthetic biology’s enabling technologies for irresponsible or 
nefarious purposes (“information hazard”), and (b) the ability to use such knowl-
edge and tools to generate and disseminate harmful engineered organisms to vulner-
able recipients.
Creating effective biosecurity procedures and policies to protect humans, agri-
culture, technology, and the environment from such nefarious usages (or accidental 
or negligent damage from misuse) will require understanding the current state of 
synthetic biology. This includes knowing the platforms and technologies available 
for manipulation or construction (e.g., viruses, microbes, multi-cellular organisms, 
or cell-free systems) and planning for the future as the field overcomes identified 
bottlenecks or roadblocks. Biosecurity will require developing screening mecha-
nisms for synthetic pathogens and biological attacks, as well as methods to assess 
how a synthetic pathogen could be dispersed during an attack, identify what the 
potential targets of the attack are, and identify who developed the bioweapon.
B. D. Trump et al.
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1.2  History
State-sponsored biological warfare has been employed since ancient times (Mayor 
2003). By 1925, germ theory and advances in bacteriology had led to enough 
advancement in the field that regulation was deemed necessary, leading to the 
Geneva Protocol, which banned the use of chemical and biological weapons in war. 
However, this did not prevent a number of countries from embarking on biological 
weapons programs. A notorious usage occurred during World War II, when Japanese 
units deployed bombs filled with plague-ridden fleas in China as a part of their bio-
logical weapons program. Other nations also invested in biological weapons pro-
grams, including the UK and the US, although they did not end up deploying the 
weapons they developed. These state-based biological weapons capabilities tended 
to be justified as “first strike” options or as methods to weaken enemy ground forces 
that could not be combatted through conventional ordnance. In all cases, states 
developed the scientific and material ability to build, package, and deploy biological 
weapons.
A major regulatory development came in 1972, with the passing of the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (usually referred to as the 
Biological Weapons Convention; here “BWC”), an update to the Geneva Protocol. 
The BWC banned the “development, production and stockpiling of microbes or 
their poisonous products except in amounts necessary for protective and peaceful 
research” (“Convention,” 1972). The BWC went further than the Geneva Protocol 
in banning not just the use of biological weapons in war, but also their development 
and possession. Although 183 countries are parties to the BWC, some countries 
with a known interest in biological weapons, such as Israel, have not signed or rati-
fied the BWC, and some countries that have ratified the BWC, such as Russia and 
China, have completely or partially ignored its statutes. Russia had an active bio-
logical weapons program comprising tens of facilities and thousands of researchers 
until at least 1992, twenty years after it signed the BWC (Zilinskas 2012). China is 
believed to have aided Iran’s biological weapons program through the sale of sensi-
tive dual-use equipment and vaccines since at least 1997 (Byman et al. 1999). Under 
the BWC, member nations agree to not aid the biological weapons programs of 
foreign nations, thereby making China’s past trade actions noncompliant with the 
BWC. However, the BWC lacks mechanisms to enforce compliance and to investi-
gate and respond to events of noncompliance.
Nevertheless, for almost fifty years the BWC has been the gold standard for 
watching for and preventing state-sponsored biological weapons. Advancements in 
synthetic biology have decreased the amount of time, money, and skill needed for 
an individual or organization to participate in the field, leading to the development 
of pathogens by smaller sub-state and non-state actors who are not restricted by the 
BWC (Evans and Selgelid 2015), as well as potentially by individuals with rela-
tively simple scientific knowledge. For example, al-Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo 
have both attempted to develop bioweapons, although with limited success (Tucker 
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2007). In the 2001 “Amerithrax” bioterror attack, an individual actor sent Bacillus 
anthracis spores through the U.S. Postal Service, resulting in five deaths, the pro-
phylaxis of 30,000 more individuals, and hundreds of millions of dollars in decon-
tamination expenses (Pita and Gunaratna 2010). The destructive potential of 
synthetic biology is only increasing with scientific advances in the field. In the 
future, threats could come from disgruntled employees of state-of-the-art scientific 
laboratories or vengeful academics, but also simply from a sorcerer’s apprentice, 
insufficiently prudent and educated to prevent accidents. Therefore, as the newest 
developments in genetic engineering grow increasingly accessible to private citi-
zens, the question arises as to what rate-limiting steps (e.g. technical knowledge or 
inspiration) can prevent non-state small group or individual actors from undertaking 
development of increasingly advanced biological weapons.
Indeed, now the average person interested in synthetic biology can set up a lab in 
their home, using common household items and equipment or kits ordered over the 
internet, in a movement now known as “DIY Bio” (“do-it-yourself biology”) or 
“garage biology” (Ledford 2010). Additionally, while chemicals have a set structure 
and formula that makes them easier to identify and govern, advancements in syn-
thetic biology allow for the creation of novel types of biological weapons that are 
not explicitly prohibited by the BWC but instead exist in a sort of “gray zone.” This 
increased accessibility of synthetic biology and difficulty in categorizing synthetic 
biology products creates a threat space that is not fully captured within the current 
structure or implementation of the BWC.
1.3  Effective Governance and Policy for Biosecurity
Because emerging biotechnologies are dual-use, governance must weigh the risk of 
misuse with the potential for beneficial use in innovation and development. 
Unfortunately, biosecurity attempts are mired in uncertainty around both the actual 
capabilities of synthetic biology, as well as the motivations of actors given the 
increasing number of contexts in which synthetic biology is used. Modern govern-
ments are still relying on old rules to regulate a new technology, clearly an insuffi-
cient strategy for ensuring security in the coming decades.
Building an effective biosecurity strategy to encompass twenty-first century bio-
technologies requires understanding the novelties that sciences like synthetic biol-
ogy create in the biosecurity threat space, as well as the structural vulnerabilities 
these sciences can exploit and the likely causes of inadequate biosecurity practices. 
Synthetic biology’s novel biosecurity concerns arise from its broad scope, wider 
availability, complexity, and uncertainty over current and future capabilities. For 
example, critical developments such as gene editing via CRISPR gene editing vastly 
improve upon previous genetic engineering processes and may yield a revolution in 
human and environmental health research, but may also cause substantial and irre-
versible harms. One application of gene editing is the gene drive, which can rapidly 
propagate a certain set of genes or alleles through a population, circumventing 
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Mendelian inheritance laws and increasing the chance that this set of genes is passed 
on. While gene drives are an exciting new technology, their ability to rapidly alter 
the genetic makeup of a population is cause for concern. Other potential negative 
consequences of gene editing may include the unconstrained diffusion of gene- 
edited material throughout the environment, the disruption of ecologies with 
genetically- modified organisms (in particular engineered gene drive systems), and 
off-target impacts from genome editing. These techniques could also be used mali-
ciously, with an actor purposely targeting humans and/or the environment.
The publication and dissemination of a methodology for synthesizing horsepox 
in a laboratory setting was a recent application of gene editing (Noyce et al. 2018). 
Some critics say this information could support a nefarious actor to reconstitute and 
develop smallpox, or to synthetize other viruses. Additionally, the widely publicized 
recreation of the 1918 Spanish Influenza (Tumpey et al. 2005), which killed some 
50 million people worldwide at the close of the First World War, could facilitate the 
synthesis process for actors wishing to cause harm. Even nonpathogenic approaches 
have been described as dual-use research, ranging from the disruption of local ecol-
ogies via gene drives to the manipulation or destruction of inorganic materials.
These and dozens of other cases demonstrate the increasing ease with which an 
actor can acquire information and apply existing tools to deploy advanced genetic 
engineering applications with limited to no oversight. In 1975, the U.S. National 
Institute of Health (“NIH”) established compliance measures for genome engineer-
ing that were enforced through funding restrictions; however, many synthetic biol-
ogy innovators can now operate without NIH funding, approval, or even awareness, 
and NIH does not oversee research in other countries. Today, the financial costs, 
time limitations, and skill requirements needed to wield synthetic biology tools 
have scaled down such that some of these tools have become accessible even to 
elementary school students. Furthermore, the requisite baseline knowledge dimin-
ishes over time as synthetic biology processes become more streamlined. While 
such broad access to sophisticated genetic engineering knowledge and equipment 
can accelerate scientific breakthroughs, it also places the responsibility for biosecu-
rity on a near infinite number of unsupervised actors across the globe.
In 2018, the BWC secretariat noted that increased access to technologies such as 
gene editing, gene drives, and gene synthesis is available to actors with limited or 
no oversight from established industry or governmental organizations, raising con-
cerns about potential violations of the BWC. It is helpful to forecast and understand 
looming threats and potential mitigation strategies at various scales, but interna-
tional treaties are not structured to oversee bottom-up efforts related to the localiza-
tion and globalization of synthetic biology below the national scale. One part of the 
solution may be the broadening of engagement from established oversight agencies 
like NIH.
An additional option is the Responsible Research and Innovation (“RRI”) 
approach, utilized by the UK and the EU, which appraises the potential effects of 
new research on society and the environment in order to improve the alignment of 
processes and expected outcomes with societal values and needs. RRI approaches 
include experts from a range of different fields whose role it is to assess scientific 
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development with the goal of mitigating risk, making research advances accessible 
through fair and sustainable means, and upholding key morals and values. Programs 
that adopt the RRI approach are not meant to prevent research or the publication of 
results, but rather to minimize downstream harms that could make developers, com-
panies, and/or governments liable for costly insurance and cleanup efforts. RRI 
becomes an important criteria in access to public funding but is not a regulatory 
requirement.
Biosecurity could also indicate to the general public that certain synthetic biol-
ogy products have been filtered to guarantee beneficial uses. The US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (nrc.gov), for instance, performs this role for research and 
test reactors; the synthetic biology field would benefit from a similar regulatory 
body for biosecurity.
Where top-down governance proves insufficient, other actors such as universi-
ties, non-profits, and companies will need to engage their own gatekeeping and 
watchdog capabilities to protect against nefarious actors. Top-down governance 
may support such initiatives, which will require harmonization and communication 
up to the international level. These initiatives will need to be incentivized. Currently, 
though, biosecurity is viewed as an obligation, such that individuals, organizations, 
and companies must use their own funds to observe unstated and often confusing or 
contradictory needs for overall security. This balance of costs and benefits is inse-
cure, and as such, institutions tend to want to minimize expenditures associated with 
oversight (Gillum et al. 2018). The best argument to support investing in biosecurity 
is that the advancement of synthetic biology ultimately requires public approval, 
whereas currently the public remains quite skeptical (Pauwels 2013; Oliver 2018). 
The public could grow more opposed to synthetic biology were the public inadver-
tently exposed to some harm as a consequence of insufficient or inadequate over-
sight. Biosecurity necessitates a strategy which incentivizes managers and 
corporations to stay up-to-date with the latest risks and concerns.
Some corporations are aware of the risks to their bottom line should the public 
be exposed to harm arising from a synthetic biology product. The majority of DNA 
synthesis companies, in fact, have joined the International Gene Synthesis 
Consortium (“IGSC”), whereby they utilize company resources to monitor custom-
ers and their requests for potential security problems. They are aware that imple-
menting such biosecurity measures is in their best interests, even though there is no 
legal regime requiring them to do so. Likewise, in January 2020, the World Economic 
Forum and the Nuclear Threat Initiative published a report recommending that a 
technical consortium be set up in order to create a common DNA sequence screen-
ing mechanism. This screening mechanism would be based on work done by 
the IGSC.
Viewing longstanding biosecurity policy practices through the lens of risk analy-
sis results in the conclusion that there are significant gaps in biosecurity effective-
ness for synthetic biology. These inefficient and inadequate policies include (a) 
viewing security as a cost or undesirable expense to be minimized, (b) the siloing of 
scholarship and practice across disciplinary domains and among government, 
industry, academia, and civil society, and (c) the narrow framing of security 
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problems ignores new actors and technological developments taking place in a vari-
ety of different countries and in adjacent technology fields. Each of these issues 
could be resolved through policy solutions that both encourage technological devel-
opment and mitigate security threats while enabling public engagement in synthetic 
biology and investment in its products as they enter the marketplace. Policies for 
synthetic biology must be scalable, transferable, and adaptable in order to take into 
account its emerging technical and social challenges.
The increasingly globalized, distributed, and dispersed nature of synthetic biol-
ogy products and research worsens challenges arising from differing practices of 
biosecurity governance globally. Advanced biological research is no longer over-
whelmingly dominated by Europe and the US, and this may introduce different 
approaches to, or priorities for, biosecurity. Russia’s Federal Research Programme 
for Genetic Technologies Development for 2019–2027, for instance, intends to 
“implement a comprehensive solution to the task of the accelerated development of 
genetic technologies, including genetic editing; to establish scientific and techno-
logical groundwork for medicine, agriculture and industry; to improve the system of 
preventing biological emergencies and monitoring in this area” (Ministry of Science 
and Higher Education of the Russian Federation 2019). Similarly, Saudi Arabia is 
funding research related to the development of microbial cell factories to produce 
fuels and chemicals, while the Singaporean government is investing considerable 
resources into the funding of life and environmental sciences researchat Nanyang 
Technological University, the National University of Singapore, and the Agency for 
Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR). The Chinese Academy of Sciences 
is establishing an Institute of Synthetic Biology, which is tasked with the dual 
responsibilities of fostering roadmaps for the future development of Chinese syn-
thetic biology while also establishing safety and security norms for researchers at 
Chinese institutions. There are no top-down efforts beyond existing mechanisms 
like the BWC or the CWC (The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction) 
that standardize global governance and usage of synthetic biology, and bottom-up 
efforts are not coordinated in their reach or messaging.
Relative newcomers to the development of synthetic biology may possess differ-
ing tolerances and constructions of risk compared to more established technology 
developers. The implications of the entry of such newcomers to the field, though 
vast, can be grouped into two general areas. One includes diverging safety and secu-
rity practices at various points of an international supply chain that forms the back-
bone of an increasingly globalized economy. Another includes the potential for 
small-scale experiments or national biosecurity policies to escape the given actor’s 
control and spill across political boundaries. While one country may find the envi-
ronmental risk of a particular synthetic biology application acceptable, its spread 
across borders into another country may disrupt those local ecologies (i.e., crashing 
or hardening a particular species through genetic engineering) or expose vulnerable 
human populations to irreversible consequences without options for amelioration. 
The nature of certain synthetic biology applications (i.e. gene drives) makes it 
impossible for risk-averse countries to wholly quarantine themselves from exposure 
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to harms resulting from another country’s decisions. This is also an issue of equity 
given that risk-tolerant countries will reap the rewards of risks when beneficial tech-
nologies emerge, but risk-averse countries may bear their neighbors’ risks without 
any means to capture potential rewards.
An environment of competing and incongruent risk architectures causes indi-
vidual states, organizations, or industries to arrive at differing definitions of security 
threats or acceptable levels of loss in pursuit of a technology’s intended gains. For a 
technology as uncertain as synthetic biology, this policy divergence may set govern-
ments, companies, and other research organizations down vastly differing policy 
paths, and impede consensus in assessing the minutiae of technical risk concerns or 
assessment protocols, or ensuring security for anyone.
1.4  Conclusion
Synthetic biology is a transformative technology with the possibility to change the 
world to the same extent as – if not more than – the digital revolution. As is the case 
with previous scientific breakthroughs, the potential for its dual-use and misuse 
represents a global problem, and necessitates that the highest levels of policy mak-
ers pay it close attention. Although targeted countermeasures can go some way 
toward providing protection, preventative actions are likely to be more effective 
given the heightened uncertainty of the field’s future (Trump et al. 2020a). It is nec-
essary that biosecurity policies and practices be updated to take into account both 
the unprecedented challenges associated with synthetic biology and the globalized, 
diffuse, and varied nature of its threat space.
Effective global biosecurity will not happen quickly, nor will it be enthusiasti-
cally adopted by all national governments and non-governmental organizations. 
Incentives to misuse synthetic biology with harmful consequences remain high for 
certain negligent actors, as are the incentives to dual-use by nefarious actors, and the 
coming years may see such events affecting human or environmental health. 
Successful biosecurity implementation must be adaptable to quickly incorporate 
uncertainty as well as new capabilities. Urgent steps are required to place such 
notions into practice before a major threat incident, which in addition to creating 
substantial damages could usher in policy changes that might limit or ban platforms 
of synthetic biology research entirely. Besides forgoing the benefits of the technol-
ogy, such a ban could force development underground and further out of the reach 
of coordinated governance or risk assessment. By identifying the social, economic, 
institutional, and technological tripwires that influence a state’s trajectory towards 
biosecurity research of concern, now is the time to take steps to apply biosecurity to 
maximize technological benefits while minimizing the dual-use potential of syn-
thetic biology by improving the framing, prioritization, and governance of biosecu-
rity risks.
Many individuals and organizations are already taking on the challenge of bios-
ecurity. For instance, the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) 
B. D. Trump et al.
9
synthetic biology competition requires that judges carry out rigorous reviews of 
each team’s planned experiments and the materials they will require. Additionally, 
iGEM’s Safety and Security Committee as well as a commercial partner review 
team plans for potential harms (McNamara et al. 2014; Millet et al. 2019).
Biosecurity is prioritized by a number of independent and governmental organi-
zations, including the DIY biology movement, which has a code of ethics operative 
in North America and in Europe (DIYbio.org). This prioritization is also indicated 
by the intent of the member states of the BWC to develop a code of conduct (Meeting 
of the States Parties 2018), the African Union’s development of biosecurity norms 
for transgenic insects and genetically-modified crops (Glover et al. 2018), and the 
MIT Bio Summit 2.0 (www.biosummit.org) statement of shared purpose. 
Additionally, there is increasing demand for an update to global biosecurity prac-
tices and norms along the lines of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Such an 
update should improve cooperation, transparency, and joint security in the practice 
of synthetic biology.
Still, the problem of how to incentivize private actors to invest in biosecurity 
remains. The answer will require the participation not only of bench scientists, but 
also of various overseers, gatekeepers, and watchdog groups involved in biotechnol-
ogy research and development (for instance, the World Organisation for Animal 
Health’s Guideline for Responsible Conduct in Veterinary Research). One example 
of a potential approach is to train journal editors to recognize potential information 
hazards within article submissions. Additionally, funders responsible for reviewing 
grants could require that applicants include a review of potential information and 
security hazards which might occur over the course of the proposed work. In these 
and other examples, a fusion of top-down and bottom-up approaches is necessary in 
order to identify security threats and to raise awareness of biosecurity issues; mean-
while, bottom-up organizations can develop on-the-ground passive surveillance 
programs to monitor potential dual-use security threats.
An example of this collaboration is between the US Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and iGEM. The FBI has funded iGEM and collaborated with the 
competition’s organizers in order to increase awareness of risk and to build an 
understanding of possible or developing threats. While no biosecurity policy or 
practice can completely eliminate all threats (especially not without unilaterally 
preventing research and innovation that could greatly benefit society), a layered 
approach in which government, private organizations, and individual citizens col-
laborate will result in a more unified effort for biosecurity which could reduce gaps 
in oversight that might be exploited by actors looking to develop biological weapons.
Ultimately, adapting national and global biosecurity principles and practices 
may yield a number of downstream benefits that will help emerging biotechnologies 
become safer, more responsibly available, insurable, and trusted by key stakehold-
ers and the broader public. Actions to achieve such goals, such as promoting multi- 
stakeholder discourse for top-down and bottom-up governance, increased global 
coordination, and crafting and implementing mechanisms that foster effective, sus-
tainable, and adaptive biosecurity, are likely needed to bridge the gap between ear-
lier generation biotechnology policy and the cutting-edge scientific and technological 
1 Biosecurity for Synthetic Biology and Emerging Biotechnologies: Critical…
10
capabilities of the next decade (Trump et al. 2020a, b). This book includes a number 
of international opinions and scholarship on how such goals might be achieved, 
building from insights related to governance, risk assessment, ELSEI (ethical, legal, 
social and environmental issues), forecasting and horizon scanning, and the state of 
the art in physical and life sciences. While solutions for biology will be difficult to 
achieve due to a number of competing incentives, political challenges, and institu-
tional requirements, we believe that the ideals expressed herein help signal how 
improved biosecurity might be achieved over time.
To explore the various topics pertaining to emerging biosecurity challenges, the 
chapters that follow build from a NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme 
(SPS) Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) hosted by the École Polytechnique 
Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) in Lausanne, Switzerland in July 2019. Specifically, 
participants from over two dozen countries gathered to explore various physical and 
life sciences as well as social sciences concerns related to emerging biotechnology 
and associated security needs, challenges, and opportunities. This book includes 
written perspectives from the various working groups, including (a) top-down gov-
ernance at the national and international levels, (b) bottom-up governance using 
grassroots and self-governing interests, (c) the uncertain and difficult challenges 
posed by information hazards, (d) security concerns from technical, life sciences, 
and computer-assisted design research, and (e) the approaches and challenges of 
foresight in the forecasting of future threats, opportunities, and governance needs 
within the broader biosecurity space  (Linkov et  al. 2018). Additional chapters 
emphasize more explicit topics within each of these core ideas, and elucidate differ-
ent perspectives on how to better understand the limitations of modern biosecurity, 
as well as how it may be improved from a risk assessment, governance, and multi-
disciplinary sciences perspective.
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Chapter 2
Emerging Biosecurity Threats 
and Responses: A Review of Published 
and Gray Literature
Christopher L. Cummings, Kaitlin M. Volk, Anna A. Ulanova, 
Do Thuy Uyen Ha Lam, and Pei Rou Ng
2.1  Introduction
The field of biotechnology has been rigorously researched and applied to many 
facets of everyday life. Biotechnology is defined as the process of modifying an 
organism or a biological system for an intended purpose. Biotechnology applica-
tions range from agricultural crop selection to pharmaceutical and genetic processes 
(Bauer and Gaskell 2002). The definition, however, is evolving with recent scientific 
advancements. Until World War II, biotechnology was primarily siloed in agricul-
tural biology and chemical engineering. The results of this era included disease-
resistant crops, pesticides, and other pest- controlling tools (Verma et  al. 2011). 
After WWII, biotechnology began to shift domains when advanced research on 
human genetics and DNA started. In 1984, the Human Genome Project (HGP) was 
formerly proposed, which initiated the pursuit to decode the human genome by the 
private and academic sectors. The legacy of the project gave rise to ancillary 
advancements in data sharing and open- source software, and solidified the promi-
nence of “big science;” solidifying capital- intensive large- scale private- public 
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research initiatives that were once primarily under the purview of government-
funded programs (Hood and Rowen 2013). After the HGP, the biotechnology indus-
try boomed as a result of dramatic cost reduction to DNA sequencing processes. In 
2019 the industry was globally estimated to be worth $449.06 billion and is pro-
jected to increase in value (Polaris 2020).
While biotechnology is lauded for its anticipated positive impacts on society, 
new public health challenges are also likely given the scientific and technological 
advances made in areas like bioengineering and gene editing (Trump et al. 2020a). 
Misuse of powerful biotechnologies is of significant concern, be it purposeful or 
accidental. For instance, the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax leak occurred when soviet 
scientists accidentally released genetically modified microorganisms from their bio-
logical weapons facility. The incident resulted in over 100 casualties in nearby pop-
ulations (Sahl et al. 2016). This case not only demonstrates tragic consequences of 
biotechnological misuse but also highlights purposeful negligence and gross imper-
tinence regarding international agreements, in this case the 1972 Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC). The BWC was an agreement signed by 183 countries 
that banned biological weapons by countries’ self- regulated accord to prohibit the 
development, production and stockpiling of biological agents or related equipment 
that could realize a biological attack (UNODA 2017). Since the 1970s, threats posed 
by biotechnological tools have become arguably more widespread as production 
costs have decreased while access to processing tools have increased. Technologies 
such as CRISPR and RT- PCR are available in many academic and research labora-
tories, increasing the possibility of independent actors misusing the technology for 
nefarious purposes. Increased access and ease of use also correlates to a greater 
diversity of individuals using biotechnology tools for distinct purposes—some of 
which are deemed unethical or antithetical to global standards for biotechnology 
research and application. An infamous example is the 2018 experiment that resulted 
in the birth of two twin girls where a research group applied CRISPR technology to 
immunize the embryos against HIV. Although this isolated incident did not pose 
direct national security threats, the experiment does open up a “Pandora’s box” of 
possible unethical misuses (Raposo 2019). Following this pernicious history, there 
is a demonstrated need for the development and synthetization of a coordinated 
biotechnology framework that can better prioritize and anticipate biotechnological 
risks while seeking to maximize the potential benefits of applications.
Biosecurity frameworks’ essential function is to create a protocol that minimizes 
the collateral damage of pathogens and pests. The BWC is a keystone of interna-
tional biosecurity policy that arose out of the need to protect nations from the threat 
of an engineered biological attack. The US Department of Agriculture defines bios-
ecurity as the methods and procedures intended to “prevent the introduction, deliv-
ery, and spread of disease pathogens that can harm or adversely affect livestock, 
crops, environments and people,” (USDA APHIS 2020). Similar to biotechnology, 
the principles behind biosecurity are based in agriculture and prioritize the need to 
protect monocultures of crops, livestock, and poultry, whose lack of genetic diver-
sity makes them especially vulnerable to disease. As the biotechnology field pro-
gressed and new capabilities in gene sequencing, synthesis, and modification were 
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refined, democratized, and globalized over the past decade, advanced biotechnology 
practices and products required greater prioritization of biosecurity practices and 
considerations.
Biosecurity threats include biological weapons and accidental releases as dem-
onstrated in the Sverdlovsk anthrax event, but they have also become more diversi-
fied and complicated as researchers develop and utilize advanced biotechnology 
techniques for the betterment of society across other sectors. Gene drives for mos-
quito population control, engineered algae for biofuel creation, and recreation of 
extinct pathogens for novel vaccine development have unique and potentially 
unknown associated risks. The envisioned coordinated biosecurity framework 
would allow for beneficial innovation to proliferate while simultaneously reducing 
anticipated and unanticipated risk of harm to humans, animals, agricultural, and the 
environment (Trump et al. 2020b; Wells et al. 2020).
Many experts in the fields of public policy, public health, biotechnology, and 
more have discussed the threats that biotechnology may pose and the appropriate 
biosecurity responses from their diverse perspectives. To date, there has been no 
synthesis of published and gray literature regarding biosecurity. This chapter fills 
this gap in order to advance understanding of this quickly growing field. This chap-
ter aims to define the typology of issues related to modern biosecurity threats and 
responses by coalescing disparate perspectives on biosecurity into a single descrip-
tive location. In sum, we analyzed over one hundred peer- reviewed documents from 
26 countries in order to identify reported threats and responses across global sources. 
The most prevalent threats identified in our analysis include dual use research of 
concern, biological weapons, and the ecological impact of advanced biotechnology 
products, while the most prevalent responses include regulation and legal oversight 
of the biotechnology field, risk assessment and management, frequent and open 
communication between researchers, government, industry, and the general public, 
and a strong adherence to ethics in the scientific community and subsequent self-
governance. These threats and responses, in addition to less frequently mentioned 
ones, are discussed in this chapter.
2.2  Methods
We began our analysis with a systematic review of articles, where only published 
peer- reviewed articles (e.g., commentary, perspective, opinion, review articles) with 
available full- text were included. We started the systematic review process in the 
summer of 2019 and only articles published in the previous five years (2014 
onwards) were considered for sampling as the area of interest is a recent emerging 
field (Fig.  2.1). The four databases we used to identify relevant articles were 
PubMed, Web of Science (WOS), Scopus, and ProQuest. We selected these data-
bases as they provide a comprehensive collection of biomedical, life sciences, and 
social sciences articles. As we employed PubMed to execute the search, the Medical 
Subject Headings (MeSH) in PubMed were also utilized to acquire highly- specific 
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results based on specific medical search terms included below. The focus of our 
chapter is on the biosecurity threats and their proposed responses stemming from 
advanced biotechnology in the area of synthetic biology. Therefore, we selected 
search terms such that a wide range of relevant technologies were included: “gene 
drive”, “virus”, “micro”, “gene edit”, “CRISPR”, “cell free”, and “synthetic biol-
ogy.” To ensure thorough coverage of biosecurity issues, we employed different 
implicated terms. These terms included “biosecurity”, “weapon”, “defense”, and 
“dual- use.” We also applied different spellings (e.g. “gene edit*” and “bio-secu-
rity”) of the search terms to ensure that we obtained a comprehensive list of articles 
(Table 2.1).
First- level analysis included data “cleaning” to improve the relevance of the final 
sample of articles. We read each abstract provided by the databases to gauge the 
relevance of the article and to screen out any non- relevant results. We removed 
articles that addressed solely the technical aspect of advanced biotechnologies and 
articles that addressed other biosecurity concerns irrelevant to advanced biotech-
nologies. We also excluded papers with no or marginal discussion on biosecurity 
issues and/or measures, articles written in languages other than English, and articles 
in which the key words (e.g. “weapons”,” defense”) were used only metaphorically 
(Table 2.1). These criteria yielded 84 articles from PubMed (MeSH included), 119 
articles from WOS, 145 articles from Scopus, and 184 articles from ProQuest. We 
then combined all of the articles gained from the four databases and removed any 
duplicates, bringing the total down to 166 articles. We were unable to obtain PDFs 
for 33 of these articles. Since this prevented us from analyzing the full content of 
these articles, we removed them from our review. The final number of articles 
included in our systematic review is 133.
In addition to the systematic review of peer- reviewed literature, we also sought 
to identify what different government agencies report about advanced biotechnolo-
gies and biosecurity and compare it with the common themes identified in the 
Fig. 2.1 Number of articles published between 2014 and summer of 2019 selected for our system-
atic review of advanced biotechnology biosecurity concerns
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peer-reviewed literature. We focused on government documents published by the 
US and the EU as they dominated the academic conversation on biosecurity 
(Fig.  2.2). The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’s 
(2018) report Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology was analyzed for the US 
and the European Commission’s (2017) report Action Plan to Enhance Preparedness 
against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Security Risks was ana-
lyzed for the EU (Fig. 2.3).
Our next step was to analyze the content of each article. To do this, we read 
through each document and identified any biosecurity threats and responses (i.e. 
Table 2.1 The frequency of reported articles by search term and database
Search term PubMed
PubMed 
(MeSH) WOS Scopus ProQuest
Biosecurity “synthetic biology” 27 (13) 35 (20) 40 (23) 26 (5)
Bio- security “synthetic biology” 0 0 2 (2) 1 (0)
Biosecurity “gene edit*” 0 6 (4) 7 (7) 67 (7)
Bio- security “gene edit*” 0 0 1 (1) 0
Weapon* “synthetic biology” 9 (3) 8 (4) 14 (7) 138 (12)
“Warfare agent*” “synthetic 
biology”
2 (0) 5 (2) 6 (2) 14 (2)
Defense “synthetic biology” 81 (4) 51 (3) 51 (5) 96 (4)
Weapon “gene edit*” 0 8 (3) 13 (5) 72 (8)
“Warfare agent*” “gene edit*” 0 3 (3) 3 (3) 7 (1)
Defense “gene edit*” 0 107 (1) 113 (2) 51 (1)
Biosecurity “dual- use” 36 (27) 32 (20) 57 (39) 83 (31)
Bio- security “dual- use” 0 0 4 (1) 4 (3)
Biosecurity “gene drive” 4 (3) 3 (3) 7 (7) 23 (13)
Bio- security “gene drive” 0 0 0 0
Biosecurity “micro*” 17 (0) 202 (5) 472 (4) 2625 
(26)
Bio- security “micro*” 1 (0) 5 (0) 21 (0) 130 (2)
Biosecurity “cell- free” 2 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 44 (1)
Bio- security “cell- free” 0 0 0 2 (0)
Biosecurity “CRISPR” 22 (8) 10 (9) 11 (8) 103 (27)
Bio- security “CRISPR” 0 0 0 1 (0)






Bio- security “virus” 11 (0) 9 (0) 29 (2) 87 (2)





Bio- security “*virus” 11 (0) 9 (0) 30 (2) 0
Gene drive technology 13 (12)
Non- bolded numbers give the frequency before initial screening of abstracts, while the bolded 
numbers in parentheses give the frequency after initial screening and abstracts
MeSH medical subject headings, WOS web of science
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solutions to biosecurity threats) described in the document. We then grouped com-
mon threats and responses until we had a comprehensive and manageable list of 
biosecurity threats (Table 2.2) and expert- recommended responses (Table 2.3). This 
processes followed a grounded theory coding structure to ensure that we maintained 
a theoretical sampling perspective with, “the aim being to explore the dimensional 
Fig. 2.2 The number of articles within the systematic literature review published from each coun-
try as determined by the affiliation of the corresponding author
Fig. 2.3 Map displaying which countries published literature used in our systematic review and 
the relative frequency of publications from each country, as determined by the affiliation of the 
corresponding author
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range or varied conditions along which the properties of concepts vary” (Corbin and 
Strauss 1990, p. 73). Using the constant comparative method, each article was com-
pared against one another to inductively assess potential emergent themes without a 
priori assumptions of the content or form of those themes. This inductive analysis 
design allows for sought- after themes to emerge from patterns present in the cases 
under analysis without presupposing what the important themes will be (Patton 
2014). Next we report the key themes identified across our samples regarding bios-
ecurity threats and responses.
Table 2.2 Biosecurity 
threats and the frequency of 
articles reported
Biosecurity threat Frequency Percent of articles (%)
Dual use 66 50
Bioweapon 37 28
Ecological impact 29 22
Accidental release 26 20
Bioterrorism 23 17
Gain of function 16 12
Societal impact 16 12
Information access 12 9
Lower barriers 9 7
Uncertain consequences 7 5
DIY community 5 4
Difficult to monitor 4 3
Theft 4 3
Table 2.3 Biosecurity repsonses and the frequency of articles reported
Biosecurity response Frequency Percent of articles (%)
Legal oversight 59 44
Communication/open discussion 49 37
Risk assessment/management 45 34
Self- governance/ethics 37 28
Education/training/awareness 35 26
Collaboration 30 23
Biosafety principles 29 22
International governance/guidelines 25 19
Surveillance 19 14
Augment access 19 14
Improved response capacity 13 10
Containment or reversal strategies 7 5
Funding 6 5
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2.3  Results and Discussion
2.3.1  US and EU Governmental Frameworks
2.3.1.1  US Framework
The process of creating a biodefense framework for the United States of America 
follows several engineering paradigms, with the Specify- Design- Build- Test- Learn 
(SDBTL) cycle being the guiding principle (NASEM 2018). In the SDBTL cycle, 
researchers are able to systemically identify the desired organism or the organism’s 
functionality that will be genetically altered in a synthetic biology (SynBio) experi-
ment. The researchers will then be able to assess the success of the alteration and 
amend the experimental protocol if needed. This empirical process has given frui-
tion to a framework by the National Academy of Science, where certain parameters 
of biotechnology can be used to qualify a level of concern or hazard in the usability 
of a certain SynBio related technology. It must be noted that this framework aims 
not to enumerate the level of risk, but to direct concern to where the technology 
might be the most compromised. The concern about SynBio- related technology 
stems from the potential of its nefarious use, creating an objective assessment of 
achievements and shortcomings. The framework can be summarized into four parts: 
usability of technology, usability as a weapon, requirement of actors, and potential 
for mitigation. The four parts can be further broken down into subparts that can be 
assessed more easily.
Usability of Technology can be decomposed into four categories: ease of use, rate 
of development, barriers to use, and synergy with other technology. Ease of use is 
related to the commonality of the technology or of the information. The more wide-
spread and accessible the technology is, the more accessible it is to nefarious actors, 
thereby increasing its threat. Rate of development refers to rapidity of improve-
ments/innovations, whether there is a defined common use of the technology and if 
the technology is relevant throughout the times. For example, if a new technology 
does not have an intended use and there is a lot of funding behind the development 
of the product, the technology would generate concerns over its misuse. Barrier to 
use refers to the hurdles that can limit the use of technology, with hurdles being fac-
tors such as the accessibility of knowledge on how to operate the technology, the 
accessibility of materials needed for the technology, and other parameters. The 
lower the barrier of usage, the higher the concern about the technology. Synergy 
with other technology assesses whether there are other technologies present that can 
enhance the effects. Thus, the presence of synergy with other tools would increase 
the overall level of concern.
Usability as a Weapon is an assessment based on three other factors: production 
and delivery, scope of casualty, and predictability of results. Production and deliv-
ery refer to whether a genetically engineering organism, or any other product related 
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to biotechnology, can produce toxins or other nefarious substances that can  endanger 
people’s lives. Production and delivery can be done inadvertently or carried out with 
a purpose. Therefore, as the production and delivery increases, the concern increases 
as well. Scope of casualty refers to the scale of the potential threat. A higher scope 
of casualty means more people are being endangered, which increases the level of 
concern. The predictability of results refers to the certainty of a nefarious user get-
ting their intended results. This can be measured in the need for testing and if phe-
notype predictability is present. If testing is not needed to achieve the desired 
effects, then the level of concern and biosecurity threat increases since there are 
reduced opportunity for authorities to recognize and prepare for an attack for attack. 
If phenotype predictability is high, then the nefarious user has some confidence that 
the protocol they have followed will result in success. Therefore, as the phenotype 
predictability increases, so does the level of concern.
Requirements of Actors is an assessment of the feasibility of perpetrators suc-
cessfully using specific biotechnology to commit a planned attack. The successful 
completion depends on the access to enterprise, access to resources, and organiza-
tional footprint. Access to enterprise relates to whether the actors have interaction 
with or access to the tools of question. Access to resources refers to whether the 
actors have the resources to carry out their attack. Resources can include items such 
as money, raw ingredients, and laboratory space. Lastly, organizational footprint is 
an estimate on how much manpower is needed to complete the attack. The more 
people an organization needs to complete an attack, the lower the concern level.
Potential for Mitigation is an assessment of areas of concern that can be addressed 
before an attack or an event occurs. The analysis is broken into four subparts to cre-
ate a holistic examination of policies or accessibility issues that can compromise 
biosecurity. The first part is deterrence and prevention capabilities, which identify 
potentially dangerous activities and take steps towards preventing these activities. 
Actions such as increased intelligence gathering and instituting regulatory safe-
guards to areas of concern are effective in preventing certain tools from wreaking 
havoc. The second step in assuagement is developing the capability to recognize an 
attack. The identification process depends heavily on public health and disease data-
bases as well as surveillance systems. By identifying and outlining the pre- existing 
tools available, the identification process can be optimized. Another step in mitigat-
ing a potential threat is attributing capabilities of an attack to a certain group. In 
simpler terms, matching the scientific evidence left at the attack to the organizations 
that have done it. The more difficult it is to identify the culprit, the higher the level 
of concern. The last step for mitigating a potential threat is developing an appropri-
ate response to a myriad of attacks. Consequence management capabilities refers to 
a series of protocols and procedures that are established before an attack happens in 
order to quickly and efficiently respond to the attack and minimize the damage 
done. The procedures often include increasing emergency response capacity, devel-
oping quarantining facilities and expanding healthcare facilities.
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2.3.1.2  EU Framework
The 2017 European Union (EU) Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 
(CBRN) Action Plan outlines a general framework on improving prevention, pre-
paredness, and response in case of an attack. The document also includes a clause 
that obligates EU member states to provide assistance to those victims of CBRN 
attacks and to maintain communication between countries within and outside the 
EU. Although the action plan covers responses to other threats that are not biologi-
cal, most of the identified threats and responses are ubiquitous in application to 
biosecurity. The framework can be split into four actions: reducing accessibility of 
materials, ensuring preparedness for incidents, building stronger links, and enhanc-
ing current knowledge of risks.
The frameworks primary concern is limiting the accessibility of potential dual-
use technology or any other hazardous materials. Increasing the legal control of 
law reinforcement and preventing the trade of dangerous material to nefarious 
actors is one viable option. Methods of accessibility reduction include providing 
technical reports on weapons and incidents through Europol and strengthening 
patrol at EU borders. This action can increase the awareness of potential threats in 
law enforcement personnel and hinder the spread of material that can be used to 
initiate an attack. Another implementation measure that can limit the accessibility 
of materials is to decrease insider threats by optimizing vetting and background 
checks of personnel in facilities holding CBRN materials in order to identify and 
remove individuals with nefarious intentions.
The second step identified in the action plan is to ensure that member states are 
prepared to respond to a CBRN incident. Due to the diversity of the European 
Union, safety protocols get adopted at various levels of intensity depending on the 
economic and political status of the member state. The first proposed action towards 
a uniform response to CBRN incidents is to develop a common training curriculum 
and institute cross- sectorial training and exercise. Other measures to improve over-
all preparedness for potential attacks include systematic review and assessments of 
previous CBRN Action Plans and strengthening the current European Emergency 
Response Capacity of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism by registering pro-
posed CBRN modules. Updating current technologies and systems used for moni-
toring CBRN materials is imperative to stay relevant to the technologies available to 
nefarious actors. Conducting a gap analysis on CBRN material detection and 
improving the Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) can be a vital strategic 
advantage for EU states against malignant actors. Concurrently, improving the abil-
ity for laboratories to identify CBRN material and improving medical countermea-
sures such as joint efforts in research and development of vaccines should be 
pursued. Pertaining specifically to biosecurity, it is essential to increase overall 
awareness and develop a response protocol for emerging bio- risks.
Building stronger internal- external links in CBRN security with key regional 
and international EU partners was also identified in the framework. While most 
of the previous content was focused on strengthening the flow of information and 
resources within the EU, the later part of the framework focused on maintaining a 
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similar level of contact with foreign entities outside of the EU. Particularly with 
NATO, the primary aim of the partnership is to develop a counter- terrorism protocol 
by increasing information exchange, capacity building, training, and exercise. This 
ties into the final section of the EU CBRN framework: enhancing current knowl-
edge on CBRN risks. This last section focused primarily on the creation and appli-
cation of a security network. The EU CBRN security network will be overseen by a 
dedicated advisory group, and will make information available for sharing with 
Europol. The maintenance of the research network will depend on updating preva-
lent needs and threats relating to CBRN.
2.3.2  Threats Identified in the Literature
The thirteen biosecurity threats identified in the literature are summarized in 
Table 2.2. On average, each article mentioned two threats (min = 0, max = 8). Each 
threat, as informed by the literature, is further described and discussed below.
Dual Use was the most frequently mentioned threat, appearing in half of the ana-
lyzed articles. Dual use research of concern is defined as “life sciences research that, 
based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowl-
edge, information, products, or technology that could be directly misapplied to pose 
a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, 
agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, material, or national 
security,” (Lev and Samimian-Darash  2014). DiEuliis and Giordano (2018) further 
state that “any tool that imparts great capability also involves at least some risk, if 
not threat, that the power conferred by such capacity can be used to leverage or 
evoke a variety of ends.” This is at the center of the concern over dual use research. 
The majority of biotechnology research and modernization is legitimate and done 
with the goal of benefiting society – that is, to beneficial ends. However, the same 
knowledge and techniques gained from beneficial research can be used maliciously. 
For instance, CRISPR- Cas9 is being used to perform targeted gene editing as a 
treatment for cancer, increasing our ability to treat cancer and reducing our reliance 
on toxic chemotherapy drugs, but it could also be used to edit pathogens to increase 
their virulence. Indeed, the dual use applications and threats from CRISPR are 
prominently featured in the literature (Vogel and Ouagrham- Gormley 2018; Webber 
et al. 2015).
Much of the controversial dual use research in biotechnology involves gain of 
function (GOF) studies, a term used in 12% of articles. Duprex et al. (2014) consid-
ers GOF to be a “generic label for a broad class of experiments that lead to a geneti-
cally altered biological agent with new or enhanced functions.” Much of the concern 
over GOF studies includes research on the avian influenza virus and relatives of the 
smallpox virus (Evans et al. 2015; Duprex et al. 2014). These studies conferred new 
traits to the virus that increased its virulence in order to study transmission or vac-
cine creation, but also have a clear application for biological weapon (bioweapon) 
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development. In this way, they are both GOF and dual use research. Publishing 
these sorts of studies is considered a biosecurity threat of its own because the infor-
mation could allow a nefarious actor to create a bioweapon when they otherwise 
wouldn’t have had the knowledge to do so. We refer to this threat as “information 
access” and it is mentioned in 9% of articles. DiEuliss and Gronvall (20) touch on 
this threat while writing about the controversial publication of a study that synthe-
sized horsepox from scratch. They state that “horsepox is not a significant disease 
for humans, but there is concern that publication of these experiments could lower 
barriers toward the synthesis and booting up of another orthopoxvirus, variola 
(smallpox) virus, which was a significant scourge in history.”
Bioweapons were the second most frequently mentioned threat, appearing in 28% 
of the articles analyzed. Franconi et al. (2018) define bioweapons as “deadly patho-
gens – bacteria or viruses – or toxins that can be deliberately released in order to 
cause harm to people or animals and plants.” Generally, when a bioweapon is used 
by a state sponsored entity it is considered an act of biowarfare, while the use of a 
bioweapon by a non- state sponsored entity or individual is considered an act of 
bioterrorism (Jamil 2015), the latter of which was mentioned in 17% of articles. 
Unaltered organisms can and have been used as bioweapons in the past, such as in 
the 2001 anthrax attacks. Biotechnology opens the door to creating enhanced or 
novel pathogens and new avenues for toxin production. Cross (2018) identifies three 
ways in which biotechnology can be used to create bioweapons: (1) “recreating 
pathogenic viruses such as Ebola, SARS, or smallpox,” (2) “engineering bacteria to 
make them more dangerous, which could be easily accomplished by inserting genes 
to confer antibiotic resistance,” and (3) “engineering microbes to produce and 
release toxic biochemicals.” Researchers have already demonstrated capabilities in 
all three of these avenues. Horsepox, a close relative of smallpox, has been synthe-
sized from mail- ordered DNA (Noyce et al. 2018), avian influenza has been engi-
neered to allow for airborne transmission between mammals (Linster et al. 2014), 
and botulinum toxin has been produced using yeast cells (Fonfria et al. 2018). These 
three cases are also prime examples of dual use research, as they were carried out 
for beneficial purposes (vaccine development, study of transmission, and enhanced 
therapeutics, respectively) but also provide a clear avenue towards weaponization.
Bioweapons and bioterrorism are mainly concerned with the deliberate release 
of an engineered pathogen or toxin with the purpose of causing harm, but the litera-
ture also identified accidental releases of modified organisms as a threat. Accidental 
releases are often cited as a concern for biosafety and not biosecurity. Pastorino 
et al. (2017) delineates the two terms in a laboratory setting as follows:
“Laboratory biosafety” is the term used to describe the containment principles, technolo-
gies, and practices that are implemented to prevent unintentional exposure to pathogens and 
toxins or their accidental release. “Laboratory biosecurity” refers to institutional and per-
sonal security measures designed to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion, or intentional 
release of pathogens and toxins.”
Legitimate research on the most dangerous pathogens are often restricted to labora-
tories with a high Biosafety Level (BSL) designation – as regulated/monitored by a 
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country’s federal disease agency and the World Health Organization. These labora-
tories have the necessary precautions to drastically reduce the risk of inadvertently 
releasing wild type or engineered pathogens (Imperiale et  al. 2018). Accidental 
releases are a higher threat if work is being done in laboratories without proper 
safety measures, such is in the growing biotechnology Do- It- Yourself (DIY) com-
munity. The risk of unintentional releases also increases as engineered organisms 
are taken outside of the laboratory setting, such as in the case of bacteria engineered 
for soil bioremediation or algae engineered for biofuel production and grown in 
outdoor open- air tanks (Mandel and Marchant 2014). In both of these cases, the 
engineered organisms have the potential to escape outside of the intended soil or 
water and have unknown consequences for the receiving environment.
Regardless of how an engineered organism or virus makes it out into the open, 
the potential ecological and societal impacts were frequently identified as concerns. 
Interestingly, concerns over ecological impacts appeared in 22% of articles, almost 
twice as many articles as societal impacts which appeared in 12% of articles. While 
bioweapons could be created to directly attack some critical component the environ-
ment, the concern over ecological impacts is largely driven by the increased inter-
est in using engineered organisms for controlling nuisance species and recent 
advancements in gene drive technology. Weidmann (2018) defines gene drives as 
the “experimental techniques which are supposed to push foreign genes into the 
chromosomes of wild populations with the aim to change the complete organisms 
in just a few generations.” Popular examples of the potentially beneficial application 
of gene drives include reducing populations of mosquitos responsible for spreading 
dengue fever and malaria (Finkel et al. 2019; Weidmann 2018) and exterminating 
introduced rodents that predate on endangered reptiles and birds from islands 
(Weidmann 2018). However, since biological organisms and viruses are capable of 
reproducing, mutating, and sharing genes, there is little way to guarantee that the 
intended modification will be contained in the target population only and little way 
to anticipate the cascading environmental consequences of manipulating popula-
tions of species in such a way. This is at the heart of the threat advanced biotechnol-
ogy poses to ecological systems and is discussed in multiple papers. Weidmann 
considers gene drives “ethically questionable because we still do not know if the 
genetic changes could affect other organisms or even entire ecosystems in a nega-
tive way.” Wintle et al. (2017) raises the similar concern that “deploying gene drives 
in wild populations might alter ecosystems, disrupting trophic levels and food webs, 
and creating vacant niches (for example, for new disease vector species or new dis-
ease organisms).” Webber et al. (2015) conclude that “removing species with gene 
drive technology could produce unintended cascades that may represent a greater 
net threat than that of the target species.” Overall, concerns of the negative and irre-
versible impact that one genetically engineered species could have on the entire 
ecosystem was evident in the literature.
These quotes, and the inherent ability of biological systems to mutate and evolve, 
also demonstrate the threat of the uncertain consequences of utilizing and deploy-
ing advanced biotechnology, which was expressed in 5% of articles. Ecological 
systems are filled with complex, intricate, and unknown interactions (from the 
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global to the intracellular level) and advanced biotechnology is still a young and 
rapidly developing field with only a few examples of field trials with engineered 
organisms (Seager et al. 2017). When these two complex components are consid-
ered in tandem, it is not surprising to see in the literature that some experts are 
concerned that consequences cannot be reliably foreseen and avoided.
Threats to human health are abundant in the conversation of bioweapons and 
bioterrorism, in which enhanced pathogens that could cause mass human casualty 
are a primary fear. However, societal impacts as identified in this chapter are less 
concerned with human health and more concerned with human or environmental 
modification and how these alterations would impact society. Caballero- Hernandez 
et al. (2017) suggest that gene drives used to control nuisance species could impact 
a nation’s food security and national sovereignty, though they do not elaborate on 
how. Esvelt and Gemmell (2017) also mention the problem of national sovereignty 
and gene drives, in that one nation risks infringing on the national sovereignty and 
harming diplomatic relations with another nation if they release an engineered strain 
of a species that is found in both nations without the other nation’s consent since the 
engineered strain will cross national borders. Concerning human modification, 
genome editing has been proposed as a way to remove undesirable traits from a 
human population, increase the average cognitive ability of a nation, and enhance 
combat soldiers by decreasing the need for sleep and food (Esvelt and Millett 2017), 
all of which have serious equality, security, and societal implications. Gomez- Tatay 
et al. (2016) propose that synthetic biology could be used to “improve humans and 
to develop what it has been called sub- humans, a kind of humanoid organism which 
would serve several purposes, such as being sources of transplantable tissues and 
organs, experimental subjects or crash test dummies and landmine diffusers.” While 
this vision of sub- humans shows potential in improving life and safety for modern 
humans, it also has clearly negative ethical and societal implications. Considering 
human modification, the field of biotechnology would need to make leaps and 
bounds forward in order for these threats to be realized, but nonetheless they are 
important to consider and address as biotechnology progresses and advanced engi-
neering of humans becomes more possible.
The lowering of barriers to entry into the biosecurity field and the DIY bio-
technology community were identified as threats in 7% and 4% of articles, respec-
tively. The lowering of barriers is largely caused by the increased globalization and 
democratization of the field in the past decade that has greatly increased the acces-
sibility of the field to a wider number and diversity of people. While this has driven 
innovation and resulted in many beneficial applications, it has also reduced the bar-
riers that would have previously kept nefarious individuals – whether working alone 
or for an organized state, sub- state, or non- state group – from using biotechnology 
towards their own harmful ends. It has also allowed individuals in the DIY com-
munity to construct quasi- laboratories in their own homes and carry out their own 
experiments devoid of regulations or safety precautions. DiEuliis and Giordano 
(2018) highlight these threats in relation to gene editing by stating that “the relative 
availability of [gene editing techniques] enables increasing use by public research 
and do- it- yourself (i.e., biohacking) communities which could foster risk incurred 
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by both inadvertent misuse and/or intentional development of products that threaten 
public safety.” Jefferson et al. (2014) share this sentiment, but extend it beyond the 
DIY community by expressing fears that “the ‘de- skilling’ of biology, combined 
with online access to the genomic DNA sequences of pathogenic organisms and the 
reduction in price for DNA synthesis, will make biology increasingly accessible to 
people operating outside well- equipped professional research laboratories, includ-
ing people with malevolent intentions.” The ease with which people are able to 
access information, equipment, materials, and learn techniques is therefore a grow-
ing biosecurity threat.
The final two biosecurity threats identified in the literature were the difficulty of 
monitoring and potential theft of pathogens or equipment, which both appeared 
in 3% of articles. A number of concerns fall under the category of difficult to moni-
tor. These include the difficulty of determining which organisms/viruses and genetic 
modifications could be used maliciously and monitoring for them (DiEuliis and 
Giordano 2017), of monitoring the spread of an engineered trait beyond where it 
was intentionally deployed for species control (Webber et al. 2015), and of differen-
tiating a natural outbreak from a biological attack (MacIntyre et al. 2018; Nelson 
et al. 2014). Regarding theft, MacIntyre et al. (2018) and Walsh (2016) both see the 
ability for radicalized research staff to steal pathogens from the laboratories they 
have access to as a biosecurity threat. Berger and Schneck (2019) and Kozminski 
(2015) are additionally concerned over the threat of malicious actors stealing sensi-
tive data that is stored digitally. Kozminski (2015) cautions that “in the area of Big 
Data with specific applications to the life sciences, information taken could 
 potentially be used for exploitation or extortion.” This “Big Data” includes the ever-
growing databases devoted to people’s genetic information collected for forensic, 
genealogical, or research purposes.
2.3.3  Responses Identified in the Literature
The thirteen biosecurity responses identified in the literature are summarized in 
Table 2.3. On average, each article mentioned three threats (min = 0, max = 8). Each 
response, as informed by the literature, is further described and discussed below.
Legal Oversight or Regulations at the national level were the most frequently 
mentioned biosecurity response, appearing in just under half of the articles ana-
lyzed. However, the form and extent of that regulation varied. The US Government 
Policy for the Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern places 
restrictions on certain types of experiments on certain infectious agents and toxins 
(Lev and Samimian- Darash 2014). De Beer and Jain (2018) suggest that regulations 
need to remain loose enough to allow for innovation and that outreach and monitor-
ing can supplement such loosening in oversight. Some articles call for regulations 
throughout the research and development process (Gomez- Tatay and Hernandez-
Andreu 2019), carefully scrutinizing the primary investigator, purpose, location, 
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and process, while others advocate that mainly the end product should be subject to 
regulation (Gronvall 2015). Regulations dictating who can purchase what genetic 
material and equipment, which laboratories are approved to conduct dual use syn-
thetic biology research, and what knowledge is appropriate to disseminate in jour-
nals were also suggested in multiple articles (Gomez- Tatay and Hernandez- Andreu 
2019; Pope 2017; Adam et  al. 2017; Diggans and Leproust 2019; Marris et  al. 
2014). These regulations also fall into augmentation of access, which appeared in 
14% of articles and could be considered a sub- category of legal oversight. The aug-
mentation of access includes any measures that reduce a person’s ability to access 
equipment, materials, facilities, or knowledge required to partake in synthetic biol-
ogy, thereby reducing the risk of unauthorized personnel engaging in intentionally 
or unintentionally harmful research.
International Agreements, Guidelines, or Regulations were also suggested, 
though at 19% of papers this response appeared less than half as often as national 
regulations did. The driving thought behind some form of international governance, 
in addition to the national regulations discussed above, is that any accident or attack 
with an engineered organism is likely to have far- reaching consequences for an 
entire ecoregion, continent, or the world. It is therefore in the best interest of human-
ity for all nations to come together and agree on best practices as they relate to 
advanced biotechnology. The BWC, as discussed in the introduction, is a founda-
tional international agreement in which nations agree not to create or stockpile bio-
weapons. Bioweapons can be easily and objectively viewed as “bad,” making 
regulations against them relatively simple, but much of modern advanced biotech-
nology exists in a more complicated grey zone owing to its dual use potential and 
newness as a field (Greer and Trump 2019). Experts have called for new interna-
tional agreements as the field of biotechnology has diversified and its related threats 
have expanded past just biological weapons. A prime example is the risk posed by 
releasing gene drives into the environment. Redford et al. (2014) emphasize that this 
poses a relatively new threat and that “international regulation of the development 
and release of modified organisms needs considerable work,” and will require 
“wider competence on the part of diplomats and lawyers in understanding both 
synthetic biology and ecology.” Other experts suggest that regulations on advanced 
biotechnology could be applied under existing international treaties and agree-
ments, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, Nagoya Protocol, United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (non- proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction), and the BWC (Gronvall 2015; Stewart 2018; Ahteensuu 2017). Citing 
new rules or guidelines under existing agreements that nations have already agreed 
to is viewed as a more stream- lined method than creating entirely new treaties and 
agreements.
The third most frequently mentioned response is risk assessment or manage-
ment, which appeared in 34% of the articles we analyzed. The most frequently 
mentioned risk assessment method was the risk- benefit analysis, in which “the risks 
of potential misuse (accidental or intentional) are weighed against the assumed 
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potential benefits of scientific innovation,” (Jacobsen et al. 2014). This analysis and 
other risk assessment methodology can be used to determine if a proposed study 
should occur. If the benefits outweigh the risks and the study is given the okay, then 
risk management can be used to identify “how to do it safely and mitigate risks,” 
(Imperiale and Casadevall 2018). Risk management options proposed in the litera-
ture include laboratory biosafety (Pastorino et  al. 2017), containment strategies 
(Duprex et  al. 2014), publication restrictions (Rychnovska 2016), and more. 
Multiple authors called for risk assessment and subsequent plans for risk mitigation 
be conducted during the project planning/grant application phase. Oeschger and 
Jenal (2018) argue that successful risk assessment and management requires the 
input of “the life science research community itself as proper risk evaluation and 
management depends on expert knowledge.” Suk et al. (2014) add that risk assess-
ment “needs to integrate the best available information from a variety of sectors, 
meaning that life scientists, regulators, ethicists, public health actors, and the secu-
rity and intelligence communities will need to become more adept at and comfort-
able with exchanging information and ideas.” In this quote, Suk et al. (2014) also 
demonstrate the benefit of collaboration between experts from diverse fields in 
reducing biosecurity threats. The usefulness of collaboration as a response was 
identified in 23% of articles, and was suggested as a way to improve the identifica-
tion of an outbreak (MacIntyre 2015), policy design and implementation (Edwards 
2014), laboratory biosafety (Trevan 2015), public outreach (Redford et al. 2014), 
and biological data security (Berger and Schneck 2019), in addition to risk 
assessment.
Three out of the five most frequently mentioned responses had less to do with 
government oversight and more to do with social aspects: communication and 
open discussion between scientists, government, industry, and the public (37%); a 
strong sense of ethics and self- regulation amongst scientists (28%); and proper 
training of scientists and awareness of biosecurity concerns (27%). These three 
social responses are also complimentary to one another. Oeschger and Jenal (2018) 
state that “a code of conduct intends to promote ethical principles and correspond-
ing behavioral norms that often go beyond legal requirements.” By adopting a code 
of conduct, scientists “raise awareness of and foster responsibility for dual use 
aspects of life science research within the scientific community,” (Oeschger and 
Jenal 2018) Fear and ter Meulen (2016) further define self- regulation as a system in 
which “there are checks and balances within the scientific community, not [one in 
which] each researcher is free to decide unilaterally which procedure to follow.” 
Self- regulation not only requires open communication between scientists, but also 
for scientists to have a line of communication with the public, government regula-
tors, and other stakeholders in order to be aware of the concerns surrounding bio-
technology, see how their intended research relates to those concerns, and take 
appropriate actions to respond. Scientists should also communicate with the public 
to relieve unwarranted concerns held by the public and allow scientific research to 
continue. Baskin (2019) emphasizes that “intentional, careful, and reassuring com-
munications from the scientific community to the public benefit both science and 
the public.” Baskin (2019) stresses that while self- regulation is ideal, scientists 
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should also receive training in the law- making process and how to engage with it so 
that the scientific community can “become involved throughout the rule- making 
process to prevent excessive restrictions that are potentially counter- productive to 
national biosecurity” when legal instruments are unavoidable. According to the lit-
erature, training, communication, and self- governance have great potential for 
addressing biosecurity threats (Engel- Glatter and Ienca 2018; Oeschger and Jenal 
2018; Baskin 2019; Gomez- Tatay et al. 2016).
The use of biosafety principles to reduce biosecurity threats, particularly acci-
dental releases of engineered organisms, was identified in 22% of articles. 
Biosafety principles include the design of laboratories with precautions appropri-
ate to the risk- level of pathogens being studied (BSL designations, as mentioned 
above), “train[ing] people that work there, the implementation of regulations, and 
the use of robust risk- based approaches to mitigate adverse events,” (Vogel et al. 
2015). Fear and ter Meulen (2016) emphasize that “attention to key biosafety 
issues is imperative at all stages of the research endeavor from first formulating a 
research idea through to the publication of results.” By identifying and following 
appropriate biosafety precautions, studies with advanced biotechnology can be 
conducted with the confidence that accidental releases will not occur, that the gen-
eral public and local environment will not be affected, and that workers are prop-
erly protected while performing their duties. Certain biosafety principles, such as 
the requirements to meet different BSL classifications, are regulated by state or 
federal agencies, but additional requirements could be established by individual 
institutions.
Many of the responses we identified looked to reduce the risk of a biosecurity 
threat before it could occur, but it is also important to have the capacity to recognize 
and respond to threats once they are present. Building a nation’s capacity to 
respond to a biosecurity threat, also referred to as “preparedness strategies,” before 
the threat is present and actively engaging in surveillance of present or imminent 
biosecurity threats were identified in 10% and 14% of articles, respectively. Nelson 
et  al. (2014) summarizes the impact that both of these responses can have: 
“Surveillance strategies enable early detection, which is vital for rapid and effective 
emergency responses whilst preparedness strategies are essential for maintaining a 
nation’s capacity to carry out effective response and recovery processes.” They go 
on to report three types of surveillance that Australia uses to identify unusual dis-
ease patterns that could indicate an outbreak: “passive surveillance, involving rou-
tine reporting of certain disease cases; active surveillance, involving the specific 
collection of data relating to a particular disease; and sentinel surveillance, where 
data are collected from a subpopulation to provide an indication of trends in the 
wider population,” (Nelson et al. 2014). Surveillance of DNA sequence orders made 
to DNA synthesis companies to identify and terminate potentially malicious orders 
has been practiced and suggested for wider adoption, as has monitoring social 
media and the dark web for signs that a biological attack is being planned or has 
occurred (MacIntyre et  al. 2018). Improved response capacity includes a variety 
of measures aimed at quickly recovering from a biological attack, thereby reducing 
the amount of damage that can be done. According to Nelson et  al. (2014), 
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“preparedness strategies incorporate aspects including: planning; personnel train-
ing; monitoring and reviewing policies and programs; maintaining supply stocks; 
and carrying out ongoing research into improved methods for disease diagnosis, 
treatment or prevention.” Preparedness strategies proposed in the literature include 
the stockpiling of vaccines and personal protective equipment (Adam et al. 2017), 
restructuring public health organizations and training medical personnel to react to 
a biological attack (de Almeida 2015), and creating novel platforms for rapid dis-
ease diagnostics and vaccine production (Franconi et al. 2018).
One response mentioned mostly in articles concerned with the threat of gene 
drives and their potential ecological impact was the creation and use of contain-
ment and reversal strategies, which we identified in 5% of articles. These strate-
gies have been referred to as “risk- reducing innovation” and “built- in safety,” and 
include creating strains of a modified organism that cannot survive outside of the 
laboratory or can only live on specific substrates to eliminate the threat of accidental 
release (van de Poel and Robaey 2017), modifying existing genes in a way that 
allows for the ancestral sequence to be easily restored (i.e. genetic restoration) (Looi 
et  al. 2018), adding susceptibilities to specific treatments or chemicals (i.e., kill 
switches) that would allow the engineered population to be easily controlled (Wintle 
et al. 2017), and only building and testing gene drives in geographic areas where the 
target species is not naturally present (Esvelt et al. 2014). These strategies work to 
reduce the threat of accidental releases, ecological impacts, and uncertain conse-
quences right at the beginning of the study by building in a way to restore the engi-
neered organism back to its natural state or eliminate it completely.
The final and least frequently mentioned response was funding, which appeared 
in 5% of articles. These articles called for the funding of specific threads of research 
or institutions that would help to enhance biosecurity. Evans (2014) stated that large 
“funding bodies have a key role to play reshaping our understanding of what it 
means to engage in biosecurity governance,” and believes that studies looking 
directly at the social aspects of emerging biotechnology should be funded in their 
own right and not just as add- ons to other research as has been done previously. He 
believes that these sorts of studies will allow governance to progress alongside the 
biotechnology field instead of playing catch- up, but have lacked funding to date. 
Other calls for funding to increase biosecurity include ensuring that laboratories are 
financially able to implement proper biosafety precautions (Trevan 2015), offsetting 
costs for DNA synthesis companies to screen for orders related to pathogens 
(DiEuliis et al. 2017), and funding biotechnology companies to increase innovation 
within the nation and decrease the likelihood of these companies moving oversees 
(Gronvall 2015).
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2.4  Conclusion
Biosecurity threats and responses have garnered significant attention and these 
issues warrant continued investigation and prioritization in order to maximize the 
benefits and reduce the likelihood of misuse that could cause significant harm to 
human and environmental health. This review pulls disparate literature together to 
provide description of the field in sum to date. We envision scholars and decision-
makers to use this work to forward new research agendas to better allocate resources 
toward underdeveloped, yet valuable areas with prescient needs.
By conducting a systematic literature review, we were able to determine which 
biosecurity threats and responses are most prevalent across this broad field. Dual 
use research was far and away the most frequently mentioned threat, appearing 29 
more times than the second most frequent threat biological weapons. Both of these 
threats were also prominently evident in the US and EU frameworks developed to 
address biosecurity concerns evolving out of the use of advanced biotechnology. 
The US framework also identified information access and lower barriers as biosecu-
rity threats, while the EU framework mentioned the threat of theft by staff (“insider 
threat”) (Trump et al. 2020c). Overall, the US and EU frameworks were concerned 
with preventing and responding to attacks with biological weapons. While this was 
a key threat identified in the literature, many of the other threats discussed were 
more concerned with the potential for negative consequences of authorized releases 
of engineered organisms into the environment. This accounts for the third most 
frequently mentioned threat in the literature, ecological impact, which was absent 
from the governmental frameworks.
Legal oversight was the top response identified in the literature and was also 
presented as a biosecurity response in both the US and EU frameworks. These 
frameworks also included other government- driven responses identified in the lit-
erature, including surveillance, augmentation of access, improved response capac-
ity, and risk assessment. The EU framework additionally suggested international 
governance, collaboration, and training/awareness as responses, but these were 
referring to collaboration and training of governmental agencies (Trump 2017). The 
top responses identified in the literature that applied more to industry, academia, and 
the public (open discussions, self- governance and ethics, and education/training/
awareness) were noticeably missing from the two governmental frameworks 
included in this chapter.
This empirical foundation of the prominent areas of concern for biotechnology-
related research and discourse may be used to help formulate needs- based consider-
ations for future research. Concise understanding and acknowledgement of the 
spectrum of concerns related to the proliferation of biotechnological tools can 
inform regulators and decision- makers who must hold command over contempo-
rary concerns and this work should be used to enable better informed decisions 
about priority tasks to corral biosecurity threat and foster adaptive responses. As 
this area continues to gain prominence within communities concerned with biotech-
nological risk, we anticipate the topics covered here to grow in coverage at an 
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increasing rate and we anticipate the entrance of yet determined considerations for 
novel threats and responses. Thus, in due time, we feel a replication of this method 
and results is warranted to isolate threat and response developments post- 2020.
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Chapter 3
Opportunities, Challenges, and Future 
Considerations for Top-Down Governance 
for Biosecurity and Synthetic Biology
R. Alexander Hamilton, Ruth Mampuys, S. E. Galaitsi, Aengus Collins, 
Ivan Istomin, Marko Ahteensuu, and Lela Bakanidze
3.1  Introduction
Synthetic biology promises to make biology easier to engineer (Endy 2005), 
enabling more people in less formal research settings to participate in modern biol-
ogy. Leveraging advances in DNA sequencing and synthesis technologies, genetic 
assembly methods based on standard biological parts (e.g. BioBricks), and increas-
ingly precise gene-editing tools (e.g. CRISPR), synthetic biology is helping increase 
the reliability of and accessibility to genetic engineering. Although potentially 
enabling tremendous opportunities for the advancement of the global bioeconomy, 
opening new avenues for the creation of health, wealth and environmental sustain-
ability, the possibility of a more ‘democratic’ (widely accessible) bioengineering 
capability could equally yield new opportunities for accidental, unintended or delib-
erate misuse. Consequently, synthetic biology represents a quintessential ‘dual-use’ 
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biotechnology – a technology with the capacity to enable significant benefits and 
risks (NRC 2004).
In relation to existing top-down governance1 measures for biosecurity,2 synthetic 
biology represents a promising yet potentially destabilizing advancement in the life 
sciences, one that could introduce new risks and regulatory challenges. In particular, 
a number of high-profile synthetic biology experiments, ranging from the de novo 
synthesis of poliovirus (Cello et al. 2002) to the recent synthesis of horsepox virus 
(Noyce et al. 2018), have raised concerns that the same techniques could be exploited 
to bypass regulatory controls (e.g. the United States, US, Select Agent Regulations) 
on lists of high-risk pathogens. Moreover, the possibility of synthesizing novel ‘tax-
onomically unclassified’ pathogens (NSABB 2006; Garfinkel et al. 2007) has led 
some to question the logic and utility of current ‘list-based’ approaches to regula-
tion. Looking to the future, if synthetic biology does, in fact, ‘deskill’ the ‘art’ of 
biological engineering, new regulatory approaches could very well be essen-
tial because the tools of modern biology will be widely accessible to both respon-
sible and malicious actors.
Claims about synthetic biology’s potential, like other emerging technologies, 
nonetheless tend to overstate its ‘enabling’ capacity. Likewise, the ease of produc-
ing biological weapons tends to be overstated. As a number of commentators note, 
biology is not yet easy to engineer (Jefferson et al. 2014) and, for the foreseeable 
future, the skills necessary to produce biological weapons are likely to remain only 
within the grasp of states (Piers Millet in Regalado 2016). However, the field’s 
emphasis on eliminating technical barriers and reducing the importance of tacit 
knowledge (Oye 2012) represents a powerful source of expectation for advocates 
and critics alike. For advocates, it represents the possible realization of modern biol-
ogy’s full potential, one that could yield revolutionary advances in health, medicine, 
and industry in the twenty-first century. For critics, it represents a seemingly open- 
ended risk that requires exceptional precaution. For national governments, and 
international conventions responsible for establishing global biosecurity norms and 
obligations that are operationalized at the national level  through legislation and 
other regulatory tools (McLeish and Nightingale 2007), a central question is how (if 
at all) does  top-down biosecurity governance need to change in response to syn-
thetic biology?
Regulatory considerations of this kind are both familiar and new (Hamilton 
2015). In the 1970s, recombinant DNA technology similarly emerged as a source of 
significant and contrasting expectations, and questions were posed about the 
1 In this chapter, ‘top-down governance’ is taken to mean laws, regulations, policies, guidelines and 
other government-led regulatory measures aimed at prohibiting undesirable behavior or encourag-
ing desirable behavior on the part of countries, organizations or individuals engaged in aspects of 
the life sciences (research activities involving the use of biological materials, knowledge and/or 
technologies).
2 In this chapter, ‘biosecurity’ is taken to mean measures aimed at preventing the deliberate misuse 
of the life sciences by non-state actors. In contrast, ‘biosafety’ is taken to mean measures aimed at 
preventing the accidental or unintended misuse of the life sciences.
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suitability of existing regulatory approaches in light of potentially novel risks. 
However, in the case of recombinant DNA technology, biosafety concerns – nota-
bly, concens about the possible unintended consequences of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs)  – were the primary focus of scientific deliberations at the 
Asilomar Conference and subsequent policy discussions. In the case of synthetic 
biology, a field that has emerged at a time of heightened concerns about (bio)terror-
ism, the possibility that synthetic biology could enable non-state actors to acquire 
(novel) biological agents that could be used as weapons has been an omnipresent 
source of concern. In 2009, synthetic biology came to the attention of the US Federal 
Bureau of Investigation  (FBI) and in 2016 gene editing was listed as a potential 
weapon of mass destruction (WMD) by the US Intelligence Community (Ledford 
2010; Clapper 2016).
To more fully understand the top-down governance  challenges introduced 
by synthetic biology it is necessary to consider how synthetic biology’s novelties 
could disrupt or potentially undermine existing biosecurity regulations. In this chap-
ter, we attempt to advance this discussion in several ways. First, we consider the 
scope and content of existing biosecurity regulations at the international and national 
levels. Second, we discuss several aspects of synthetic biology that present distinct 
regulatory challenges. Finally, we conclude with recommendations for strengthen-
ing current approaches to top-down biosecurity governance.
Taken together, we argue that although synthetic biology appears to be broadly 
(if indirectly) covered by existing international and national regulatory systems, 
several novelties underline the limitations of top-down governance approaches pre-
mised upon prohibiting access to specific ‘intrinsically dangerous’ scientific arti-
facts (McLeish and Nightingale 2007). Indeed, by some accounts, such restrictions 
may not only be ineffective, but may also make the world less safe. In an era of 
synthetic biology – characterized by technology convergence, increased access to 
bioengineering capabilities, and rapid growth in intangible life science knowl-
edge – top-down governance must be increasingly adaptive, and hybrid forms of 
governance (incorporating a ‘mix’ of top-down and bottom-up approaches that 
leverage the self-governance potential of non-governmental actors) should be 
encouraged.
3.2  Understanding the Scope and Limitations of Top-Down 
Governance for Biosecurity and Synthetic Biology
To understand how synthetic biology could challenge or undermine existing 
approaches to biosecurity oversight and regulation, it is necessary to first consider 
the international legal instruments relevant to biosecurity, and how these instru-
ments are implemented at the national level (Trump et  al. 2020). Based on this 
analysis, it is apparent that there is no single international legal instrument and no 
‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to national implementation. Rather, the regulatory space 
3 Opportunities, Challenges, and Future Considerations for Top-Down Governance…
40
governing biosecurity and synthetic biology can most accurately be described as a 
‘patchwork’ of regulatory measures that tend to address biosecurity and synthetic 
biology indirectly. As scholars have previously observed, the regulatory space gov-
erning biosecurity comprises a “collection of cooperative and coercive national and 
international control measures – including international agreements, multinational 
organisations, national and international laws, regulations, policies, norms and 
rules  – intended to prevent the spread of dangerous weapons and technologies” 
(McLeish and Nightingale 2007, p. 1638).
3.2.1  International Instruments for Biosecurity
3.2.1.1  Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
International legal instruments establish global norms and obligations that are 
implemented by countries according to their unique risk and regulatory cultures. In 
relation to biosecurity, no single instrument is more important or directly relevant 
than the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, commonly known as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The 
BWC, which opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 
March 1975, is the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning the development, 
production and stockpiling of an entire category of WMD.3 Under Article I of the 
Convention, member states agree that they must not “develop, produce, stockpile or 
otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins what-
ever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no 
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, 
equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile 
purposes or in armed conflict.”
Although tracing its origins to the Cold War, therefore focused on the activities 
of states and the possibility of biological warfare, the BWC remains relevant and 
has proven remarkably adaptive in the face of emerging concerns about non-state 
actors and advances in science and technology (S&T), including synthetic biology. 
In relation to non-state actors, the BWC requires, as defined under Article IV, States 
Parties to take any necessary measures “to prohibit and prevent the development, 
production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, 
equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the 
territory of such state, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.” In other 
words, States Parties have a responsibility to enforce the Convention irrespective of 
who (state or non-state) is acting in contravention to the universal ban on biological 
weapons.
3 See: https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/
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In relation to advances in S&T, the BWC is widely recognized as embodying a 
‘General Purpose Criterion’, whereby the hostile use of biology – irrespective of the 
specific agents, knowledge or technologies involved  – is universally prohibited. 
This means that new discoveries enabled by advances in S&T, including possible 
future ‘novel’ agents produced using synthetic biology techniques or technologies, 
are covered (Hart and Trapp 2012). In other words, the BWC is effectively ‘future 
proofed’ – it “cannot be innovated around, and it embodies the norm in a timeless 
form” (McLeish and Nightingale 2007, p. 1638).
With a view to advances in synthetic biology, States Parties to the BWC recog-
nize that the field, among other areas of S&T, is rapidly evolving and could poten-
tially introduce novel risks over time (Hart and Trapp 2012). It is equally recognized 
that developments in S&T could offer new opportunities for countering bioterror-
ism, and detecting and responding to attacks should they occur (ibid.). To keep pace 
with advances in S&T and their implications for the BWC, there is general support 
among States Parties for increased scientific and technical review within the BWC 
process (ibid.). Notably, proposals have been made for establishing a scientific advi-
sory body that could play a critical role in assessing the impact of advances in S&T 
on the BWC regime, as well as building consensus among States Parties based on a 
systematic review of developments in the life sciences relevant to the Convention 
(ibid.).
While the BWC establishes a global norm against the hostile use of biology, it is 
nonetheless confronted by a number of challenges and limitations. Notably, despite 
having 183 States Parties, four Signatory States have yet to ratify the Convention, 
and ten states have neither signed nor ratified it. There is therefore a need to con-
tinue to strive for universality to ensure that the BWC is universally ascribed to and 
ultimately implemented and enforced at the national level. Moreover, the BWC 
lacks a verification mechanism to monitor compliance with the Convention. In the 
absence of such a mechanism, confidence-building measures (CBMs) – voluntary 
annual reports describing a member state’s activities relevant to the Convention – 
are intended to build trust and transparency. However, annual CBM submissions 
remain low, the quality of submissions is inconsistent, and States Parties are not 
obliged to explicitly report on S&T developments (Lentzos and Hamilton 2010). 
Finally, the BWC is limited by resource constraints and currently depends upon a 
three-person team – the BWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU) – to facilitate 
meetings and support daily administrative operations (Hart and Trapp 2012).
3.2.1.2  Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
Complementing the BWC, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, 
commonly known as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), prohibits the 
development, acquisition, possession, transfer and use of toxic chemicals and their 
precursors for weapons purposes. Unlike the BWC, the CWC, which opened for 
signature in 1993 and entered into force four years later, is administered by an 
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autonomous international organization, the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which performs a variety of administrative, legal and 
field functions, including verification to ensure compliance.
Because the BWC and CWC both cover toxins, there exists an overlap between the 
two conventions and the possibility of mutually reinforcing legal coverage (Hart 
and Trapp 2012). However, because toxins can be interpreted as biological or chem-
ical weapons, situations could arise where states decline to take specific measures to 
prevent the misuse of toxins under either agreement (ibid.). Advances in synthetic 
biology – an interdisciplinary field encompassing biology, chemistry, engineering 
and computing – are likely to make distinctions between chemical and biological 
weapons  even  more complex. In this environment, there is a need for inter- 
convention dialogue to better understand the risks, as well as the jurisdictions and 
responsibilities of all relevant international conventions and legal instruments.
3.2.1.3  Australia Group, United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1540 and Others
Other important international instruments relevant to biosecurity include the 
Australia Group (AG) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 
(UNSCR 1540). In the case of the AG, established in 1985 in response to evidence 
that Iraq had sourced precursor chemicals and materials for its chemical warfare 
program through legitimate channels,4 member states have harmonized export con-
trols covering materials and technologies likely to contribute to the development of 
chemical or biological weapons. Biological agents and dual-use biotechnology 
were specifically added to the AG guidelines in 1992 (Oye 2012). In 2008, in light 
of advances in synthetic biology, the AG established a dedicated advisory body to 
keep pace with developments in the field and to suggest responses to synthetic biol-
ogy innovations (ibid.). A key challenge faced by the AG is the growing relevance 
of intangible technology transfers, which not only make-up an increasingly signifi-
cant component of legitimate life science research, but also present distinct chal-
lenges to regulatory control. Unlike physical pathogens and dual-use equipment, 
intangible  life science transfers cannot be easily monitored and  prevented from 
crossing borders. In the case of synthetic biology, a field characterized as much by 
digital and informational  resources (e.g. DNA sequence information) as physical 
ones (e.g. DNA sequencers), the regulatory challenges posed by intangible technol-
ogy transfers are especially acute.
Established in 2004, UNSCR 1540 “obliges States, inter alia, to refrain from 
supporting by any means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufactur-
ing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological 
4 See ‘the origins of the Australia Group’. The Australia Group website. URL [https://www.dfat.
gov.au/publications/minisite/theaustraliagroupnet/site/en/origins.html] (accessed 25 March 2021)
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weapons and their means of delivery.”5 Under this resolution, member states have 
specifically agreed to enact relevant legislation and to demonstrate national imple-
mentation through national reporting. In addition to directly contributing to global 
efforts to combat WMD, UNSCR 1540 is significant due to its explicit focus on 
non-state actors. This focus, as others have observed, “marks a new development in 
biosecurity policy, which historically has been state-centric” (McLeish and 
Nightingale 2007, p. 1640). This development not only reflects growing concerns 
about bioterrorism, but also the belief that advances in S&T have contributed to 
lowering technical barriers and enhancing the capabilities of non-state actors (ibid.).
In addition to the international instruments discussed above, further international 
regulations and conventions, including the World Health Organization (WHO) 
International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), cover aspects of biosecurity and synthetic biology. In the case of 
the IHR, the scope of the regulations cover natural, accidental and deliberate disease 
events, thus capturing biosafety and biosecurity. The WHO, which directs and coor-
dinates international health within the UN system, also monitors and offers guid-
ance on life science research recognized as dual-use research of concern (DURC), 
including notable experiments involving synthetic biology. In 2012, in response to 
two such experiments (one led by a team in the Netherlands, the other by a team in 
the US) that resulted in laboratory-modified H5N1 viruses capable of airborne 
transmission between mammals (‘gain-of-function’ experiments), the WHO con-
vened a technical advisory group that considered the biosafety and biosecurity 
implications of the research, including concerns about the public dissemination of 
the findings (WHO 2012). In 2015, the WHO convened another scientific working 
group to address the public health implications of synthetic biology as it relates to 
smallpox preparedness and control (WHO 2015). The working group concluded 
that, in light of advances in synthetic biology, including de novo DNA synthesis, the 
risk of smallpox re-emerging can never be fully eradicated. Among the working 
group’s recommendations was the need for revised regulations for research on DNA 
fragments and the synthesis of virus DNA by new technological approaches.
In the case of the CBD, many considerations that apply to GMOs remain relevant 
in the case of synthetic biology. Since 2010, the CBD has considered whether syn-
thetic biology should be classified as a new field presenting novel risks and whether 
new regulations are needed in view of the protection of biodiversity and genetic 
resources (Lai et al. 2019). Although these deliberations have been oriented to bio-
safety, the protection of biodiversity and the management of digital sequence infor-
mation are also relevant for biosecurity.
Taken together, these international conventions and agreements create overlap-
ping governance structures that cover biosecurity and synthetic biology more or less 
directly. Over time, each of these conventions have evolved and adapted to address 
emerging risks and regulatory challenges introduced by advances in S&T and non- 
state actors. As they will undoubtedly continue to evolve and adapt, it will be 
5 See: https://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/about-1540-committee/general-information.shtml
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important for all parties to monitor developments in synthetic biology, develop and 
share common definitions, and determine to what extent synthetic biology intro-
duces novel biosafety and biosecurity risks.
3.2.2  National Implementation
International conventions are intent-based, broadly defined and therefore generally 
future proofed, but they only take effect when they are ratified and implemented at 
the national level. For example, to implement the BWC, countries must adopt 
appropriate penal measures criminalizing the production, handling and use of bio-
logical weapons;6 biosafety and biosecurity measures accounting for the safe and 
secure handling of dangerous pathogens; and import and export controls covering 
specific biological agents and dual-use equipment and technology.7 Finally, enforce-
ment measures must be adopted to ensure the ongoing monitoring of life science 
activity and to prosecute and punish offenders.8 How countries carry out each of 
these implementation measures is influenced by a variety of factors, including a 
country’s attitudes toward risk and the importance of technological innovation. In 
practice, countries often draw on and/or adapt existing laws and regulations, rather 
than creating new ones. For example, aspects of the BWC may already be covered 
by existing criminal laws, public health (and medical) laws, emergency manage-
ment laws and/or national security laws (Fidler 2001; Colussi 2015). This means 
that national implementation not only takes different forms between countries, but 
also tends to result in a patchwork of rules applying directly, or more often indi-
rectly, to biosecurity and synthetic biology within countries.
With a view to national implementation, this section discusses some general 
characteristics of top-down approaches to biosecurity and synthetic biology regula-
tion. There are numerous categorizations that can be used to group these approaches, 
but for the purpose of this chapter we limit ourselves to the distinction between hard 
and soft law, between different levels of precaution in governance, and between 
general and specific legislation. It should be emphasized that these distinctions are 
merely ideal types. While some examples of national implementation will be given, 
it should be noted that most countries apply a mix of different strategies that cannot 
be strictly assigned to a single type of governance.
6 See for example The Biological Weapons Act (1974) in The UK or the Biological Weapons Act 
(1989) in the USA.
7 See VERTIC factsheet on national implementation measures for the BWC, available at: http://
www.vertic.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/FS7_BWC_EN_FEB_2018.pdf
8 Ibid.
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3.2.2.1  Hard Law vs. Soft Law
When selecting regulatory options, national governments have to balance hard law, 
meaning statutorily defined legal prescriptions that result in punishment when vio-
lated, and soft law, comprised of norms and standards within the operating com-
munity that build validity, trust, and collaboration opportunities between community 
members and other stakeholders. By these definitions, hard law is generally taken to 
correlate with traditional ‘top-down’ governance. However, a government can 
equally make the deliberate ‘top-down’ choice to cede some responsibility to soft 
law in an effort to stimulate ownership and self-responsibility on the part of industry 
and technology users, encourage economic development, limit the burden and costs 
of regulatory oversight, etc. (Palumbo and Bellamy 2010). The balancing of hard 
and soft law can be categorized according to three generalized types of governance 
approach: precautionary, laissez-faire and stewardship (Linkov et al. 2018a, b).
Precautionary Governance
There is a broad range of precautionary approaches that are discussed in the schol-
arly literature and that have been implemented by governments in practice 
(Ahteensuu and Sandin 2012; Dinneen 2013). Rather than analyzing each of these 
approaches in detail, the following discussion considers precautionary governance 
more generally, treating it as a set of pre-emptive regulations aimed at ensuring the 
safe and secure application of technologies and preventing exposure to risk (Linkov 
et al. 2018a, b).
In general, precautionary governance is associated with risk-aversion and cen-
tralized governance systems that require safety to be demonstrated prior to permit-
ting the use of new technologies or products (Stirling 2006). For example, the 
European Union (EU) is widely known to take a precautionary approach in relation 
to GMO biosafety as prescribed by EU legislation (European Commission 2000; 
Anyshchenko 2019). This legislation, which aims to protect the health and safety of 
humans, animals, and the environment from adverse biological contamination, 
equally applies to aspects of synthetic biology (especially genome editing).9
Comparable legal requirements for biosecurity were introduced later in Europe 
(2000),10 and much of the GMO debate remains focused on the subject of biosafety. 
Following a recent review process on whether or not existing gene technology regu-
lations and risk assessment and management practices are applicable to synthetic 
biology, three opinion statements by the Scientific Committees did not address 
9 See Case C-528/16, Court of Justice of the European Union 2018. Organisms obtained by muta-
genesis are GMOs and are, in principle, subject to the obligations laid down by the GMO Directive. 
However, whereas radiation and chemically induced mutagenesis are exempt from the regulations 
because they have a so called ‘history of safe use’, mutagenesis induced by gene editing techniques 
such as CRISPR is not because it lacks this ‘history of safe use’.
10 See Regulation 1334/2000 of 22nd June 2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of 
exports of dual-use items and technology in O.J. L 159/2000, modified by Regulation 2432/2001 
of 20th November 2001  in O.J. L 338/2001, and by Regulation 428/2009 of 5th May 2009  in 
O.J. L 134/2009.
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 biosecurity directly, focusing solely on biosafety (SCHER, SCENIHR and SCCS 
2014; SCENIHR, SCHER and SCCS 2015). By contrast, synthetic biology’s bios-
ecurity implications 11 have been the subject of considerably more policy discussion 
in the US (e.g. NSABB 2006, 2011; for a review, see Oye 2012). Whereas Europe 
has historically strongly focused on biosafety, biosecurity regulations were devel-
oped in the US at a relatively early stage (1989). Moreover, since 9/11 and the 
subsequent anthrax letter attacks, US policy has further emphasized biosecurity 
(McCarty 2018). These developments have resulted in extensive controls on scien-
tific research (McLeish and Nightingale 2007).12
A precautionary governance system seeks to protect against undue and unneces-
sary harm, but this approach can also impose costs. It is often argued that a strict 
pre-emptive regulatory system can potentially cut off avenues for innovation and 
industry and diminish a country’s economic development and international com-
petitiveness. These potential pitfalls have been pointed out both in relation to GMO 
biosafety regulations in Europe and biosecurity controls in the US (Wager and 
McHughen 2010; Bogner and Torgersen 2018; Gaudioso and Salerno 2004). 
Moreover, in a world where other countries may be more risk-tolerant, countries 
that adopt a precautionary governance approach are not necessarily insulated from 
risk. This problem has been faced before when individual countries have pursued, 
for example, nuclear disarmament or sought to reduce or eliminate nuclear power 
plants domestically while neighbors have not. Thus, strict adherence to precaution-
ary governance in the case of biosecurity and synthetic biology is not a panacea for 
all threats.
Laissez-Faire Governance
A laissez-faire governance approach cedes much of the regulatory power to existing 
or emerging bottom-up initiatives, placing trust in the capacity of technology pro-
ducers, industry and users to play an active role in their own regulation. Under this 
approach, such non-governmental actors are encouraged to determine (at least in 
part) how safety and security practices are structured, implemented and enforced, 
while centralized government plays a role in setting minimum standards and inter-
vening in the event of regulatory failures. This approach is generally intended to 
promote innovation and flexibility, as well as rapid adaption and response to emerg-
ing threats (Linkov et al. 2018a, b).
While laissez-faire governance is  a promising approach that recognizes the 
important role that non-governmental actors can play in the regulatory process, 
there are also potential pitfalls. One such example, albeit focused on bioethics rather 
than biosecurity, can be traced to the use of germline editing in humans to produce 
the first CRISPR baby. In this case, despite broad international agreement that sci-
entists should “hold off on editing human eggs, sperm or embryos until gene-editing 
11 See Ahteensuu 2017.
12 For a review of all the legislative framework about bioterrorism in the U.S.A., see RICHARDS, 
Edward P./O’Brien, Terry/Ratburn, Katharine C., “Bioterrorism and the Use of Fear in Public 
Health”, The Urban Lawyer, No. 3, Vol. 34, 2002, pp. 685–726.
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technology (and the implications of the edits) are better understood.”13 (See also 
Cyranoski and Ledford 2018), a researcher in China took advantage of laissez-faire 
regulatory controls that resulted in multiple potential risks and unintended conse-
quences. These included the possibility of long-term changes to the human germ-
line; encouraging other scientists (including those working internationally) to 
pursue germline editing in humans (Cyranoski 2019a, b), and motivating Chinese 
regulators to introduce stricter regulatory controls on genetic research (ibid.).
As the above example suggests, one risk of laissez-faire governance is that an 
individual’s risk tolerance may not (intentionally or unintentionally) conform to 
existing norms and their actions may subsequently expose everyone to undue risk or 
irreversible harm, with implications for the laissez-faire state as well as other states. 
Additionally, the more a state relies on soft law, the more responsibility the govern-
ment delegates to individuals, groups and organizations, not only to establish norms 
and follow them, but also to enforce them. In the case of synthetic biology, such 
bottom-up initiatives have played an important role in this rapidly developing field. 
Organizations such as the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC) have 
come to play an important role in the regulatory process by, for example, developing 
industry standards and guidelines (IGSC 2017). For better or worse, the success of 
such approaches will depend on the commitment of non-governmental actors to act 
in the best interests of society, valuing safety and security as a public good.
Ultimately, while a laissez-faire approach may effectively supplement aspects of 
centralized government regulation, it cannot be expected to fully replace it. This is 
because, as history has shown, individual researchers or individual members of 
industry will sometimes choose to value personal prestige or cost cutting over safety 
and security. Moreover, from the standpoint of non-governmental actors, including 
the DNA synthesis consortia noted above, regulation is not necessarily a bad thing. 
Indeed, by some accounts, the standards and codes of conduct produced by the 
DNA synthesis industry were motivated by a lack of top-down regulations that 
could provide a benchmark for not only mitigating potential biosecurity risks, but 
also liability issues and reputational costs in the event of an incident. For this rea-
son, the US Government’s own DNA screening guidance14 has been largely wel-
comed by industry.
Stewardship Governance
A stewardship governance approach seeks to balance the advantages of laissez-faire 
governance with centralized risk management, and different countries may enact 
stewardship approaches that incline towards one side or the other (Linkov et  al. 
2018a, b). Governments that adopt a stewardship governance approach to synthetic 
13 Many articles and newspaper items have in response to the Jiankui He case referred to the (per-
ceived) broad worldwide consensus that germline editing in the clinic would be a step too far. See 
a.o. Weintraub (2019).
14 See: https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/guidance/syndna/Documents/syndna- 
guidance.pdf
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biology will seek to monitor developments in the field, enabling space for innova-
tors and industry to operate, while intervening in the event of observed inconsisten-
cies with objectives formulated through multi-stakeholder processes involving both 
government and non-governmental actors. Stewardship governance is more guid-
ance than direction, and typically involves the active participation of bottom-up 
entities in formulating norms alongside traditional top-down regulatory bodies. 
Though some hard constraints exist, they are likely to arise through consensus 
driven collaborative forums that both support beneficial innovation and use of tech-
nologies while critically evaluating risks (the Goldilocks principle).
Many countries apply a stewardship style of governance for emerging technolo-
gies, including synthetic biology. While the specific approaches of individual coun-
tries differ at the level of detail, they are all based on the principles of being flexible 
and adaptive and using a mix of different tools to achieve a ‘balanced’ form of 
governance. For example, the US employs a stewardship model in much of its 
engagement with emerging technology developers and users: the executive govern-
ment, state governments, the US patent system, insurers, and the system of legal 
liability all serve to foster innovation while constraining what scientists can attempt 
within established risk tolerances. The stewardship model aims to limit innovation 
only when the risks are deemed sufficient to justify government intervention.
Similar governance concepts, capturing the notion of balancing laissez-faire and 
precautionary models, mentioned in the literature include ‘adaptive governance’ 
and ‘prudent vigilance’. The main characteristic of adaptive governance is its 
emphasis on flexibility, allowing “stakeholders in industry, government, and society 
at large to iteratively adjust their best practices and codes of conduct to derive the 
benefits…without incurring unnecessary or unacceptable risks or losses” (Linkov 
et al. 2018a, b). The ‘prudent vigilance’ model “establish[es] processes for assess-
ing likely benefits along with safety and security risks both before and after projects 
are undertaken” (PCBSI 2010). Introduced by the US Presidential Commission for 
the Study of Bioethical Issues in its policy report on synthetic biology, the model 
reflects a combination of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ strategies for the enforcement 
and control of biosecurity risks associated with synthetic biology (see Collussi 2015).
3.2.2.2  Biosafety vs. Biosecurity, GMOs vs. Synthetic Biology
Given that biosecurity and synthetic biology are relatively new concepts with lim-
ited regulatory legacies, there are few sign posts to indicate how countries’ regula-
tory frameworks should evolve to meet their associated risks, and even if new 
regulations are needed. In light of existing GMO and biosafety regulations, coun-
tries are faced with the question of determining what is already covered and what is 
not. In this context, much depends on the ‘newness’ or ‘novelty’ ascribed to syn-
thetic biology relative to conventional biotechnology, and governments must weigh 
the benefits and costs of introducing new regulations that are typically complex and 
time-consuming to produce (Hamilton 2015).
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Even in states where synthetic biology is actively pursued, many do not (yet) 
explicitly reference it in legal documentation. In Germany, for example, the 
Research Office of Parliament concluded in 2015 that the processes currently called 
‘synthetic biology’ are in fact still conventional biotechnology and can be covered 
by existing regulations, including existing security, transport, and export control 
regulations, and the Health Care Act, for issues related to human health. From the 
standpoint of the Research Office of Parliament, synthetic biology results in new 
genetic combinations of a host organism with a variable amount of new genetic 
material, just like GMOs. Similar conclusions have been reached by scientific advi-
sory bodies in Europe and beyond (Trump 2017; ZKBS 2018; Pauwels et al. 2013).
Synthetic biology is similarly not mentioned in EU legislation and, historically, 
changes to the EU biosafety regulations have proven to be extremely time consum-
ing due to different perspectives on both the necessity and desirability of change 
(Eriksson et  al. 2018). In the case of several new plant breeding techniques, it 
remains unclear whether they are covered by EU GMO legislation, despite delibera-
tions (including several scientific and legal expert committees and reports) stretch-
ing back more than 15 years.
Finally, distinctions  between biosecurity and biosafety can be ambiguous. In 
countries with regulations specifically covering biosecurity, a variety of definitions 
can be found depending on the context and field of application. For example, differ-
ent interpretations exist between the human health sector, and the animal and plant 
health sectors . In the case of human health, biosecurity is generally understood as 
a set of regulatory measures aimed at preventing the deliberate misuse of biology 
(i.e. the same way we interpret biosecurity in this chapter). In the case of animal and 
plant health, biosecurity is generally understood as a set of regulatory measures 
aimed at preventing and responding to the natural or unintentional introduction, 
establishment and spread of pests or pathogens (Mumford et al. 2017).15 Some lan-
guages also lack distinct words for biosafety and biosecurity (at least in general 
usage). For example, biosecuridad, in Spanish, Biosicherheit, in German, and bio-
turvallisuus, in Finnish, are generally used to capture both biosafety and biosecu-
rity. This can result in misunderstandings, as these concepts can be understood 
differently between countries and between sectors. In the case of languages that do 
differentiate between biosafety and biosecurity, there can nonetheless be confusion 
15 In the setting of the BWC, it is most commonly used to refer to mechanisms to establish and 
maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms, toxins and relevant resources. 
But For example, the glossary of the FAO Basic Laboratory Manual for the Small-Scale Production 
and Testing of I-2 Newcastle Disease Vaccine considers biosecurity to be “precautions taken to 
minimize the risk of introducing an infectious agent into a population”. And in the glossary of the 
New Zealand Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment considers biosecurity to be “The 
exclusion, eradication and effective management of pests and unwanted organisms into New 
Zealand.” http://www.pce.govt.nz/reports/pce_reports_glossary.shtml. The OECD developed best 
practice guidelines for biosecurity at ancillary facilities, defining it as “institutional and personal 
security measures and procedures designed to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion or inten-
tional release of pathogens, or parts of them, and toxin-producing organisms, as well as such toxins 
that are held, transferred and/or supplied by Biological Resource Centres”.
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over how each set of practices should be applied and what actors or institutions bear 
responsibility for their oversight. Recognizing these ambiguities, initiatives in the 
EU and Central Asia have been undertaken to map how these terms are understood 
and applied in different countries (EBRF 2016; EEAS 2017).
3.2.2.3  National Implementation: An Inevitable Patchwork
In many (if not most) countries, the regulatory frameworks governing synthetic 
biology and biosecurity are fragmented – divided across multiple pieces of legisla-
tion (e.g. legislation on bioweapons, dual-use materials and technologies; export/
import and transport; gene technology; human health; microorganisms, animal and 
plant health; agriculture; occupational health; waste disposal; criminal behavior, 
etc.) – and tend to address one or both subjects only indirectly (Greer and Trump 
2019). In Finland, for example, over twenty acts and regulations can be interpreted 
as governing the biosafety and biosecurity dimensions of synthetic biology, and 
none make explicit reference to ‘synthetic biology’. In other countries, like the US, 
synthetic biology is explicitly referenced in relevant regulations and guidance docu-
ments (e.g. federal DNA screening guidance), accompanied by more than 35 differ-
ent biosecurity regulations (some of which have been described as mutually 
inconsistent, making compliance with all of them impossible): “The regulation of 
products of synthetic biology is juggled, and not always clearly so, among three 
federal agencies, various federal laws, and the Coordinated Framework (…). The 
regulatory framework that has evolved is complicated, increasingly circuitous, and 
not for the faint of heart” (Bergeson et al. 2015).
In other countries, especially developing countries that may share very different 
priorities due to limited resources and urgent challenges associated with human 
rights and food security, relevant biosecurity and synthetic biology regulations have 
not yet been adopted. Thus, the fact that international conventions are in place may 
create a false sense of confidence about the level of consensus and  adoption. In 
practice, the effectiveness of conventions depends on how they are implemented, a 
task that can take a considerable amount of time. Indeed, despite the relatively long 
history of GMO regulation, relevant laws have not been adopted by all countries.
Additionally, in an interconnected and globalized world, the effectiveness of 
national implementation is limited in its ability to prevent or limit access to new 
technologies that may be carelessly used or transferred by other states. National 
implementation acts within legal and geographical boundaries and depends upon 
rules designed to shape the behavior of domestic audiences. For truly robust gover-
nance to occur, all states must work to mitigate the risks posed by advances in syn-
thetic biology through effective national implementation.
Given the diversity of national implementation efforts globally, it seems unlikely 
that there will be a unified approach and that all gaps in the governance of synthetic 
biology will be filled. However, potential vulnerabilities can be addressed through a 
combination of different instruments. “Often, approaches to risk governance are 
defined in terms of a choice between two alternatives. Either accept the 
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precautionary principle but in so doing choke off development of potentially prom-
ising technologies, or go with laissez-faire and in so doing accept potentially irre-
versible harms” (Oye 2012, p.  22). Linkov, Trump, Poinsatte-Jones, and Florin 
(2018b) emphasize the importance of a stepwise learning approach under condi-
tions of acknowledged uncertainty, with initial limits on use, iterative phases of data 
gathering and regulatory evaluation. In addition to adopting hybrid governance 
models, combining elements of precaution with policies aimed at stimulating inno-
vation, governments may also look to strengthen regulatory systems through a com-
bination of hard and soft law. For example, legal measures can be complemented 
by codes of conduct or guidelines produced by researchers and industry.
Top-down governance systems, in their various forms, offer advantages and dis-
advantages. The regulatory challenges presented by synthetic biology will require 
the careful consideration of multiple (hybrid) governance options.
3.3  Key Novelties and Tensions Introduced by 
Synthetic Biology
Biosecurity in the context of synthetic biology benefits from the groundwork previ-
ously laid to mitigate biological weapons threats and the risks posed by earlier 
advances in biotechnology. We have seen that international conventions and national 
implementation already cover (albeit imperfectly) many aspects of synthetic biol-
ogy. In this section, we  discuss three aspects  of synthetic biology that represent 
distinct  governance challenges: convergence, democratization and intangibility. 
Cutting across these tensions are overarching issues that are familiar to all emerging 
technology discussions, including the pace of technological change and uncertainty, 
both in terms of the potential risks and benefits (Marchant et al. 2011). For effective 
governance in this environment, regulatory efforts must seek to be forward-looking 
and adaptive. Moreover, whether states are applying existing legislation to synthetic 
biology or enacting new legislation, both relevance and coherence will be paramount.
3.3.1  Convergence
Because synthetic biology represents a convergence between biology, chemistry, 
engineering and computing, ambiguities may arise regarding which conventions 
should regulate specific developments. This could produce redundancies in regula-
tory efforts or, far worse, gaps in responsibility as each authority presumes another’s 
attention and jurisdiction. Frontier research on protocells and xenobiology, among 
other domains of synthetic biology that push the limits of scientific classification, 
may even fall outside the scope or remit of existing conventions and established leg-
islation. Other synthetic biology risks, including those that blur  the  line between 
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biological and informational hazards, may require new security concepts and prac-
tices. For example, recent studies that have demonstrated the capacity to encode 
computer viruses in synthesized strands of DNA, exploiting vulnerabilities in the 
sequencing and processing pipeline (Ney et al. 2017), underline the growing rele-
vance of cyberbiosecurity, an emerging field at the intersection of cybersecurity and 
biosecurity.
Synthetic biology processes and methods may also become (or may already be) 
too diverse to legislate individually, and the convergent nature of synthetic biology 
may lead to fragmentation or duplication of laws at the national level. In this envi-
ronment, it may become increasingly unclear which laws should be applied to syn-
thetic biology and how judges or legislators should interpret and apply them. In light 
of its numerous applications, multiple contributing scientific disciplines, and prac-
titioners working in both institutional and non-institutional settings, synthetic biol-
ogy is an exemplary case of convergence.
3.3.2  Democratization
Synthetic biology provides new ways to modify organisms outside of dedicated 
laboratories and without advanced skills (Oye 2012). This broadens access to the 
science and enables individuals to apply its techniques without oversight from for-
mal institutions or associated institutional norms (NSABB 2011; Gruber 2019). 
Theoretically, democratization could allow untrained or malicious actors to create 
dangerous organisms. In practice, current synthetic biology applications are far 
from facilitating this: in most cases, so-called do-it-yourself (DIY) biology is lim-
ited to relatively simple experiments with nonpathogenic organisms, with relatively 
low success rates (Kuiken 2016). However, looking to the future, it is possible that 
advances in synthetic biology will lower the technical barriers needed to engage in 
more advanced bioengineering projects. Much like the history of computing, as syn-
thetic biology tools and techniques become more reliable, streamlined, and easy to 
use, bioengineering may become common place, accessible to specialists and non- 
specialists alike.
If synthetic biology does (eventually) make biology easy or at least significantly 
easier to engineer, traditional top-down governance and enforcement will no longer 
be sufficient to provide adequate oversight, and there is likely to be a growing 
need to enlist the support of the synthetic biology community itself to participate in 
various forms of self-regulation or self-policing. Already, innovative self- governance 
approaches of this kind have been employed in the context of DIY-biology, wherein 
DIY-culture and social protocols have been leveraged to support responsible science 
and self-regulation (Bolton and Thomas 2014). However, such regulation works 
only if all parties engage, or are permitted to engage, which is not always guaranteed.
One potential model for policing synthetic biology in an era of democratization 
is provided by the partnership that has evolved between the International Genetically 
Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition and the US FBI.  This partnership has 
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sought to create a culture of trust and transparency between law enforcement and 
members of the synthetic biology community through engagement with students 
and the private sector, demonstrating positive results (Ossola 2016). Moreover, 
iGEM organizers require, as a condition of student teams’ participation, students to 
engage with safety and security issues throughout their projects (Oye 2012). These 
partnership activities create an opportunity for mutual learning, but there can be 
tensions. In 2019, 47 countries sent teams to iGEM, but some international students 
were barred from attending the event (Baber 2018) due to a US Executive Order that 
banned students from several countries, including Iran and Syria. This represented 
a collision of top-down priorities. The travel ban’s focus on national security com-
promised the FBI’s ability to build relationships within the evolving international 
synthetic biology community.
Democratization in synthetic biology requires balancing individual liberty and 
risk prevention. In a hypothetical future world of broad bioengineering capabilities, 
safeguards will still be necessary, but whether they are best applied through top- 
down or bottom-up efforts remains to be seen. The successful governance of syn-
thetic biology will partially depend upon the functioning collaboration between 
top-down and bottom-up governance in identifying and preventing purposeful or 
accidental misuse. Bottom-up governance is further discussed in Chap. 6 of 
this volume.
3.3.3  Intangibility
The ‘ingredients’ for synthetic biology are increasingly informational, thus regula-
tions focusing on material control, while important, cannot address the full scope of 
synthetic biology’s risks. Digital sequence information, access to online research 
protocols and methodologies, and the capacity to construct laboratory  hardware 
from scratch using 3D-printing technologies are all developments that threaten to 
undermine regulatory systems that privilege policies aimed at restricting access to 
physical technologies (NRC 2004). In an era of the life sciences dominated by the 
production and distribution of information-based resources, effective regulatory 
controls on intangible technology transfers are essential. However, successfully 
designing and implementing controls of this kind is a challenging task. Whereas 
dual-use equipment must (or at least should) pass through physical checkpoints, 
digital sequence information can be transmitted with the click of a button. 
Advances in synthetic biology may also yield threats that are not only difficult to 
regulate, but impossible to anticipate. For example, it may someday be possible to 
design and build novel genomes (based on existing, modified or new genetic code) 
that transcribe previously unknown pathogens. Therefore, although select agent 
lists are likely to remain relevant (if for no other reason than because they generate 
awareness about pathogens that are known to cause severe harm to public, animal or 
plant health), they cannot be expected to capture the full spectrum of harmful agents 
that are (or may someday be) possible to create.
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Finally, in the context of synthetic biology and the contemporary life sciences in 
general, important questions remain about what life science information should be 
considered ‘risky’ in the first place and how this information aught to be controlled. 
To place these considerations in context, one need look no further than the H5N1 
gain-of-function experiments (Imai et al. 2012). In this case, concerns were raised 
about whether research describing the synthesis of a novel H5N1 variant was suit-
able for open publication. Some argued publishing the protocols would provide a 
blueprint for bioterrorism. Others asserted that the research should never have been 
conducted. Decisions about whether (or what parts of) the research should be pub-
lished were sources of international debate and global controversy (Hamilton 2015). 
While past technologies have motivated similar controversies (see McLeish and 
Nightingale 2007), questions about the intrinsic dangers of life science information, 
and what information may be too dangerous to share, have never been more acute.
3.4  Conclusions and Recommendations
• The regulatory landscape for biosecurity and synthetic biology can best be 
described as a ‘patchwork’ of international conventions, national laws, regula-
tions, guidelines, etc. In many instances, these were designed to address other 
(state biowarfare programs) or earlier (biosafety) concerns.
• While synthetic biology appears to be broadly (if indirectly) covered by existing 
top-down governance measures (e.g. GMO laws), several characteristics of the 
science, including convergence, democratization and intangibility, point to pos-
sible regulatory gaps. How governments address these novelties depends upon 
their regulatory cultures and perceptions of risk.
• To date, the regulatory response, while varied (ranging from more precautionary 
to more laissez-faire), suggests a preference for evolutionary rather that revolu-
tionary regulatory change. Like the regulatory response to GMOs, there is a ten-
dency for governments to adapt existing regulations to new technologies.
• Whether new conventions, laws or regulations are (or are not) needed to address 
synthetic biology’s novelties is open to question. At the very least, there is a need 
to monitor advances in the field and to consider how top-down governance 
approaches could be improved. The following recommendations aim to advance 
this discussion:
• The BWC, the premier international forum that addresses biological threats, 
should play a leading role in monitoring security-relevant advances in synthetic 
biology. Proposals to establish a BWC scientific advisory body and to introduce 
a S&T reporting requirement into the CBM mechanism should be encouraged.
• In view of the growing convergence between biology, chemistry, engineering and 
computing, inter-convention dialogue is needed between the BWC and CWC, 
among others, to ensure the full scope of synthetic biology’s risks are taken into 
consideration and that there is agreement on how to address these risks in the 
event of deliberate misuse by state or non-state actors.
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• Given that many security concerns about synthetic biology relate to its informa-
tional (e.g. digital sequence information) rather than physical (e.g. DNA sequenc-
ers) dimensions, it is necessary to develop improved methods of regulating 
intangible technology transfers. It is no longer sufficient to rely exclusively on 
material controls and list-based approaches to regulation.
• Synthetic biology is contributing to the democratization of genetic engineering. 
It is therefore essential to enlist the support of non-governmental organizations 
and actors, including technology developers, industry and users, in the regula-
tory response. The value of complementing top-down governance measures with 
bottom-up governance measures, drawing on limited forms of self-regulation or 
self-policing, will only increase as the tools of modern biology become more 
accessible.
• There is no one-size-fits-all approach to synthetic biology’s governance. Finding 
the appropriate ‘mix’ of top-down and bottom-up regulatory measures will 
require foresight, broad dialogue, and a willingness on the part of governments 
to look to new, hybrid forms of risk regulation.
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Chapter 4
Biological Standards and Biosecurity: 
The Unexplored Link
Manuel Porcar
The issue of standardisation in Synthetic Biology has important implications at both 
the technical and governance levels. At the former, standardisation in biology (a 
still-ongoing process) is expected to exponentially increase the potential of syn-
thetic biology by democratising, easing and expanding our ability to engineer life. 
Indeed, it has to be stressed that Synthetic Biology is -or at least aims at being- a 
fully engineering discipline. And engineering, from industrial to electronics, largely 
relies on standards. A standard is a part, piece, device or procedure with well- 
established properties, and which can reliably be used in a broad range of industrial 
applications. Standards are often considered as universal components, in such a way 
that their constant properties allow a world-wide use. A well-known example of 
standard parts are nuts and bolts. Indeed, the onset of the industrial revolution was 
associated with a bloom of different designs of nuts and bolts, with different sizes 
and thread pitch. It soon became obvious that a standardisation of nuts and bolts was 
required: standard nuts and bolts were born.
Today, standards are everywhere in our technological civilization. From the 
screws of our cars to the lids of plastic water bottles, the industrial world we live in 
would simply be impossible without the use of robust, reliable and standard compo-
nents. In Synthetic Biology, however, the standardisation process is still in its 
infancy. Despite the enormous efforts carried out so far to develop and use standard 
biological parts, plasmids or procedures, the challenge of standardising the biologi-
cal realm has proved very difficult (Porcar et  al. 2015). In this section, we will 
address the state-of-the-art of standardisation in biology, as well as the implications 
in biosafety and governance. In order to address this issue, it has first to be stressed 
than standardisation in the frame of synthetic biology can actually refer to two 
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separate and different perspectives, that, for the sake of clarity, we name from now 
onwards standards in biology or standards for biology.
4.1  Standards in Biology
In contrast with the standardisation of the norms and regulations of the biosafety or 
biosecurity issues of synthetic biology (see standards for biology), standards in 
biology are those that are used within the discipline. These include, in a matryoshka- 
like hierarchy of complexity, the following levels amenable to standardisation: parts 
(i.e. short genetic sequences), devices (simple combinations of the former), genetic 
circuits, metabolic pathways, engineered cells and engineered cell consortia (or cell 
tissues). Beyond all those physical components, standards in biology can also refer 
to the protocols and techniques used in the discipline, as well as the human practices 
(manual movements, use of biosafety material, etc.) required to carry out any synbio 
experiment. Figure 4.1, extracted from the BIOROBOOST project, describes this 
comprehensive and hierarchical structure, which shows the complexity of the 
endeavor.
This comprehensive description includes all levels in SynBio that are amenable 
to standardisation. But the question is, do we really have standards at all those lev-
els? The answer is negative,  although it is true that major efforts have been made 
and are still ongoing in order to develop robust standards. In order to get a glimpse 
of the state-of-the-art in SynBio, two examples of standard parts can be considered: 
BioBricks™ and pSEVA plasmids.
Fig. 4.1 Standards in biology. From DNA part to the protocols and activities of the research staff, 




BioBricks are DNA sequences which conform to a restriction-enzyme assembly 
standard, used in SynBio (Smolke 2009). Biobricks were one of the former attempts 
to standardise engineering in biology, and they are certainly one of the most widely 
used components, with many scientific references reporting their use, advantages or 
deficiencies. The main reason behind this wide use is due to the international 
Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition (http://www.igem.org), in 
which hundreds of teams of mainly undergraduate students develop and present 
ingenuous SynBio projects for which the use of BioBrick parts is imperative. 
Indeed, iGEM teams not only can use the thousands of BioBricks parts available in 
the Repository of Biological Parts (http://parts.igem.org/Main_Page) but are 
requested to provide at least one new part to the registry, in a potent and effective 
strategy to both broaden the number of available/registered parts and to foster the 
use of existing Biobricks. Unfortunately, the wide use of Biobricks has not resulted 
in broad acceptance outside the iGEM world. Moreover, a close analysis of the use 
of Biobrick-based standard parts by iGEM award-winning teams clearly shows that 
those teams tend to develop their own standards rather than using those already 
present in the Registry (Vilanova and Porcar 2014). This lack of trust in the reliabil-
ity of BioBricks leads to the surprising result that re-inventing the wheel, rather than 
using standards, is the path to win a standard-centered competition (Fig. 4.2).
Another, very different, example of a widely used standard part in SynBio is that 
of Standard European Vector Architecture (SEVA) plasmids. SEVA consists of a set 
of shuttle plasmids developed by the team of Victor de Lorenzo (CNB, CSIC, 
Madrid, Spain). While most plasmids are only usable in a given bacterial species, 
shuttle plasmids in particular are functional in a relatively wide range of bacterial 
species. This means that those plasmids can be used, exchanged and transferred 
within and among many bacterial species. SEVA plasmids (pSEVA) have been 
made freely available to researchers worldwide. Since their publication, de 
Lorenzo’s group has received more than 500 requests; more than 2000 plasmids 
have been shipped to 35 countries worldwide, and they have been used in research 
which yielded, for example, 277 (SEVA 1.0, Durante-Rodríguez et al. 2014) and 88 
(SEVA 2.0, Martínez-García et al. 2015) citations (Esteban Martínez, personal com-
munication). Interestingly, and in contrast with the case of Biobricks, pSEVA plas-
mids have thus found their way as standards in many SynBio’s toolbox without a 
regulatory (i.e. iGEM’s rules) requirement.
pSEVA plasmids could metaphorically be considered “double standards”. First, 
their proven robustness and relatively wide use fit with the definition of standard; 
and second, the fact that they can be used in a broad range of bacterial species make 
these plasmids particularly “universal” (they can be interchangeably used in several 
bacteria). It has to be stressed, though, that the universality of bacterial hosts has 
both technical and biosafety/biosecurity implications. Regarding the former, this 
universality contributes to develop the potential of SynBio by facilitating genetic 
modification within different bacterial taxa. Regarding the latter, the question arises 
on whether this ease of modification of non-model bacteria (potentially including 
pathogenic ones) may contribute to an increased concern in terms of the biosecurity 
and biosafety of those and other technologies being enabled to trespass the “species 
barrier.”

































































































































































































































4.2  Implications of Standards in Biosecurity in Terms 
of Risks
The issue of biological standardization as it relates to biosecurity has not previously 
been addressed in detail. In the present chapter, we identify a series of aspects linked 
to standardization and their implications in biosecurity (Fig. 4.3).
4.3  Universality
An example of an almost-universal device is the smartphone. There are millions of 
them on Earth, and in many countries, most citizens have at least one. Smartphones 
are standard in the sense that, despite the existence of different models (or strains/
species, in biology), they work in an equivalent way. Receiving or sending a 
Whatsapp message, for example, is largely independent of the smartphone used, 
because they all work alike with the app. Additionally, an informatic virus, a par-
ticular fake new or a geolocation involving smartphones could have an effect on all 
of them. In other words, the universality of a device is linked to the universality of 
the risk. Not unlike smartphones, making a standardized platform for SynBio would 
universalize the risk. If a given plasmid, virus or cellular chassis were made univer-
sally available, so would be the risk derived from malicious use.
Fig. 4.3 Aspects of 
biological standardization 
as they relate to biosecurity
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4.4  Chassis and Trojan Horses
In Homer’s Iliad, Greek soldiers entered the city of Troy hidden inside a wooden 
horse. It must be stressed that the horse was not the weapon, but the vehicle of the 
actual weapon (the army). Considerable effort was required to set in place the horse 
as a chassis of the weapon, but once in place, its further use because much easier 
(although there are no mentions in the Iliad of a further use of the horse). In the 
example above, smartphones were described as standard devices that may serves as 
chassis/Trojan horses. Biological chassis, provided that they are robust, easy to 
maintain and to amenable to modification, could also be considered as biological 
Trojan horses: inoffensive by themselves, but susceptible of being use as delivers of 
bioterrorist actions because of their manipulability.
4.5  Breaking Down the Species Barrier
As we have stressed in the previous section, several currently ongoing efforts are 
successfully allowing microbial transformation by introducing plasmids in a range 
of different species (see the description of pSEVA above). The obvious implication 
in terms of biosecurity is that pathogenic DNA fragments could be inserted into 
harmless bacteria turning them pathogenic or, alternatively, pathogenic bacteria 
could be turned into more lethal agents by including certain biological circuits from 
taxonomically distant bacterial species.
4.6  Standards as Social Constructs
As a final remark, we strongly believe that it is important to be aware of a common 
misconception on the “inner” nature of standards. Robustness, reliability and ease 
of use are highly relevant features of any standard. That said, though, a standard 
must be acknowledged within a group of individuals on a basically arbitrary basis 
(see metric units, flag colours, and any other “conventional” standards). This has 
implications in terms of biosecurity assessment, since discussions tend to focus on 




4.7  Final Remarks and Open Questions
As we have seen in this chapter, standardization in biology is a complex, still in 
process path that will be central for SynBio to fully develop its potential. 
Standardisation could finally make SynBio’s promise come true and make biology 
easier to engineer. As we have described above, this fact will ineluctably be linked 
to an increased risk in the discipline because of the universality of the biological 
systems (and actors), their amenability as Trojan horses, and the possibility of easily 
breaking the species barrier. The question arising here is not thus whether advances 
in standardization will be linked to increased bioterrorism concerns, but to which 
extent the risk is proportional to the standardization level accomplished. This ques-
tion does not only affect biosecurity but also biosafety. Consider, for example, the 
much needed biocontainment of potentially dangerous biological agents: are bio-
containment strategies different in a standard-free vs. a standard-complete scenario?
As a general conclusion, the standardization of SynBio is a complex process, 
mostly still in its infancy. The success of this process will result in immense eco-
nomic and societal benefits. However, the risks of SynBio in terms of biosecurity 
are only partially known, and the implications of the possible success of the ongoing 
standardization process in the biosecurity threads of this emerging discipline 
deserve further study.
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Chapter 5
Responsible Governance of Biosecurity 
in Armenia
Ineke Malsch and Maria Espona
Abstract This chapter analyses a case study of responsible governance of dual use 
life sciences and biosecurity in Armenia. It is based on materials presented during a 
Responsible Research and Innovation Course in Armenia, held on 17–19 May 2019. 
The course was organised as part of the ISTC Targeted Initiative (TI) on CBRN 
Export Control and Dual Use in Central Asia. The focus of the case study is on ethi-
cal aspects and how collective responsibility for biosecurity can be organised, in 
order to prevent innovation from undermining international law prohibiting hostile 
uses of life sciences.
5.1  Introduction
For the purpose of this chapter, dual use technology is defined as civil technology 
with military or criminal misuse potential. Dual use sciences and technologies are 
problematic, because banning them is impossible since this would inhibit the devel-
opment of beneficial peaceful applications such as new medicine or novel food. In 
addition, the current legal framework is insufficient to govern emerging new tech-
nologies. Innovation in dual use technologies calls for additional voluntary self- 
governance of the scientific and industrial communities concerned.
In general, innovation impacts laws through the following mechanism. Laws 
governing technologies are formal instruments, adopted by legislative authorities, 
which regulate the market access and permitted properties and uses of known tech-
nological products, processes and systems. Future technological innovation can be 
addressed to some extent during the formulation of laws, e.g. through “general pur-
pose criteria” in the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions prohibiting any 
kind of chemical, biological or toxin substance for hostile purposes, implicitly cov-
ering also substances which did not exist at the time of adopting the convention.
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However, innovation tends to create uncertain and unforeseen impacts, which 
often go beyond the imagination of lawmakers (Trump et al. 2020a). This unpredict-
ability of emerging technologies calls for regular updating of existing laws or even 
adoption of new laws. E.g. the increasing popularity of innovative drones among 
hobbyists (e.g. airborne cameras) and commercial service providers (e.g. delivery 
drones) has led to discussion on the adoption of new laws regulating unmanned 
aerial vehicles (c.f. Finger et al. 2015). Nevertheless, the laws update process is dif-
ficult and takes time to catch up with technological innovation, because of that, in 
many cases, when the new law is out, it is already outdated.
The formulation of legal texts related to science and innovation are based on 
sound scientific evidence, the collection of which is time consuming, and on consul-
tations with the relevant stakeholders, often with conflicting interests and diverging 
views. In these circumstances, soft law (e.g. EU or UNESCO Recommendations) or 
voluntary codes of conduct are often used as complementary instruments to fill the 
formal legislative deficit.
After presenting the current legal framework governing dual use life sciences 
and biosecurity, we will discuss some ethical concepts and instruments that could be 
used to govern this domain. How these ethical instruments can work out in practice, 
and which stakeholders should be involved is illustrated in the subsequent case 
study of dual use life sciences in Armenia. The chapter ends with some conclusions 
and recommendations.
5.2  Capacity Building in Dual Use Export Control in TI 
Partner Countries
The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) and the Science and 
Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) are intergovernmental organizations estab-
lished in 1992 and 1993, respectively as unique multilateral mechanisms to prevent 
proliferation of ex-Soviet scientific know-how related to weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD). By sponsoring and facilitating scientific cooperation, the two Centers 
seek to integrate these scientists into the international community and redirect their 
talents into peaceful, sustainable, civilian work. Between them, the ISTC and STCU 
Recipient membership include most of the former Soviet Independent States. Both 
Centers have the legal status of intergovernmental organizations with diplomatic 
privileges in the member countries where they work.
In the last two decades, the threat that non-state actors may acquire chemical, 
biological, radioactive or nuclear (CBRN) weapons has become an increasing con-
cern for the international community. Taking into consideration the fast pace of 
scientific and technological change that is taking place in the ISTC/STCU coun-
tries, both Centers have developed new delivery mechanisms for science & technol-
ogy projects over the past 10 years described as Targeted Initiatives (TI’s). One of 
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them is a Targeted Initiative on CBRN Export Control on Dual-Use Materials and 
Technologies funded by the European Commission.
The partner counties (PC) of the TI are Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
The Targeted Initiative focuses on mitigating the risks of misuse of the investiga-
tions and know-how related to CBRN weapons programs; the raising of awareness 
among both the academic and industrial community of these risks, as well as facili-
tating the collaboration between state and non-state actors of Export Control sys-
tems in PC’s.
The Targeted Initiative includes the following activities:
• Development of a network of scientists and activities related to responsible sci-
ence and ethics;
• Development of a master course and other customized courses on export control;
• Grants for PhD students from the Partner countries; and
• Outreach to Industry, including handbooks development and commodity identi-
fication courses.
Since the start of the activities under the TI, the Centers have carried out several 
regional seminars to raise awareness among researchers, academics, industry, and 
government representatives.
In September 2019, in conjunction with Taras Shevchenko National University 
of Kyiv, Ukraine, a master program on Economic security of Entrepreneurship 
including modules on export control was launched.
Furthermore, within the TI activities, local experts from Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, 
Moldova, Ukraine and Azerbaijan developed handbooks on export control. These 
handbooks will be available free of charge to the public with an intention to facili-
tate the access to the information and improve the control of dual-use goods.
In Kazakhstan, a group of experts is working on an Internal Compliance Program 
(ICP) model to be used by industries, which will then be made available to all part-
ner countries.
In August 2019, the Centers held a meeting in Ypres, Belgium, for young scien-
tists, in order to raise awareness of the potential misuse of their research and the 
importance of ethics in education. The outcome was very impressive with many of 
the scientists developing projects on ethics and education to be run in their own 
countries, for young students.
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5.3  Legal Framework Governing Dual Use Life Sciences 
and Biosecurity
There are several legal instruments governing dual use life sciences, each of them 
with different characteristics and imposing different obligations to signatories and 
partner countries.
5.3.1  Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare – Geneva Protocol of 17 June 19251
The Geneva Protocol was drawn up and signed at a conference which was held in 
Geneva under the auspices of the League of Nations from 4 May to 17 June 1925, 
and it entered into force on 8 February 1928.
The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons 
in war: “asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of 
warfare.” It recognizes the significance of bringing together controls on chemical 
and biological weapons. It prohibits the use of such weapons. A number of coun-
tries submitted reservations when becoming parties to the Geneva Protocol, declar-
ing that they only regarded the non-use obligations as applying to other parties and 
that these obligations would cease to apply if the prohibited weapons were used 
against them. The main elements of the protocol are now considered by many to be 
part of customary international law.
Armenia signed the Protocol on 13 March 2018.
5.3.2  The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons 
and on Their Destruction2
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, com-
monly known as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) or Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is a legally binding multilateral treaty that 




I. Malsch and M. Espona
71
for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. It currently has 183 states- 
parties, including Palestine, and four signatories (Egypt, Haiti, Somalia and Syria). 
Ten states have neither signed nor ratified the BTWC (Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Israel, Kiribati, Micronesia, Namibia, South Sudan and Tuvalu).
The BTWC bans the development, production, acquisition, transfer, retention, 
stockpiling and use of
• Biological agents and toxins “of types and in quantities that have no justification 
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;”
• Weapons, equipment, and delivery vehicles “designed to use such agents or tox-
ins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.”
The convention further requires states-parties to destroy or divert to peaceful 
purposes the “agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery” described 
above within nine months of the convention’s entry into force. Accordingly, many 
States Parties have adopted national legislation and regulations to implement the 
prohibitions of the Convention. The BTWC does not ban the use of biological and 
toxin weapons but reaffirms the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits such use. It 
also does not ban biodefense programs.
In contrast to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the BTWC has no verification 
mechanism to monitor compliance, and negotiations on the creation of such a mech-
anism have stalled to date. The treaty regime mandates that states-parties solve 
compliance concerns consulting each other and also allows states-parties to lodge a 
complaint with the UN Security Council who can investigate compliance issues; but 
this power has never been invoked.
At the Sixth Review Conference (2006), the States parties adopted by consensus 
a detailed plan for promoting universal adherence and decided to update and stream-
line the procedures for submission and distribution of the Confidence-Building 
Measures (CBMs). They also adopted a comprehensive intersessional programme 
spanning from 2007 to 2010 that included activities related to the implementation of 
the obligations that arise from different articles of the treaty. In a significant devel-
opment, the Conference agreed to establish an Implementation Support Unit (ISU) 
to assist States parties in implementing the Convention. The ISU -a 3 persons team- 
has been established for the BTWC within the Geneva Branch of the United Nations 
Office for Disarmament Affairs, which is also tasked with outreach activities. But in 
practice, education, outreach and awareness-raising activities take place in scien-
tific, professional and academic associations, bodies and institutions within States 
Parties.
Recently, and in particular in the wake of the evolution of more sophisticated/
complex terrorism threats and actions, a renewed interest in ensuring greater global 
participation and implementation of the BTWC has rapidly emerged. So, States 
Parties agreed to promote the effective implementation of the Convention nation-
ally, including integration into education; outreach; and raising awareness.
In 1994, Armenia joined the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).
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5.3.3  United Nation Security Council Resolution No. 1540 
(UNSCR 1540)3
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 places an international 
obligation on all Members of the UN to take action against the proliferation of 
WMD. UNSCR 1540 is a legally binding international instrument with the objec-
tive to prevent non-state actors from acquiring and using WMD, which has been 
widely used as a common legal basis for states to use when drafting and promoting 
strategic trade control legislation. The resolution also encourages international 
cooperation to achieve its goals and raise awareness among the national stakehold-
ers to have a sound implementation of the Resolution.
The control lists agreed in the multilateral regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group, 
Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime and Wassenaar Arrangement) 
have become an informal part of international law, since they are (vaguely) referred 
to in UNSCR 1540. In a footnote, UNSCR 1540 defines related materials as ‘mate-
rials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral treaties and 
arrangements, or included on national control lists, which could be used for the 
design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weap-
ons and their means of delivery’.
Armenia sent information to the 1540 Committee on the following dates: 9 
November 2004, 21 December 2005, 12 December 2007, 4 March 2014 and 22 
August 2016.
The country matrix was approved on 23 December 2015. It contains all the rel-
evant provisions related to the implementation of the UNSCR 1540 on the nuclear, 
chemical and biological fields included in the Constitution, Criminal Code and 
other legal instruments.
The 1540 Committee uses the matrices as a reference tool for facilitating technical assis-
tance and to enable the Committee to continue to enhance its dialogue with States on their 
implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The matrices are not a tool for 
measuring compliance of States in their non-proliferation obligations but for facilitating the 
implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008), 
1977 (2011) and 2325 (2016).4
5.3.4  National Laws and Law Enforcement
Internally, each country must fulfil the obligations assumed at the time they become 
part of the international instruments above-mentioned. According with their legal 
system, they will issue the laws that are required to comply with the treaties.
3 https://undocs.org/S/RES/1540(2004)
4 https://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/national-implementation/1540-matrices.shtml
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When it comes to the enforcement there are many nuances related to both the 
extent of the dual use related sector in the country (not only the industry but the 
universities and academia), the commitment of the state with WMD non- 
proliferation, the risk perception analysis on the topic and the availability of 
resources (human and financial) to do the task.
Because of the disparity between countries, many international programs are in 
place to help them to have a sound implementation of their international obligations.
Our TI on Export Control is linked to the countries’ obligations under the UNSC 
1540 as well as the BTWC.
In 2010 Armenia adopted a Law on control over the circulation of goods and 
technologies of dual use which substituted an analogous law adopted in 2003. For 
the implementation of the law, the Government of Armenia adopted a Decree No 
1785 of 15.12.2011, which confirmed the control list of dual-use goods. The list 
follows the European list of controlled dual-use goods and technologies and it is 
frequently updated according to the changes of the European lists.
The violations of the obligation of the international treaties regarding biological 
weapons is included in the Armenian Criminal Code, mainly in articles 284–286 
and 386–387.5
5.4  Ethics of Dual Use Life Sciences
The legal framework described above constitutes a solid foundation for governing 
dual use life sciences. As mentioned in the introduction, this legal basis should be 
complemented by respect for fundamental ethical principles. From an ethical per-
spective, four concepts are relevant for governance of dual use life sciences: human 
rights, justice, war and peace, and responsibility.
Human rights are fundamental and inalienable, meaning that the rights of any 
human being should always be respected, even if they would not be formally written 
down in a positive legal text. Human rights are universal, meaning that everyone is 
entitled to the rights. International law includes positive formulations of human 
rights, distinguishing civil and political liberties, and socio-economic rights.6 This 
formalisation is a continuing process leading to the recognition of new rights under 
the influence of social as well as technological innovations. Some current discus-
sions address the recognition of rights for human embryos, animals and cyborgs 
(cybernetic organisms, e.g. combining robotic and human body-parts). Several tech-
nologies can impact human rights in different ways. For example, innovation in 
biomedical technologies can affect the right to life, human dignity, informed con-
sent and other health-related rights. Emerging Information and Communication 
5 https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/armenia_criminal_code_html/Armenia_Criminal_
Code_of_the_Republic_of_Armenia_2009.pdf
6 C.f. UN Treaty collection: https://treaties.un.org/
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Technologies (ICT) influence the way privacy, personal data protection, civil and 
political rights and the right to decent working conditions can be protected. Novel 
agricultural or food technologies can affect socio-economic rights of farmers and 
consumers. Human rights are not absolute: trade-offs between different rights must 
be found in a continuing balancing act, e.g. between academic freedom for life sci-
entists and biosecurity for society at large.7
Justice is a concept which intrinsically calls for balancing the rights of different 
individuals and social communities. New technology tends to impact this balance in 
different ways. For example, the right to ownership presupposes a delicate balance 
between protection of intellectual property for inventors and companies versus the 
universal right to reap the fruits of progress in science for the common good. As new 
technologies emerge, this balance may shift. For example, the European Group on 
Ethics highlighted potential ethical issues related to protection of intellectual prop-
erty raised by innovation in nanomedicine: “According to the current regulatory 
system for patenting, some exemptions are allowed with regard to the patentability 
of therapeutic and surgical procedures. The exemptions in the present patent system 
are based on a balance of interests whereby diagnosis, therapy and research should 
be available to patients without patents being a hindrance. This is likely to be blurred 
because the new nanomaterials may logically fall within more than one category. To 
protect the ethical position that has led to these exemptions it is important to ensure 
that patents in these new areas do not alter the current balance. There are risks of 
overly broad patents being granted that may hinder their therapeutic availability. 
This is also the case for nanomedicine.” (EGE 2007). In addition, fairness may be 
affected if technology gives rise to a changing gap between haves and have-nots. 
New surveillance technologies can facilitate shifting the balance between liberty 
and security towards securitization by “big brothers” (governments monitoring the 
movements of citizens without a reasonable ground) and “little sisters” (private 
companies and citizens spying on each other).8
Dual use technologies sit squarely at the crossroads between war and peace, 
which are the focus of several philosophical ethical theories including pacifism9 and 
the Just War Theory.10 The former prohibits the use of violence to solve conflicts 
between states, while the latter imposes threshold for political decisions to go to war 
(Jus ad Bellum) and humanitarian rules for conduct of armed forces during a war 
(Jus in Bello). International Humanitarian Law11 can be considered a positive for-
mulation of Just War Theory. Some conventions including the Geneva Conventions 
and arms control treaties including the Biological and Chemical Weapons 
Conventions extend their scope to military and dual use research and innovation. 
7 Read more about the philosophical concept “Human Rights” here: https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/rights-human/
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Notably, Article 36 of the First Protocol of the Geneva Convention (8 June 1977) 
reads: “In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means 
or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine 
whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this 
Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High 
Contracting Party.”
Dual use life sciences are simultaneously subject to human rights including the 
right to academic freedom and ownership of intellectual property, and to interna-
tional humanitarian rights, including the ban on use of life science knowledge and 
technologies for hostile purposes. Malsch (2013) includes a suggestion for balanc-
ing these rights, by extending the scope of some Just War principles to military and 
civil security research and balancing these with academic ethical principles govern-
ing peaceful uses. In the early stages of dual use research, from basic research 
(Technology Readiness Level, TRL 1)12 until TRL 5 (technology validated in rele-
vant environment) as well as commercial dual use research from TRL 6 (technology 
demonstrated in relevant environment) until TRL9 (actual system proven in opera-
tional environment), care should be taken to balance freedom and security, and dual 
use risk and technology assessment should be performed in parallel to the 
R&D. Advance civil security research (TRL 6–9), such as the development of sen-
sor technologies for controlling access to life science laboratories, should in addi-
tion address the Just War principles of Just Intent and Proportionality. Advanced 
legitimate military research (TRL 6–9) such as biodefence is subject only to Just 
War principles Just Intent, Legitimate Authority and Proportionality.
The principle of collective responsibility for progress in science and technology 
was formulated by the philosopher Hans Jonas (1979). In short, he asserted that sci-
ence and technology can potentially contribute to catastrophic risks, e.g. by large 
scale use of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. To prevent the extinction of 
humankind he foresaw, all people must contribute to a collective responsibility. In 
his view, worst case scenarios must be developed as the basis for strict regulation of 
science and technology. Since then, the interdisciplinary field of technology assess-
ment has emerged (c.f. Banta 2009), and several methodologies have been devel-
oped for risk management and risk governance. Currently, most experts seek to 
strike a balance between potential benefits and risks. A related trend is the shift from 
government to governance. Government implies that national authorities in a State 
have the sole responsibility to protect their citizens, environment, and national inter-
ests. Governance implies that governments share a collective responsibility with 
non-state actors, including companies, the research community, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and citizens. However, responsible governance of innovation 
is not straightforward, because of “many hands” (c.f. Poel et al. 2015) or “wicked 
problems”13: in the current system with a globalised economy, national legal 
12 Read more on Technology Readiness Levels: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technology_ 
readiness_level
13 C.f.: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wicked_problem
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 sovereignty and international governmental organisations, too many parties take 
responsibility for their own part of the problem, nobody has the capacity to take 
responsible for the common good, and unforeseen negative consequences are not 
addressed (Trump et al. 2020a, b). The need for institutional reform is often stressed 
by UN institutions, Multinational companies (World Economic Forum), International 
NGOs and the Scientific community (c.f. Malsch 2018).
5.5  Case Study Life Sciences and Biosecurity in Armenia
On 17–19 May 2019, we organised a Responsible Research and Innovation Course 
for young researchers in Armenia, together with Kai Ilchmann and Hrayr Azizbekyan 
in the framework of the ISTC TI on export control. An interdisciplinary group of 15 
young researchers participated. One of the key case studies demonstrated how inno-
vation can undermine law focused on biosecurity issues. The present chapter dis-
cusses the responsible governance of dual use life sciences and biosecurity in 
Armenia, based on the course materials.
Biology, biomedical sciences, agriculture and other life sciences are double 
edged swords. The same knowledge, materials and technologies are needed to cure 
or feed people but can also be misused to kill people or to destroy livestock or food 
crops (biological weapons). Bio risk management is needed, consisting of two dis-
tinct approached. Biosafety aims to “protect people from bad bugs” (natural or acci-
dental infectious disease outbreaks), while biosecurity aims to “protect bugs from 
bad people” (human-made epidemics). Biosecurity can be protected through legal, 
social, and technological means. In the legal dimension, biological weapons are 
prohibited through the abovementioned international agreements and national laws, 
but also through professional codes of conduct for researchers and companies, 
including the Statement on Biosecurity published by the Inter-Academies 
Partnership (IAP) in 2005.14 The code includes these principles: Awareness, Safety 
and Security, Education and Information, Accountability and Oversight. The 
National Academy of Sciences of Armenia is among the 70 national academies 
which endorsed this code.
Technological biosecurity measures include infrastructure and equipment in 
laboratories at increasingly stringent biosafety levels (1–4).15 In addition to techno-
logical means for protecting the Occupational Health and Safety of laboratory staff, 
safer-by-design methods are under development, which can limit the feasibility of 
misusing life sciences for hostile purposes. Social biosecurity measures include 
peer review of laboratory risk management including site visits. Researcher train-
ing, security screening of employees and dialogue with stakeholders and citizens 
14 https://www.interacademies.org/17806/Biosecurity and http://www.interacademies.org/10878/ 
13912.aspx
15 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biosafety_level
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about biosecurity measures are also useful social means to raise awareness of bios-
ecurity issues.
5.6  Dual Use Life Sciences in Armenia
Life science research is performed in Yerevan State University, Armenian State 
Agrarian University, and several institutes of the National Academy of Sciences: the 
institutes of Zoology, Hydroponics, Botany, Molecular Biology, Organic Chemistry 
and the centre of microbiology and deposition of microorganisms. The Scientific 
Centres of Agrobiotechnology and of Vegetable-Melons and Industrial Crops of the 
ministry of agriculture and the Scientific Research Institute of Biotechnology of the 
Ministry of Economy are also involved (Hovhannisyan and Yesayan 2010). In addi-
tion to the biological research in universities, nature is also a possible source of 
biosafety and biosecurity risks. Some infectious diseases are endemic in the terri-
tory of Armenia, including plague (in 80% of the country), tularaemia, anthrax, 
yersiniosis, leptospirosis, and erysipeloid (Hovhannisyan and Yesayan 2010).
As mentioned in the section on the regulatory framework, Armenia has adopted 
the BWC already in 1994. The capacity for bio risk management has been built up 
in international projects since then. Recent international cooperation projects 
include the following. In 2013–15, UNICRI16 funded several biosecurity projects in 
Armenia, focusing on food safety risk assessment, and the work of ministries for 
emergencies, agriculture, public health, and livestock disease surveillance. The 
USA and EU have also invested in infrastructural laboratory safety and building 
human capacity to comply with biosafety protocols including the WHO biosafety 
manual. Armenian researchers including Avetisyan et al. (2017) surveyed the status 
quo in medical laboratories and recommended introducing biosafety manuals and 
training for the personnel. Likewise, Danielyan and Mnatsakanyan (2017) recom-
mended setting up training, working groups and investment in biosafety and biose-
curity measures. Indeed, such training and capacity building has continued since 
then. For example, in 2018, the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) 
organised seven workshops in Armenia to strengthen laboratory biosafety, training 
75 participants from 38 laboratories, with EU funding. In addition, ISTC organised 
a seminar on dual use export control in Yerevan.17
16 http://www.unicri.it/index.php
17 C.f. www.istc.int
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5.7  Discussing Ethical Dilemmas
While most of the capacity building on dual use export control focused on transfer-
ring knowledge on national and international legal requirements and on technologi-
cal and infrastructural safeguards for implementing biosecurity and biosafety, in the 
Responsible Research and Innovation Course, we raised some ethical dilemmas 
connected to dual use life sciences and biosecurity issues. The first addressed what 
would be an appropriate balance between openness and confidentiality in academic 
dual use research. The second addressed balancing public and private responsibili-
ties in governing biosecurity. The third addressed the acceptability of do-it-yourself 
biology with dual use potential. All three cases were based on ethical issues which 
had been discussed in other countries, where private biotechnology companies and 
do-it-yourself biology laboratories were more common than in Armenia. For exam-
ple, some participating young researchers had not heard about do-it-yourself biol-
ogy and were concerned about the implications of allowing this outside of the 
institutional oversight in universities.
As most of the dual use life sciences research in Armenia is academic at 
Technology Readiness Levels 1–5, Malsch (2013) would recommend dialogue to 
reach agreement on the appropriate balance between fostering academic freedom 
and protection biosafety and biosecurity. The capacity building activities including 
training staff in biosafety and biosecurity measures are suitable ways to foster such 
dialogue. In addition, the research performed in the facilities should be accompa-
nied by dual use risk and technology assessment, to monitor emerging biosafety and 
biosecurity risks.
During the RRI Course, we pointed out the limitations of legal instruments for 
governing dual use life sciences and called for collective responsibility for dual use 
research in a “web of prevention” perspective (Dando 2000; Rappert and McLeish 
2007). In this case, regulation is not enough, because lifesaving and economically 
useful research is inherently dual use. In addition, rapid progress in science and 
technology undermines existing legislation. Collective responsibility for frontier 
research implies distinct role responsibilities for the involved actors. Governments 
should perform oversight, improve regulation, and organise public and stakeholder 
dialogue. Scientists should contribute their expertise in science for policy, train stu-
dents, develop and abide by codes of conduct, conduct confidence building peer 
review, participate in academic and public dialogue, and apply their knowledge in 
safer-by-design research. Companies handling dual use biological materials includ-
ing pharmaceutical and food producing industry should take their corporate social 
responsibility, develop and abide by biosafety and biosecurity codes of conduct, 
inform policy makers about innovations which could influence the current legal 
framework governing biosecurity, host site visits as part of confidence building 
measures, and participate in public and stakeholder dialogue. NGOs should contrib-
ute to raising public awareness of biosecurity issues, campaign for governmental 
oversight of dual use life sciences activities, and participate in public dialogue. 
Citizens should also participate in public dialogue.
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5.8  Conclusions and Recommendations
Besides knowledge transfer, the course programme featured lively discussions 
about the role of scientists in the contemporary Armenian society. Several partici-
pants were keen on developing skills in science communication. Inspired by exist-
ing codes of conduct including the IAP Statement on Biosecurity, the participants 
expressed the intention to develop an “Apaga Declaration” including common ethi-
cal principles governing their research. The development of such a new contextual-
ised declaration is more important than simply endorsing an existing code because 
the underlying rationale is to raise awareness about ethical issues and to stimulate 
scientists to reflect on the decisions they take in their daily practice. In addition to 
investing in infrastructural and institutional conditions ensuring biosafety and bios-
ecurity, it is important to continuously train young generations of scientists in labo-
ratory safety practices. In addition, these young generations will need to acquire 
skills in two-way science communication, to be able to participate in public debate 
around responsible science and ethics topics. Civil Society Organisations and com-
munities are becoming more critical of the role of science in society, and it is impor-
tant that scientists are not only persuasive in transmitting their enthusiasm for 
science, but also aware of genuine concerns about potential risks and ethical issues 
related to their research.
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6.1  Introduction
In the run-up to the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention (BTWC) – the principal international agreement that outlaws 
the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, and retention of biological 
and toxin weapons – the US National Research Council published a report which 
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highlighted three trends in science and technology that affect the scope and opera-
tion of the BTWC:
• The rapid pace of change in the life sciences and related fields;
• The increasing diffusion of life sciences research capacity and its applications, 
both geographically and outside traditional research environments; and
• The extent to which scientific and technical (engineering) disciplines beyond 
biology are increasingly involved in life sciences research and innovation.1
The advancement of synthetic biology over the past two decades epitomises 
these three trends and underscores the need to develop and implement effective 
mechanisms for safeguarding all life sciences activities against accidental or delib-
erate misuse.
Synthetic biology is a fast-growing interdisciplinary field that combines the prin-
ciples of engineering with the knowledge in biology to generate technologies and 
products with applications in agriculture, healthcare, foods, materials science, and 
more by enabling the design, redesign, manufacture and/or modification of genetic 
material, living organisms, and biological (eco)systems.2 Such enabling capabilities 
are inherently dual-use: on the one hand, they can benefit the advancement of life 
science R&D, but on the other, they might also be misused to cause harm to humans, 
animals, or the environment (e.g. through the development of biological weapons). 
The biosafety and biosecurity implications of synthetic biology are being consid-
ered within the framework of different international agreements, such as the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 
the International Health Regulations (IHRs), and the BTWC. In 2014, the Conference 
of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, recognising the potential 
1 National Research Council, Life Sciences and Related Fields: Trends Relevant to the Biological 
Weapons Convention. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2011, available at https://
doi.org/10.17226/13130. See also J.A.  Carrera, A.J.  Castiglioni, P.M.  Heine, ‘Chemical and 
Biological Contract Manufacturing Services: Potential Proliferation Concerns and Impacts on 




2 A. Nouri and S. Seyedin-Noor, ‘Synthetic Biology: A Call for a New Culture of Responsibility’, 
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 7 December 2018, available at https://thebulletin.org/2018/12/
synthetic- biology-a-call-for-a-new-culture-of-responsibility/; CBD Ad Hoc Technical Expert 
Group on Synthetic Biology, Report of the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Synthetic Biology, 
UNEP/CBD/SYNBIO/AHTEG/2015/1/3, 7 October 2015, Montreal, Canada, available at https://
www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/synbio/synbioahteg-2015-01/official/synbioahteg-2015-01-03-en.pdf; 
NASEM, Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology, National Academies Press, Washington DC, 
2018; J. Zhang et al., The Transnational Governance of Synthetic Biology: Scientific Uncertainty, 
Cross-Borderness, and the ‘Art’ of Governance, BIOS Working Paper No. 4, 2011, BIOS, London 
School of Economics and Political Science, London. Available at https://royalsociety.org/~/media/
Royal_Society_Content/policy/publications/2011/4294977685.pdf; R.  Carlson, Biology is 
Technology: The Promise, Peril, and New Business of Engineering Life, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge MA, 2010.
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impact that technologies with synthetic life, cells or genomes can have on the con-
servation and sustainable use of biological diversity, decided to establish an Ad Hoc 
Technical Expert Group on Synthetic Biology.3 The mandate of the AHTEG 
includes, inter alia, the identification of the potential benefits and risks of organ-
isms, components, and products arising from synthetic biology techniques to the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, as well as any related human health 
and socioeconomic impacts relevant to the Convention and its Protocols.4 The work 
of the AHTEG is directly pertinent to the functioning of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety to the CBD. The Cartagena Protocol aims to ensure the safe handling, 
transport, and use of living modified organisms (LMOs) resulting from modern bio-
technology that may have adverse effects on biological diversity, taking also into 
account risks to human health.5 The convergence of chemistry and biology and its 
implications for the Chemical Weapons Convention  – the principal international 
agreement that outlaws the development, production, and use of chemical weap-
ons – are being reviewed by the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) of the Organisation 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).6 The benefits and risks of recent 
life science advances such as genome editing have been considered during the 
BTWC proceedings, in order to ensure that related knowledge, materials, and tech-
niques are utilised only for peaceful, protective, and prophylactic purposes.7 
Synthetic biology has also been addressed in the context of global health security, 
particularly with regard to the need for strengthening laboratory biosafety and bios-
ecurity norms and fostering a culture of responsibility in the life sciences.8
Despite the growing recognition of the dual-use potential of synthetic biology, 
developing viable mechanisms for mitigating biosafety and biosecurity concerns 
3 Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Decision XII/24. New and 
emerging issues: synthetic biology, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/XII/24, 17 October 2014, Pyeongchang, 
Republic of Korea, available at https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-12/cop-12-dec-24-en.pdf.
4 Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Decision XII/24. New and 
emerging issues: synthetic biology, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/XII/24, 17 October 2014, Pyeongchang, 
Republic of Korea, available at https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-12/cop-12-dec-24-en.pdf.
5 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 11 September 2003, 
available at http://bch.cbd.int/protocol.
6 OPCW Scientific Advisory Board, Report of the Scientific Advisory Board on Developments in 
Science and Technology for the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to 
Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, RC-4/DG.1, 30 April 2018, The 
Hague, The Netherlands, available at https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/CSP/
RC-4/en/rc4dg01_e_.pdf.
7 See, for example, BTWC Meeting of Experts on Review of developments in the field of science 
and technology related to the Convention, Report of the 2018 Meeting of Experts on review of 
developments in the field of science and technology related to the Convention, BWC/MSP/2018/
MX.2/3, 12 November 2018, Geneva, Switzerland, available at https://undocs.org/BWC/
MSP/2018/MX.2/3.
8 World Health Organisation, Responsible Life Sciences Research for Global Health Security: A 
Guidance Document, 2010, Geneva, Switzerland, available at https://www.who.int/csr/resources/
publications/HSE_GAR_BDP_2010_2/en/.
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without significantly impeding research and innovation remains a challenge. This is 
largely due to the fact that under international law dual-use research per se is not 
illicit, as long as it meets the general purpose criterion enshrined in Article I of 
the BTWC:
“Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, 
produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of 
production, of types and quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or 
other peaceful purposes. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, https://www.un.org/
disarmament/biological- weapons/.”
The general purpose criterion is intended as a comprehensive prohibition of bio-
logical and toxin weapons. However, as the negotiations on the development of an 
international verification protocol to the BTWC have demonstrated, devising a tech-
nical system for compliance with the provisions of the Convention has significant 
limitations, which, unless fully addressed run the risk of undermining the effective-
ness of the biological prohibition regime and compromising its integrity. Upholding 
the general purpose criterion thus requires an integrated set of policies, initiatives, 
and measures that are flexible and accommodating of the interests and goals of the 
different stakeholders. In other words, it requires the in-depth implementation of the 
existing international biosafety and biosecurity regulations, in order to promote, 
foster, and sustain a strong and viable culture of biosafety, biosecurity, and respon-
sible conduct of science. Such a culture manifests itself in shared beliefs, attitudes, 
and patterns of behaviour of individuals and organisations that can support, comple-
ment or enhance operating procedures, rules, and practices, as well as professional 
standards and ethics designed to prevent the unintentional (accidental) or inten-
tional release of biological agents and toxins.9 A robust safety and security culture 
is an integral element of high reliability organisations and an essential prerequisite 
for mitigating the risk of ‘normal accidents’ associated with advanced technology.10 
The Eighth Review Conference of the BTWC in 2016 acknowledged the essential 
contribution that the life science community can make to promoting and sustaining 
such a culture. When considering the national implementation of the Convention, 
the Conference agreed on the value of measures to:
9 International Working Group, A Guide to Training and Information Resources on the Culture of 
Biosafety, Biosecurity, and Responsible Conduct in the Life Sciences, 2019, available at https://
absa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/CULTURE_TRAINING_CATALOGUE.pdf.
10 K.  Roberts, ‘New Challenges in Organisational Research: High Reliability Organisations’, 
Organizations and Environment, vol. 3:2 (1989), pp. 111–125; G. Rochlin, ‘Reliable Organisations: 
Present Research and Future Directions’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, vol. 
4:2 (1996), pp. 55–59; Ch. Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999); N. Goodman, Shifting the Blame: Literature, Law, and 
the Theory of Accidents in Nineteenth-Century America, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1998); Tim Trevan ‘Biological Research: Rethink Biosafety’, Nature, 11 November 2015.
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 (a) implement voluntary management standards on biosafety and biosecurity;
 (b) encourage the consideration of development of appropriate arrangements to promote aware-
ness among relevant professionals in the private and public sectors and throughout relevant 
scientific and administrative activities;
 (c) promote amongst those working in the biological sciences awareness of the obligations of 
States Parties under the Convention, as well as relevant national legislation and guidelines;
 (d) promote the development of training and education programmes for those granted access to 
biological agents and toxins relevant to the Convention and for those with the knowledge or 
capacity to modify such agents and toxins;
 (e) encourage the promotion of a culture of responsibility amongst relevant national professionals 
and the voluntary development, adoption and promulgation of codes of conduct.11
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of the synthetic biology com-
munity in strengthening biosafety and biosecurity and safeguarding synthetic biol-
ogy against accidental and deliberate misuse. The chapter argues that biosafety and 
biosecurity education, awareness-raising, and outreach are essential for fostering 
effective bottom-up (self-governance) approaches for biosafety and biosecurity risk 
management. Section 6.2 provides an overview of the structure of the synthetic biol-
ogy community underscoring its complexity in terms of (1) professional interdisci-
plinarity, (2) diversity of stakeholders, and (3) dynamic landscape with professional 
and non-professional actors moving from one context to another over time. Section 
6.3 then examines the prevalent perceptions and framing of biosafety and biosecu-
rity risks within the synthetic biology community, in order to identify options for 
enhancing stakeholder engagement and leveraging the diversity of expertise within 
the synthetic biology community for promoting responsible research and innovation 
practices (Sect. 6.4). The conclusion (Sect. 6.5) outlines a summary of the key find-
ings in this chapter.
6.2  Structure of the Synthetic Biology Community
Synthetic biology has developed as a result of the convergence of knowledge, tech-
niques, and tools of different scientific disciplines such as systems biology, genetic 
engineering, mechanical and electrical engineering, information technology, phys-
ics, chemistry, nanotechnologies, and computer modelling.12 The Lego analogy is 
commonly used to illustrate the potential of synthetic biology: just as Lego bricks 
of different colour, shape, and size can be combined together to build new 
11 Eighth Review Conference of the States Parties of the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and 
on Their Destruction, Final Document, BWC/CONF.VIII/4, 11 January 2017, Geneva, Switzerland, 
available at https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VIII/4.
12 United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), Security 
Implications of Synthetic Biology and Nanobiotechnology: A Risk and Response Assessment of 
Advances in Biotechnology (Turin: UNICRI, 2012), http://www.unicri.it/special_topics/nanobio-
technology/security_report/.
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structures, so can genes and proteins be used as building blocks to create new kinds 
of cells and new biological functions for cells.13 In some respects, the evolution of 
synthetic biology follows the consolidation of molecular biology throughout the 
1930s, which facilitated the characterisation of the structure of the DNA molecule 
and culminated in the emergence of gene splicing experiments in the early 1970s. 
As noted in the National Research Council 2009 report, ‘A New Biology for the 21st 
Century’:
Biology is at a point of inflection. Years of research have generated detailed information 
about the components of the complex systems that characterize life – genes, cells, organ-
isms, ecosystems – and this knowledge has begun to fuse into greater understanding of how 
all those components work together as systems. Powerful tools are allowing biologists to 
probe complex systems in ever-greater detail, from molecular events in individual cells to 
global biogeochemical cycles. Integration within biology and increasingly fruitful collabo-
ration with physical, earth, and computational scientists, mathematicians and engineers are 
making it possible to predict and control the activities of biological systems in ever greater 
detail. 14
Within this context, synthetic biology could be considered a game-changing 
technology, rather than just a novel scientific discipline.15 For one thing, it allows 
an unprecedented access to cutting-edge tools, techniques, and methods for manip-
ulating biological and biochemical systems to an increasingly diverse range of 
practitioners outside traditional life science domains. This is manifested in the 
horizontal interdisciplinary diversity across the synthetic biology community 
which includes engineers, computer and materials scientists, and chemists. 
Synthetic biology has further attracted the interest of designers and artists, as well 
as given rise to a fast- growing global ‘do-it-yourself’ (DIY) movement of ‘ama-
teur/garage’ biologists, some having little or no formal science education or 
research credentials.16
The synthetic biology community is heterogeneous in terms of stakeholders, too. 
As far as academic research and teaching are concerned, relevant courses are 
embedded within the formal curricula of universities at undergraduate and post- 
graduate level around the world. There are specialised synthetic biology academic 
research centres, institutes, and ad-hoc societies for advancing innovation and 
scholarship. A case in point is the BioBricks Foundation, a not-for-profit organisa-
tion set up in 2006, in order to promote the use of standardized biological parts that 
13 J.  Collins, ‘Synthetic Biology: Bits and Pieces Come to Life’, Nature, vol. 483 (2012), pp. 
S8–S10.
14 National Research Council, A New Biology for the 21st Century (Washington DC: National 
Academies Press, 2009), available at https://www.nap.edu/catalog/12764/a-new-biology-for- 
the-21st-century.
15 R. Carlson, Biology is Technology: The Promise, Peril, and New Business of Engineering Life, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2010.
16 R. Sleator, ‘Synthetic Biology: From Mainstream to Counterculture’, Archives in Microbiology, 
vol. 198 (2016), pp. 711–713, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00203-016-1257-x.
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are safe, ethical, cost effective and openly accessible.17 National science academies, 
individually and collectively carry out periodic monitoring of the state of science in 
the field, organise meetings and events, and conduct high-level assessments of the 
social, economic, environmental, or security impact of novel scientific and techno-
logical advances.18
Synthetic biology finds a wide-ranging application in the biotechnology industry, 
particularly in the field of drug development, plant breeding, food production, and as 
an alternative to  petrochemical manufacturing. The commercial sector further 
includes gene synthesis companies – firms that sell synthetic DNA – as well as start-
up companies, social entrepreneurs, and bio-incubators – organisations and spaces 
that help projects and startups develop into mature and sustainable businesses.19
Professional associations within industry and academia play an important role in 
developing standardised approaches and practices, promoting competence and 
excellence, and recognising and rewarding positive behaviour. They can also act as 
interlocutors during policy- and decision-making processes.
R&D in the area of synthetic biology benefits from public and private funding 
from a variety of sources, including government agencies, private foundations and 
charities, venture philanthropies, and investors. Government agencies are further 
involved in the administration and regulation of science and research activities.
Science publishers and mass media, including social networks constitute another 
critical stakeholder, not least because of their role in shaping public opinion and 
their responsibility to ensure rigorous and ethical reporting and dissemination of 
information.
The availability of kits, affordable equipment, and commercial services has facil-
itated the emergence of community-style laboratories effectively turning the prac-
tice of biology into a leisure activity open to individuals from all walks of life.20 
Through their activities, non-traditional actors interested in the life sciences, such as 
Do-It-Yourself (DIY) biologists, designers, and artists seek to promote a better 
understanding of biotechnology and ultimately uncover new creative ways of 
resolving societal challenges.
17 BioBricks Foundation, 2020, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20151113084040/http://
biobricks.org/about-foundation/.
18 See, for example, European Academies Science Advisory Council, Synthetic Biology: An 
Introduction, (Brussels: EASAC, 2011), available at https://easac.eu/publications/details/syn-
thetic-biology-an-introduction/; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and 
the Royal Society, Symposium on Opportunities and Challenges in the Emerging Field of Synthetic 
Biology, (OECD, Royal Society, 2010), available at https://sites.nationalacademies.org/pga/stl/
PGA_050738.
19 For more information about bio-incubators, see https://sphere.diybio.org/.
20 National Research Council, Life Sciences and Related Fields: Trends Relevant to the Biological 
Weapons Convention, (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2011), available at https://
doi.org/10.17226/13130; L. Scheifele and T. Burkett, ‘The First Three Years of a Community Lab: 
Lessons Learned and Ways Forward’, Journal of Microbiology and Biology Education, vol. 17:1 
(2016), pp. 81–85.
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The general public is the primary beneficiary and end-user of the materials and 
products generated as a result of the progress of synthetic biology. Ensuring R&D 
integrity, safety, security, and reliability are essential requirements for maintaining 
public trust in science.
The field of synthetic biology is very dynamic, allowing practitioners to fre-
quently change jobs and professional settings. It is possible, for instance, to move 
from academic research to industry and vice versa; to take up biology as a hobby 
with the prospect of becoming a social entrepreneur; or to start one’s own business 
during or after formal schooling. This means that professionals often get exposed to 
different professional cultures, which in turn, enables them to develop a range of 
transferrable skills and increase their capacity for professional adaptation (Fig. 6.1).
6.3  Perceptions of Risks Within the Synthetic 
Biology Community
Risks associated with synthetic biology generally fall into two overarching catego-
ries: biosafety risks that result from accidents or negligent behaviour; and biosecu-
rity risks that result from the deliberate misuse of knowledge, information, or 
materials. The term ‘biosafety’ is defined differently by stakeholders. For the pur-
poses of the present chapter, two definitions of ‘biosafety’ are considered, namely 
the definition of the World Health Organisation and the definition accepted under 
the Convention on Biological Diversity. The World Health Organisation defines bio-
safety as the set of ‘containment principles, technologies, and practices that are 
implemented to prevent the unintentional exposure to biological agents or their 
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inadvertent release’.21 Within the context of the CBD, ‘biosafety’ is understood as 
the ‘safe handling, transport and use of living modified organisms (LMOs) resulting 
from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on biological diversity 
and human health’. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 11 September 2003, available at http://bch.cbd.int/protocol. Taken 
together, these two definitions encompass the spectre of measures, technologies, 
and procedures that are required to ensure occupational health and safety through-
out the research process, as well as the safe handling of research results and products.
The importance of safe laboratory practice is recognised as an essential condi-
tion for conducting work in the area of synthetic biology. Following the first genetic 
engineering experiments in the 1970s which led scientists developing the technol-
ogy to call for a research moratorium, heated debates on the future of work involv-
ing recombinant DNA (rDNA) resulted in an international consensus that research 
should continue but under stringent restrictions.22 The pinnacle of these debates was 
the Asilomar Conference convened in 1975 which brought together some 140 par-
ticipants including scientists, lawyers, journalists, and government officials. The 
recommendations of the conference largely informed the development of the offi-
cial US guidelines for research involving rDNA molecules that were published a 
year later and, to date, are regularly updated.23
The issue of laboratory and environmental safety is explicitly acknowledged in the 
guide ‘Doing Global Science: A Guide to Responsible Conduct in the Global Research 
Enterprise’ that the Inter-Academy Partnership (IAP) published in 2016.24 The guide 
defines the professional responsibilities of scientists and is intended as an essential 
tool for fostering the norms and principles of research integrity. Biosafety profes-
sional associations make a significant contribution to promoting safe work with bio-
logical materials through advocacy and capacity building, professional certification, 
and networking. For example, the International Federation of Biosafety Associations 
(IFBA) administers a Professional Certification Programme in different technical dis-
ciplines related to the management of biological risks and a Global Mentorship 
Programme that seeks to facilitate peer learning and experience sharing among prac-
titioners. IFBA has also established a Biosafety Hero award, in order to celebrate the 
personal achievement of dedicated biosafety professionals and identify role models.25
21 World Health Organisation, Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 4th ed., (Geneva: World Health 
Organisation, 2020), https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240011311.
22 P. Berg, ‘Asilomar 1975: DNA Modification Secured’, Nature, vol. 455 (2008), pp. 290–291, 
available at https://www.nature.com/articles/455290a.
23 US National Institutes of Health, Biosafety and Recombinant DNA Policy, https://osp.od.nih.
gov/biotechnology/biosafety-and-recombinant-dna-activities/.
24 Inter-Academy Partnership, Doing Global Science: A Guide to Responsible Conduct in the 
Global Research Enterprise (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), available at https://
www.interacademies.org/33345/Doing-Global-Science-A-Guide-to-Responsible-Conduct- 
in-the-Global-Research-Enterprise.
25 For information about the activities of the International Federation of Biosafety Associations, see 
https://internationalbiosafety.org/.
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Developing safe and good quality products is among the key priorities and respon-
sibilities of any industry. In 2007, the Biotechnology Innovation Organisation (BIO) – 
the largest trade association representing private and public enterprises and academic 
institutions across the US and in over 30 other nations – launched the ‘Excellence 
through Stewardship’ (ETS) Programme, the first industry- coordinated effort to 
address product stewardship and quality management.26 A year later, the programme 
evolved into a non-profit organisation which currently has over 50 members, includ-
ing sector research institutions, technology providers, seed producers, and biotechnol-
ogy associations from around the world.27 The overriding goal of ETS is to enable 
enterprises to ensure effective compliance with the regulations that are applicable to 
their operations. To this end, ETS seeks to promote the universal adoption of quality 
management systems for the full life cycle of agricultural technology products through 
the articulation of relevant guiding principles and management practices; the develop-
ment of training resources and programmes; and the administration of audit processes.
Contrary to common perceptions, the ‘do-it-yourself’ biology community has 
strived to internalise biosafety procedures and practices and ensure that these are 
tailored to the specific setting within which DIY biologists operate. As a result of a 
series of workshops and gatherings that brought together DIY practitioners from 
around the world, codes of conduct were developed in 2011 (Box 6.1).28 These 
codes define a set of guiding principles by which practitioners agree to abide. 
Community laboratories have their own advisory boards comprising of technical 
experts who review project proposals and assist in addressing potential safety con-
cerns. It is also possible for DIY biologists to seek advice and guidance from bio-
safety professionals via designated online portals.29
Similar to biosafety, the term ‘biosecurity’ has multiple definitions. The World 
Health Organisation considers biosecurity within the laboratory setting and defines 
laboratory biosecurity as the protection control and accountability for biological 
materials within laboratories, in order to prevent their unauthorised access, loss, 
theft, misuse, diversion, or intentional release.30 More generally, biosecurity refers 
to the successful minimising of the risks that the biological sciences might be 
26 Biotechnology Innovation Organisation, ‘BIO Launches the Excellence Through Stewardship 
Program Initiative Introduces Best Practices for Quality Management of Plant Biotechnology 
Products’, Press Release, 25 July 2007, available at https://archive.bio.org/media/press-release/
bio-launches-excellence-through-stewardship-program-initiative-introduces-best-p.  See also 
Biotechnology Innovation Organisation, ‘BIO Statement of BIO Ethical Principles’, https://www.
bio.org/articles/bio-statement-of-bio-ethical-principles. 
27 For information about the Excellence through Stewardship Organisation, see https://www.excel-
lencethroughstewardship.org/.
28 For information about the DIY biology codes of conduct, see https://diybio.org/codes/.
29 T.  Kuiken, ‘Learn from DIY Biologists’, Nature, vol. 531 (2016), available at https://www.
nature.com/news/governance-learn-from-diy-biologists-1.19507; T.  Landrain et  al. ‘Do-It-
Yourself Biology: Challenges and Promises for an Open Science and Technology Movement’, 
Systems and Synthetic Biology, vol. 7 (2013), pp. 115–126.
30 World Health Organisation, Biorisk Management: Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance (Geneva: 
World Health Organisation, 2006), available at https://www.who.int/ihr/publications/WHO_CDS_
EPR_2006_6/en/.
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accidentally or deliberately misused in a way that causes harm to humans, animals, 
plants, or the environment.31 This includes the risk of bioterrorism, bio-crimes, and 
development of biological weapons.
Biosecurity risks have attracted considerable attention over the past two decades, 
particularly in the light of rapid global diffusion of enabling capabilities with dual- 
use potential. The accidental discovery of a method for enhancing the virulence of 
the Mousepox virus, the artificial synthesis of the polio virus, the recreation of the 
31 S. Whitby et al. eds. Preventing Biological Weapons: What You Can Do (Bradford: University of 
Bradford, 2015), available at https://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk/handle/10454/7821.
Box 6.1 DIYbio Codes of Ethics
European Congress: Draft DIYbio code of 
ethics
North American Congress: Draft DIYbio 
code of ethics
Transparency
Emphasize transparency and the sharing of 
ideas, knowledge, data and results.
Open Access
Promote citizen science and 




Emphasize transparency, the sharing of 
ideas, knowledge and data.
Open Access
Promote citizen science and decentralized 
access to biotechnology.
Education
Engage the public about biology, 
biotechnology and their possibilities.
Education
Help educate the public about biotechnology, 








Carefully listen to any concerns and questions 
and respond honestly.
Peaceful Purposes
Biotechnology should only be used for 
peaceful purposes.
Peaceful Purposes
Biotechnology must only be used for peaceful 
purposes.
Tinkering
Tinkering with biology leads to insight; 
insight leads to innovation.
Respect
Respect humans and all living systems.
Responsibility
Recognize the complexity and dynamics of 
living systems and our responsibility towards 
them.
Accountability
Remain accountable for your actions and for 
upholding this code.
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Spanish Influenza virus, and the creation of a novel synthetic life form are among 
the early studies which have underscored the need for a careful assessment of the 
broader social, ethical, and legal implications of synthetic biology.32 Two high-level 
reports published by the US National Research Council in 2004 and 2006, respec-
tively have made recommendations in this regard. The Fink Committee report titled 
‘Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism’ defines seven types of experi-
ments that require review by informed members of the scientific and medical com-
munity before they are undertaken or, if carried out, before they are published in full 
detail. These include experiments that:
 1. Would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective.
 2. Would confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents.
 3. Would enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a non-pathogen virulent.
 4. Would increase transmissibility of a pathogen.
 5. Would alter the host range of a pathogen.
 6. Would enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection modalities.
 7. Would enable the weaponisation of a biological agent or toxin.33
The proposed criteria could serve as the backbone of an oversight system for 
minimising potential biosecurity concerns. However, as noted by the Committee, 
(1) the scope of the criteria is limited, since they address only microbial threats and 
(2) in the future, the proposed categories need to be expanded to cover a signifi-
cantly wider range of potential threats.34 The Lemon-Relman Committee report 
titled ‘Globalisation, Biosecurity, and the Future of Life Sciences’ has proposed a 
conceptual framework for assessing the potential for beneficial and disruptive 
32 See S. Whitby and M. Dando, ‘Biosecurity Awareness-Raising and Education for Life Scientists: 
What Should Be Done Now?’ in B.  Rappert, ed. Education and Ethics in the Life Sciences: 
Strengthening the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (Canberra: ANU Press, 2010), pp. 179–196, 
available at https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/series/practical-ethics-public-policy/education-
and-ethics-life-sciences. On examples of dual-use research, see M.Selgelid and L.  Weir, ‘The 
Mousepox Experience’, EMBO Reports, vol. 11:1 (2010), pp. 18–24, available at https://www.
embopress.org/doi/10.1038/embor.2009.270; E. Wimmer, ‘The Test-Tube Synthesis of a Chemical 
Called Poliovirus: The Simple Synthesis of a Virus Has Far-Reaching Societal Implications’, 
EMBO Reports, vol. 7: Spec No (2006), pp. S3–S9, available at https://www.embopress.org/
doi/10.1038/sj.embor.7400728; J van Aken, ‘Ethics of Reconstructing Spanish Flu: Is it Wise to 
Resurrect a Deadly Virus’, Heredity, vol. 98 (2007), pp. 1–2, available at https://www.nature.com/
articles/6800911; A. Katsnelson, ‘Researchers Start Up Cell with Synthetic Genome’, Nature, 20 
May 2010, available athttps://www.nature.com/news/2010/100520/full/news.2010.253.html; 
‘Sizing up the “Synthetic Cell”’, Nature, 20 May 2010, available at https://www.nature.com/
news/2010/100520/full/news.2010.255.html.
33 National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism (Washington DC: 
National Academies Press, 2004), available at https://www.nap.edu/catalog/10827/
biotechnology-research-in-an-age-of-terrorism.
34 National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism (Washington DC: 
National Academies Press, 2004), available at https://www.nap.edu/catalog/10827/
biotechnology-research-in-an-age-of-terrorism.
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applications of the novel life science advances. 35 The Committee has developed a 
system of classification comprising of four thematic groupings, namely:
 1. Technologies that seek to acquire novel biological or molecular diversity;
 2. Technologies that seek to generate novel but pre-determined and specific bio-
logical or molecular entities through directed design;
 3. Technologies that seek to understand and manipulate biological systems in a 
more comprehensive and effective manner;
 4. Technologies that seek to enhance production, delivery, and “packaging” of bio-
logically active materials.
The report has recommended that a broader perspective on the ‘threat spectrum’ 
is adopted by focusing on trends in life science advances that can facilitate hostile 
misuse.36
Unlike biosafety considerations, by and large, biosecurity risks may not be 
immediately evident to life science stakeholders. A case in point in this regard is the 
multifaceted international controversy that spurred as a result of the creation of a 
mammalian-transmissible H5N1 virus in 2011.37 The two studies conducted inde-
pendently in the Netherlands and the USA met several of the criteria for experi-
ments of concern as defined by the Fink Committee. In 2005, the Inter-Academy 
Panel published a Statement on Biosecurity which acknowledged the special 
responsibility of scientists regarding problems of dual use and the misuse of science 
and technology and the duty to be aware and foresee the possible consequences of 
their own activities.38 One of the lead scientists of the Dutch research team had par-
ticipated in the focus group established to support the development of the Code of 
Conduct on Biosecurity that the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences 
had adopted 4 years earlier (Box 6.2).39 Nevertheless, biosecurity issues were only 
considered after the editorial boards of Science and Nature decided to defer the 
publication of the manuscripts and the papers were subject to additional review.40 
The publication of the two studies was preceded by a protracted global debate on 
35 National Research Council, Globalisation, Biosecurity, and the Future of Life Sciences 
(Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2006), available at https://www.nap.edu/cata-
log/11567/globalization-biosecurity-and-the-future-of-the-life-sciences.
36 National Research Council, Globalisation, Biosecurity, and the Future of Life Sciences 
(Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2006), available at https://www.nap.edu/cata-
log/11567/globalization-biosecurity-and-the-future-of-the-life-sciences.
37 On the H5N1 controversy, see Nature Special Collection, available at https://www.nature.com/
collections/wntqfnjrxb.
38 Inter-Academy Panel, IAP Statement on Biosecurity, 2005, available at https://www.interacade-
mies.org/13912/IAP-Statement-on-Biosecurity.
39 Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), A Code of Conduct for Biosecurity 
(Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008), available at https://www.
knaw.nl/en/news/publications/a-code-of-conduct-for-biosecurity.
40 For a review of editorial policies regarding the publication of dual-use research of concern, see 
D. Patrone et al. ‘Biosecurity and the Review and Publication of Dual-Use Research of Concern’, 
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, vol. 10:3 (2012), pp. 290–298, available at https://www.liebertpub.
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how the risks and benefits of life science research should be balanced has demon-
strated that, by and large, biosecurity issues tend to be considered mainly within the 
context of laboratory practice, whereby priority is given to the physical security of 
biological materials and information, including through access control and vetting 
of research personnel. The debate has further shown that concerns of dual use and 
science misuse are rarely considered and addressed at the different stages of research 
process.
In its 2016 publication, ‘Doing Global Science: A Guide to Responsible Conduct 
in the Global Research Enterprise’, the IAP has noted that preventing the misuse of 
life science research is likely to challenge researchers and the broader research 
enterprise in future which is why researchers need to participate in discussions 
about the possible consequences of their work, including harmful consequences, 
when planning research projects.41 More recently, the World Health Organisation 
has sought to provide additional guidance on the governance of dual-use research of 
concern (DURC) in the life sciences – “research that, based on current understand-
ing, has the potential to provide knowledge, information, products or technologies 
that could be directly misapplied to create a significant threat with potential conse-
quences to public health and safety, agricultural species and other plants, animals, 
and the environment”.42 According to WHO, the recommended approach for DURC 
management is “laboratory and medical-scientific self-governance” underpinned by 
regulatory oversight and “an enhanced culture of trust, personal responsibility, 
accountability and transparency in laboratories, a culture which comes from strong 
leadership and a commitment to championing ethics in the workplace”.43
com/doi/10.1089/bsp.2012.0011. Both the Dutch and US research papers were eventually pub-
lished in 2012, see S. Herfst et al. ‘Airborne Transmission of Influenza A/H5N1 Virus Between 
Ferrets’, Science, vol. 336:6088 (2012), pp.  1534–1541, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1126/sci-
ence.1213362; M. Imai et al. ‘Experimental Adaptation of an Influenza H5 HA Confers Respiratory 
Droplet Transmission to a Reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 Virus in Ferrets’, Nature, vol. 486 (2012), 
pp. 420–428, https://www.nature.com/articles/nature10831.
41 Inter-Academy Partnership, Doing Global Science: A Guide to Responsible Conduct in the 
Global Research Enterprise (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), available at https://
www.interacademies.org/33345/Doing-Global-Science-A-Guide-to-Responsible-Conduct- 
in-the-Global-Research-Enterprise.
42 World Health Organisation, Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 4th ed. (Geneva: World Health 
Organisation, 2020), https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240011311.
43 World Health Organisation, WHO Guidance on Implementing Regulatory Requirements for 
Biosafety and Biosecurity in Biomedical Laboratories  – A Stepwise Approach (Geneva: World 
Health Organisation, 2020), https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/who-guidance-on-implementing- 
regulatory-requirements-for-biosafety-and-biosecurity-in-biomedical-laboratories%2D%2Da-
stepwise-approach.
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44 Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), A Code of Conduct for Biosecurity 
(Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008), available at https://www.
knaw.nl/en/news/publications/a-code-of-conduct-for-biosecurity.
45 Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), A Code of Conduct for Biosecurity 
(Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008), available at https://www.
knaw.nl/en/news/publications/a-code-of-conduct-for-biosecurity.
46 Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, Biosecurity Committee, Improving Biosecurity: 
Assessment of Dual Use Research (Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
2013), available at https://www.knaw.nl/en/news/publications/improving-biosecurity.
Box 6.2 The Dutch Code of Conduct for Biosecurity [Emphases Added]
In 2007, the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) 
adopted a ‘A Code of Conduct for Biosecurity’.44 The Code aims to prevent 
life sciences research or its application from directly or indirectly contribut-
ing to the development, production or stockpiling of biological weapons, as 
described in the BTWC, or to any other misuse of biological agents and tox-
ins. It targets different groups of stakeholders and defines six basic principles 
of biosecurity including:
• Raising awareness.
• Research and publication policy.
• Accountability and oversight.
• Internal and external communication.
• Accessibility.
• Shipment and transport.45
Following the H5N1 controversy, in 2013, the Royal Netherlands Academy 
of Arts and Sciences published a report titled ‘Improving Biosecurity: 
Assessment of Dual-Use Research’ which underscored that ‘the primary 
responsibility for dealing with potential dual-use risks of life science 
research lies with the researchers and parties in the knowledge chain’.46
The report outlined a biosecurity assessment framework noting that ‘when 
determining whether a study should be regarded as dual use from the perspec-
tive of biosecurity, both the biological and the contextual factors must be 
considered. […]. The question then is not only whether a research project is 
dual use within the context of biosecurity, but in particular what conse-
quences this should have.’
The report further recommended the establishment of a Biosecurity 
Advisory Committee in the Life Sciences. The proposed Advisory Committee 
would fulfil both case-specific tasks, such as advising on specific research 
proposals, reviewing reports by whistle-blowers about projects and 
(continued)
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6.4  Enhancing Stakeholder Interaction in the Field 
of Biosafety and Biosecurity
The professional diversity within the synthetic biology community presupposes a 
multitude of professional cultures, each characterised by its own system of values, 
shared meanings, established practices, and routines. These cultures are constantly 
in flux and being conditioned by the larger national cultures within which they exist 
and operate. Each professional culture is a manifestation of the prevalent priorities 
and objectives that different stakeholders set and pursue. The ways in which the 
concepts of risks and benefits are framed by different stakeholders inevitably vary, 
not least because these concepts are expressions of the dominant common under-
standings and interests that each professional group considers important. A robust 
biosafety and biosecurity culture entails the existence of mechanisms, practices, 
procedures, and attitudes which ensure that risks and concerns are raised, tackled, 
and effectively managed throughout the full research and innovation cycle.48 Active 
interaction among stakeholders is crucial for finding a common ground for con-
structive dialogue and identifying viable avenues for reconciling competing inter-
ests among different professional cultures. Cooperation is key in order to develop 
and implement adequate and sustainable approaches for risk mitigation which do 
not hinder research and innovation.
Education and training are key elements of the process of sensitising prospective 
and practising scientists to the values of research integrity, responsible conduct, and 
professionalism. Science classes are meant to encourage curiosity and desire to learn 
and aspire. They also provide an opportunity to foster an understanding of the social 
responsibility of scientists to be aware of the broader implications of their work and 
carry out an informed assessment of the risks and benefits involved (Box 6.3).
researchers, and reporting, as well as system-based tasks, such as keeping 
track of scientific, technological and policy-related trends and developments, 
maintaining contacts with research institutions, international networking, 
facilitating public engagement, communication, and accountability.
Finally, the report highlighted that the ‘Code of Conduct for Biosecurity 
should be an ongoing topic of interest in education and researcher train-
ing and for research team heads and funding bodies’.47
Box 6.2 (continued)
47 Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, Biosecurity Committee, Improving Biosecurity: 
Assessment of Dual Use Research (Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
2013), available at https://www.knaw.nl/en/news/publications/improving-biosecurity.
48 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Governance of Dual-Use Research 
in the Life Sciences: Advancing Global Consensus on Research Oversight (Washington DC: 
National Academies Press, 2018), available at https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25154/
governance-of-dual-use-research-in-the-life-sciences-advancing.
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Box 6.3 International Recognition of the Need for Responsible Science 
Education
NRC (US), Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, 2004:49
Recommendation 1: Educating the Scientific Community
The Committee has recommended that ‘national and international profes-
sional societies and related organizations and institutions create programs to 
educate scientists about the nature of the dual use dilemma in biotechnology 
and their responsibilities to mitigate its risks.’
NRC (US), Globalisation, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life 
Sciences, 2006:50
Recommendation 4: The committee recommends the adoption and pro-
motion of a common culture of awareness and a shared sense of 
responsibility within the global community of life scientists.
 4a. ‘Recognize the value of formal international treaties and conventions, 
including the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) 
and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
 4b. Develop explicit national and international codes of ethics and conduct 
for life scientists.
 4c. Support programs promoting beneficial uses of technology in developing 
countries.
 4d. Establish globally distributed, decentralized, and adaptive mechanisms 
with the capacity for surveillance and intervention in the event of malevo-
lent applications of tools and technologies derived from the life sciences.’
German Ethics Council, Biosecurity  – Freedom and Responsibility of 
Research, 2014:51
Recommendation 1: Raising the level of awareness for questions of bios-
ecurity in the scientific community
‘In view of the potential for misuse of dual use research in the life sciences, 
there is a need to increase the degree of awareness amongst members of the 
49 National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism (Washington DC: 
National Academies Press, 2004), available at https://www.nap.edu/catalog/10827/
biotechnology-research-in-an-age-ofterrorism.
50 National Research Council, Globalisation, Biosecurity, and the Future of Life Sciences 
(Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2006), available at https://www.nap.edu/cata-
log/11567/globalization-biosecurity-andthe-future-of-the-life-sciences.
51 German Ethics Council, Biosecurity – Freedom and Responsibility of Research, German Ethics 
Council, 2014, available at https://www.ethikrat.org/fileadmin/Publikationen/Stellungnahmen/
englisch/opinion-biosecurity.pdf.
(continued)
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Continued professional development training allows practising researchers to 
keep up to date with relevant policy and legislative developments and ensure that 
institutional procedures and practices are aligned with national regulations. It is 
important that biosafety and biosecurity issues are given equal attention during edu-
cation and training and that the complementary role of biosafety and biosecurity in 
the governance of science and technology is elucidated. A case in point is the 
Professional Certification Programme of the International Federation of Biosafety 
Association which features Biosecurity as a technical discipline. The Biosecurity 
certification exam covers six topic areas:
 (1) Biosecurity Conventions, Guidelines and Standards;
 (2) Biosecurity Risk Assessment and Programme Management;
 (3) Physical Biosecurity Measures;
 (4) Pathogen Accountability;
 (5) Personnel Reliability;
 (6) Dual-use and Bioethics.53
Those willing to sit the exam need to hold a valid certification in Biorisk 
Management which covers basic laboratory biosafety concepts, among other things. 
The Biosecurity Professional Certification aims to promote biosecurity learning and 
competence among practising researchers, so that they can subsequently apply the 
acquired skills and knowledge on their workplace, for example, by helping intro-
duce biosecurity concepts into the existing institutional oversight policies and staff 
development training schemes.
When implementing biosafety and biosecurity education and awareness-raising 
programmes, attention needs to be given both to the content and mode of its 
Box 6.3 (continued)
scientific community for these issues and to promote an underlying culture of 
responsibility.’
Swiss Academies of Arts and Sciences, Misuse Potential and Biosecurity in 
Life Sciences Research, 2017:52
‘Education and training in biosecurity are among the most effective 
strategies to anticipate and prevent misuse of life science research. […] Other 
important measures to prevent misuse include fostering responsible research 
practices and scientific integrity more generally and cultivating an atmo-
sphere of trust at research institutions and in research groups.’
52 Swiss Academies of Arts and Sciences, Misuse Potential and Biosecurity in Life Sciences 
Research: A Discussion Basis for Scientists on How to Address the Dual Use Dilemma of Biological 
Research (Swiss Academies Report: 2017), available at https://naturalsciences.ch/organisations/
geneticresearch/topics/biosecurity
53 For information about the IFBA Professional Certification in Biosecurity, 2020, see https://inter-
nationalbiosafety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/3.2-Professional-Certification-in-Biosecu-
rity-Exam-Content-English.pdf.  See also R.  Moritz et  al. ‘Promoting Biosecurity by 
Professionalizing Biosecurity’, Science, vol. 367:6480 (2020), pp.  856–858, https://science. 
sciencemag.org/content/367/6480/856https://science.sciencemag.org/content/367/6480/856.
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delivery. Teaching and training methods need to be carefully selected, in order to 
maximise learning impact and facilitate the application of relevant knowledge to 
everyday science practice.54 Active learning techniques such as simulations and 
scenario- based exercises encourage critical reflection and self-assessment, and con-
tribute to an enhanced understanding of biosafety and biosecurity risks. This in turn 
enables stakeholders to be proactive in the process of risk governance and develop 
a sense of ownership. An in-depth shared understanding of the risks posed by 
advances in synthetic biology among stakeholders is essential, in order to ensure 
consistency and coherence across the implemented mechanisms and approaches.
Examples of initiatives that seek to promote responsible innovation in the field of 
synthetic biology include the Engineering Biology Research Consortium (EBRC) 
and the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) Competition. EBRC 
is a non-profit, public-private partnership dedicated to advancing engineering biol-
ogy.55 EBRC administers a programme on improving security considerations that is 
designed to facilitate education and dialogue on security issues among stakeholders 
through workshops, awareness-raising, and development of training material. 
Launched in 2004, the iGEM Competition is an annual event that brings together 
interdisciplinary teams of university and high school students, DIY biologists, and 
more from around the world and provides them with the opportunity to push the 
boundaries of synthetic biology by tackling everyday social and environmental 
challenges.56 iGEM has a dedicated biosafety and biosecurity program which oper-
ates throughout the life cycle of projects – from inception to future applications – 
allowing risks and concerns to be identified, flagged up, and addressed in a timely 
manner (Box 6.4).57 iGEM participants also have at their disposal the ‘iGEMers 
Guide to the Future’ which is an online resource designed to provide iGEM partici-
pants with a space, process, and tools for facilitating project development and 
responsible design and innovation.58 The Guide has been developed as a result of a 
EU-funded collaborative initiative titled ‘Synthetic Biology – Engaging with New 
and Emerging Science and Technology in Responsible Governance of the Science 
and Society Relationship’ (SYNENERGENE), designed to establish an open dia-
logue among stakeholders on the potential benefits and risks of synthetic biology.59
54 T. Novossiolova et al. ‘Altering an Appreciative System: Lessons from Incorporating Dual-Use 
Concerns into the Responsible Science Education of Biotechnologists’, Futures, vol. 108 (2019), 
pp.  53–60, available at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S001632871 
830466X.
55 For information about the Engineering Biology Research Consortium, 2020, see https://ebrc.org/.
56 For information about the International Genetically Engineered Machine Competition, 2020, see 
https://igem.org/Main_Page.
57 P.  Millet et  al. ‘Developing a Comprehensive, Adaptive, and International Biosafety and 
Biosecurity Program for Advanced Biotechnology: The iGEM Experience’, Applied Biosafety, vol. 
24:2 (2019), pp.  64–71, available at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/15356760 
19838075.
58 The ‘iGEMers Guide to the Future’ is available at https://live.flatland.agency/12290417/
rathenau-igem/.
59 The SYNENERGENE project was carried out between July 2013 and June 2017 as part of the 
FP 7 funding scheme of the European Commission. Further information about the initiative is 
available at https://www.synenergene.eu/index.html.
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Similar to iGEM, DIY biology community labs have been recognised as poten-
tial catalysts for promoting responsible innovation.61 ‘Patient-led research’ or 
‘citizen- driven biomedical research’ is a new form of research where citizens and 
patients are the primary producers and mobilizers or instigators of knowledge 
Box 6.4 iGEM Biosafety and Biosecurity Programme60
iGEM’s biosafety and biosecurity programme is forward-leaning, in that it 
addresses both traditional (pathogen-based) and emerging risks both in terms 
of new technologies and new risks. It is integrated into the technical work of 
the competition  – with clearly described roles and responsibilities for all 
members of the community. The program makes use of both incentives (such 
as through a Safety and Security Award for excellence and human practices 
components of its medals) and penalties for noncompliance (up to and includ-
ing disqualification).
As all biological lab work, even simple experiments, carries some risk, 
teams must follow a set of safety and security rules:
• Teams must be in full compliance with iGEM’s safety and security policies.
• Teams must use the competition’s forms to provide information on any 
risks from their project and steps taken to manage them.
• The Safety and Security Committee must have approved (a) check-in 
forms before a team uses parts and organisms not on the white list and (b) 
animal use forms before teams use vertebrates and some invertebrates.
• Instructors must sign off relevant forms.
• All deadlines for providing safety and security information must be met.
• Teams must follow all relevant international, regional, national, local, or 
institutional laws, rules, regulations, or policies, including national or insti-
tutional biosafety and biosecurity rules. If conducting any experiment with 
human subjects (including noninvasive experiments, such as surveys), teams 
must comply with all rules governing experiments with human subjects.
• Teams must work in the biosafety level appropriate for their project.
• Teams cannot conduct work with risk group 3 or 4 organisms, parts from a 
risk group 4 organism, or work in a safety level 3 or 4 laboratory.
• Teams must follow iGEM shipment requirements when submitting 
samples.
• Teams cannot release or deploy their project outside of the laboratory 
(including putting them in people) at any time during the competition or at 
the Giant Jamboree.
60 This text box is based on Piers Millet et  al. ‘Developing a Comprehensive, Adaptive, and 
International Biosafety and Biosecurity Program for Advanced Biotechnology: The iGEM 
Experience’, Applied Biosafety, vol. 24:2 (2019), pp. 1–8.
61 E. Pauwels and S. Denton, The Rise of the Bio-Citizen, Wilson Center, January 2018, available at 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-rise-the-new-bio-citizen.
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pursuing a range of activities from analyses of genomic data for diagnosing rare 
diseases, identification of potential therapeutic drugs, organization and crowdfund-
ing of clinical trials’ cohorts, and even self-surveillance or self-experimentation.62 
Collectively the DIYbio community have adapted and adopted biosafety standards 
to meet their needs as well as worked with ABSA International to develop a bio-
safety boot-camp training program in order to promote mentorship regarding the 
risks and benefits of emerging technologies.63
6.5  Conclusion
This chapter has sought to examine the role that the synthetic biology community 
can play in addressing the security implications of their work and thus contribute to 
the efforts to ensure that the life sciences are used only for peaceful purposes. The 
interconnectedness of the following three points is of particular importance in 
this regard:
• Identifying, assessing, and mitigating biosafety and biosecurity risks related to 
emerging life science advances (e.g. synthetic biology) requires the active 
engagement of all science stakeholders, including professional and amateur sci-
ence practitioners.
• There is a need for institutionalised early and recurring training in responsible 
conduct of research, biosafety, and biosecurity for prospective and practising 
scientists and engineers, in order to foster a shared understanding of the potential 
risks and how they can be addressed. Equally, it is important that DIY biology 
communities internalise the requirements for biosafety and biosecurity aware-
ness and practices.
• Stakeholder interaction, experience sharing, and collaboration among the differ-
ent professional and non-professional communities engaged in synthetic biology 
is vital to strengthening the concepts of stewardship, responsibility, and account-
ability, in order to safeguard research and innovation against accidental or delib-
erate misuse.
62 E. Pauwels and S. Denton, The Rise of the Bio-Citizen, Wilson Center, January 2018, available at 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-rise-the-new-bio-citizen.
63 Lim, Y. B., Checking Ourselves Before Wrecking Ourselves:Co-Evolving Innovation and Safety in 
the DIYBio Community, BUGSS, September 2019, available at https://bugssonline.org/community/
diybio-biosafety/. See also L. Sundaram, ‘Biosafety in DIY-Bio Laboratories: From Hype to 
Policy’, EMBO Reports, e52506 (2021), available at https://www.embopress.org/doi/abs/10.15252/
embr.202152506 
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Chapter 7
Cyberbiosecurity and Public Health 
in the Age of COVID-19
Aaron Adler, Jake Beal, Mary Lancaster, and Daniel Wyschogrod
7.1  Introduction
Cyberbiosecurity, the aspect of biosecurity involving the digital representation of 
biological data, had already been emerging as a matter of public concern even prior 
to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Key issues of concern include, among oth-
ers, the privacy of patient data, the security of public health databases, the integrity 
of diagnostic test data, the integrity of public biological databases, the security 
implications of automated laboratory systems and the security of proprietary bio-
logical engineering advances.
With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the importance of digital 
resources in combatting it, concern about the potential for cyber attacks by state- 
based or non-state actors has been elevated. To illuminate the challenges, we focus 
on the cyber vulnerabilities that need to be addressed in public health activities such 
as disease surveillance and outbreak management. In particular, we examine cyber 
issues raised by the accelerated pace of development for COVID mitigations, treat-
ments, and vaccines.
Figure 1 illustrates a simplified view of key components and their interactions in 
this area, as well as vulnerable points where informational attacks can result in sig-
nificant biosecurity consequences. In particular, the challenges that we consider 
here are:
 1. Privacy of contact tracing data – Contact tracing has been used in one form or 
another to contain epidemics for centuries. With the widespread adoption of 
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smart phones, the potential for automated contact tracing holds significant prom-
ise. How can this be done in a manner that protects patient privacy? How can 
smartphone data be integrated with manual contact tracing? What are the pri-
vacy, security and efficacy tradeoffs? What are the implications of patient pri-
vacy concerns for the collection of public health data?
 2. Integrity of public health and disease surveillance data  – As COVID-19 has 
shown, disease surveillance data is critical both for scientists and policy makers. 
These data include but are not limited to case counts, diagnostic test results, and 
general trend information. Various governments, agencies, or other malicious 
actors might want to manipulate such information to artificially inflate or sup-
press data. What safeguards against such manipulation can be provided?
 3. Data integrity and result validation of self-administered testing  – Self- 
administered tests can provide fast, actionable health information. For COVID-19, 
a number of at home tests are being proposed, some of which would allow users 
to receive immediate results, similar to pregnancy tests. Self-administration, 
however, also allows many more opportunities for data corruption or exposure. 
How can such results be shared for aggregation into public health statistics and 
use in contact tracing in such a way that their results can be validated by health 
care professionals and individual privacy also be preserved?
 4. Integrity of public bioinformatic databases – Both researchers and medical per-
sonnel rely on public sequence and sample data resources such as those main-
tained by NCBI.  Frequently, mistakes are made in labeling that can cause 
difficulties. Currently, most such errors appear to be inadvertent rather than mali-
cious, but such data could also be deliberately manipulated to confuse bioinfor-
matic investigations. How can the integrity of public data be maintained and 
attempts at manipulation detected?
 5. Defending against cyberattacks on laboratory automation – Laboratory through-
put is increasingly being accelerated through automation involving robotics, 
laboratory information management systems (LIMS), and network-enabled 
devices that fall under the general category of Internet of Things (IoT). These 
systems are often connected to the internet (e.g., for software updates or remote 
monitoring and control), providing an attack surface by which they may be com-
promised. Such devices can be used as entry points into laboratory networks or 
manipulated for their biological effects (e.g., destroying stored specimens by 
changing temperature settings on a freezer). How can these devices be protected 
and how can they be prevented from becoming points of entry into critical labo-
ratory computer networks?
 6. Protection of intellectual property – Theft of intellectual property by both state 
and non-state actors is a longstanding problem. The race for COVID-19 vaccina-
tions and treatments has amplified this illicit activity, motivated both by a desire 
for direct monetary gain and by nations’ need to protect their populations and 
restore their economies. What safeguards need to be provided and how can mali-
cious parties be identified?
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In the subsequent sections, we will expand on each of these threats in turn, followed 
by a summary of their implications.
7.2  Privacy of Contact Tracing Data
Contact tracing is the process of identifying and monitoring persons who have been 
in contact with an infected person or persons. It has been used in one form or another 
for centuries.1 More recently, it has been used effectively in the control of tubercu-
losis, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and Middle East Respiratory 
Syndrome (MERS).2 Manual contact tracing has limitations in the number of per-
sons that can be identified and interviewed in a timely manner. With about 8000 
SARS infections and 800 deaths3 and about 2500 instances of MERS and 858 
deaths,4 manual contact tracing proved sufficient. In the case of COVID-19, with 
4.3 million confirmed cases and about 300,000 deaths worldwide at the time of this 
writing, complete and timely manual contact tracing may not be possible in many 
local jurisdictions.
Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, a number of countries leveraged smart phones 
to help automate contact tracing. Various types of relevant information are available 
on a smart phone. GPS and location services, which can add information about 
nearby WiFi hotspots, can be used with contact tracing apps but raises privacy con-
cerns. In China, people are sent QR codes on their phones indicating their level of 
risk for COVID-19 and access to public transportation or public areas such as 
shopping malls is determined by the QR code granted to an individual.5 These codes 
are based on self-reported information as well as possibly location services infor-
mation (though the Chinese government has not been forthcoming on the data used 
to produce these codes). South Korea does not use such QR health codes, but publi-
cizes details concerning individuals who have tested positive including the person’s 
age range, gender, and places they recently visited. QR codes can also be used to 
register visitors to businesses and users of public transportation.
1 S. Cohen, M. O’Brian, The Conversation, ‘Contact tracing: how physicians used it 500 years ago 
to control the bubonic plague’, https://theconversation.com/contact-tracing-how-physicians-used-
it-500-years-ago-to-control-the-bubonic-plague-139248, June, 2020 (retrieved August 2020).
2 K.O. Kwok, A. Tang, V.W.I. Wei, W. H. Park, E.K. Yeoh, and S. Riley, “Epidemic Models of 
Contact Tracing: Systematic Review of Transmission Studies of Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome”, Comput Struct Biotechnol J., 2019; 
17;186–194
3 CDC, “Fact Sheet: Basic Information about SARS”, https://www.cdc.gov/sars/about/fs-SARS.
pdf, retrieved August 2020.
4 WHO, “Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)”, https://www.who.int/
emergencies/mers-cov/en/, retrieved August 2020.
5 BBC, “China launches coronavirus ‘close contact detector’ app”, https://www.bbc.com/news/
technology-51439401, February 2020 (retrieved August 2020).
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Another approach that is believed to be more privacy preserving and more secure 
in a number of respects involves the use of Bluetooth rather than GPS or location 
services. Singapore has released an app called TraceTogether.6 TraceTogether 
attempts to minimize the amount of personal information it gathers, but it does col-
lect the cell phone numbers of users on a voluntary basis.7
The ability to use Bluetooth and maintain a high level of privacy has been greatly 
assisted by the cooperation of Google and Apple in inserting new capabilities in 
both iOS and Android at the operating system level.8 The Apple/Google protocol is 
based on privacy ideas emerging from the MIT-led PACT project9 and the European 
DP-3T10 project.
The goal of the Apple/Google application protocol interface (API) is to provide 
a set of functions and procedures in the operating system that can be used by state 
or local authorities and software developers to develop user-level contact tracing 
apps. The two foundations of this methodology are:
 1. Extensions of the Bluetooth protocol to determine “too close for too long”
 2. A distributed architecture such that notifications of proximity to a confirmed 
case of COVID-19 are sent only to the user of a phone and no other parties.
Algorithms to determine “too close for too long,” however, are still under devel-
opment. They have both a physical and biological component. The physical aspect 
involves the inference of distance between infectious and susceptible individuals 
from the observed information. The new interface provided by Apple/Google will 
give the app developer information about Received Signal Strength Indication 
(RSSI) for each transmission from a nearby (typically tens of meters) source.11 The 
RSSI falls off with distance so it can be used to infer distance between phones but 
also falls off with attenuation due to phones being in pockets or handbags and inter-
vening obstacles (e.g. walls or shelving), making the translation from RSSI to dis-
tance complex. The biological issue is how much exposure to an infected person at 
what distance indicates a high risk of infection. Tuning the criterion for “too close 
for too long” clearly will affect both the false positive and false negative rates.
The second foundation of this methodology is that only a user of the app is 
informed of a possible exposure, but no one else. The goal here is to achieve 
6 Singapore Government, “TraceTogether home page”, https://www.tracetogether.gov.sg, retrieved 
August 2020.
7 Singapore Government, “TraceTogether Privacy Safeguards”, https://www.tracetogether.gov.sg/
common/privacystatement, retrieved August 2020.
8 Apple, Inc., “Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing”,https://covid19-static.cdn-apple.com/applica-
tions/covid19/current/static/contact-tracing/pdf/ExposureNotification-CryptographySpecification
v1.2.pdf, retrieved August 2020.
9 PACT, “PACT: Private Automated Contact Tracing”, https://pact.mit.edu, retrieved August 2020.
10 DP3T, “DP3T  – Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing” https://github.com/
DP-3T/documents, retrieved August 2020.
11 Bluetooth SIG, “Proximity and RSSI”, https://www.bluetooth.com/blog/proximity-and-rssi/, 
September 2015 (retrieved, August 2020).
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maximal privacy. The mechanism works as follows. An individual phone creates a 
seed at a particular time period, say each hour. That seed is used to generate chang-
ing values in each “chirp” emitted by the Bluetooth interface. Neighboring phones 
detect these chirps and record them along with timestamps. If an individual tests 
positive and they consent, their phone is accessed and the list of seeds over the 
infection time period are uploaded to a central database. The central database down-
loads the seeds with time stamps of all infected individuals to all users of the app. 
The user’s phone then generates the seeds of infected persons to generate chirp 
values, which they check against the user’s list of received chirps to see if the user 
has been exposed to any COVID-19 confirmed case. Thus, the recipient only knows 
that they have been potentially exposed to confirmed case of COVID-19. They do 
not know the identity of the person they were exposed to, nor does anyone else 
know that the user might be infected. The exposed app user is encouraged to seek 
diagnostic testing and to self-quarantine, but this is voluntary.
An important item to note is that while private information is withheld from 
unauthorized malicious or just curious agents, it is also withheld from health profes-
sionals and public health authorities, including human contact tracers. This infor-
mation would undoubtedly be useful in determining with whom an infected 
individual came in contact, many of whom they may have forgotten or not noticed. 
While individuals who are notified about contact with infected individuals may be 
encouraged to contact health authorities, it would be voluntary and because of the 
anonymity protections, much of the work tracing back to previous contacts and 
forward to successive contacts would have to be repeated by the human contact trac-
ers. Following the chain of individuals who are farther and farther removed from the 
diagnosed individual would be particularly useful for superspreader events where 
rapid identification and quarantine of all those exposed in the first several genera-
tions is critical. Identifying and isolating individuals with asymptomatic infections 
is also important. All of this information would have to be re-discovered by the 
human contact tracer.
A possible solution might be the voluntary submission of information to public 
health authorities by individuals who have gotten a match on their phone, perhaps 
through the app itself. The issue then is that more and more potentially private infor-
mation is entered into the central cloud database.
These are all issues that are under active discussion. Since the Apple/Google 
interface is at the operating system and API level, however, different countries and 
regions will be able to choose to make different privacy decisions.
Such issues of privacy versus importance of data collection in emergency situa-
tions will apply to future post-COVID situations as well. Depending on the success 
of automated contact tracing in assisting in opening up commerce and day-to-day 
life, such apps, and perhaps their extension to wearables, may become more com-
monplace. Clearly, this is an issue where epidemiologists, infectious disease spe-
cialists, privacy and security experts, and medical ethicists must collaborate to 
identify and address risks and vulnerabilities.
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7.3  Protecting Public Health and Disease Surveillance Data
As COVID-19 has shown, disease surveillance data are critical both for scientists 
and policy makers as well as the general public. These data include but are not lim-
ited to case counts, diagnostic test results, and general trend information. Various 
nation state or other malicious actors might want to either suppress or artificially 
inflate data.
As we have seen in the COVID-19 pandemic and the West Africa Ebola 
outbreak,12 delayed response to outbreak events can result in larger impacts. If false 
negative diagnostic tests are returned and surveillance data are altered to keep case 
counts below epidemic thresholds, outbreak control measures may not be imple-
mented until much later, when the outbreak is much larger.
Alternately, creation of disease cases in a surveillance system may create the 
appearance of an outbreak and result in mobilization of resources to investigate and 
mitigate an outbreak that does not exist. For example, for some livestock diseases, 
control measures include depopulation of the affected farms. Failure to properly 
confirm the presence of an outbreak before control measures are implemented may 
be catastrophic.
Furthermore, for many livestock and agricultural diseases, trade restrictions may 
be invoked to prevent the spread of disease across borders. The false creation of an 
outbreak in surveillance data may result in significant trade losses until the apparent 
outbreak can be invalidated. Considerable resources may be expended in verifying 
to trade partners and international organizations that an apparent outbreak was not 
real and that the animals in a herd or in a geographic area are not infected.
7.4  Integrity and Validation of Self-Administered Testing
Testing for SARS-CoV-2 provides a test case for the use of home diagnostic tests. 
Some routine tests, e.g., pregnancy tests or glucose tests, have long been available 
for home use. Some SARS-CoV-2 tests also allow for in-home collection, but speci-
mens must be mailed to a laboratory that processes the results. This is similar to 
some other at-home testing systems, e.g., via Everlywell.13 With SARS-CoV-2 test-
ing, there is a public health interest in tracking test results, and integrity and valida-
tion are important.
There are four broad categories for handling of at-home testing:
 1. Self tests with unreported results;
 2. Self tests shared and interpreted via a telehealth appointment;
12 M. Jeremiah Matson, Daniel S. Chertow, and Vincent J. Munster,“Delayed recognition of Ebola 
virus disease is associated with longer and larger outbreaks,” Emerg Microbes Infect. 2020; 9(1): 
291–301.
13 Everywell, “Everywell home page”, https://www.everlywell.com, retrieved August 2020.
7 Cyberbiosecurity and Public Health in the Age of COVID-19
110
 3. Self tests interpreted via a cell phone mobile application;
 4. Self tests with an internet connected testing device that reports results.
We will address each of these situations in turn. There are two aspects to result 
interpretation – first, does the patient understand their results, and second, are the 
results correctly reported to medical or public health personnel.
Self-Tests with Unreported Results In the case of routine home tests, the focus 
is on providing an interpretable result. There are many ways to provide result inter-
pretation, including a visual indicator on a disposable test (e.g., pregnancy tests), 
reporting via an accessory device (e.g., digital glucose reading), or a result provided 
via a cell phone application (e.g., picture interpretation of Vessel Health app14). In 
these cases the focus is on providing a result understandable to the user and not at 
all reporting the results to anyone else, and any of the solutions is viable.
Self Tests Shared and Interpreted Via a Telehealth Appointment Some at home 
testing is planned for the near future where results are interpreted remotely (e.g., 
Vessel Health serology software). In this case, a diagnostic image is sent to a health 
care professional and analyzed during a telehealth appointment. This solves several 
of the issues with at-home testing by providing a way to do contact tracing (via the 
telehealth appointment) and helping to ensure a correct diagnostic. This enables a 
patient to easily understand their result and allows results to be reported to health 
officials appropriately. A code may be provided with each test to associate the tele-
health appointment with an actual test, though there is no guarantee that the image 
of the test is authentic or that the person providing information to the telehealth 
professional is the person who actually took the test. While the latter is a problem 
with all self tests, the former can be addressed by using something other than just a 
visual image. For example, a unique RFI tag or barcode could be used with an app 
or an internet connected device to ensure the authenticity of the test. It should be 
noted that while malfeasance on the part of individuals is possible with this kind of 
testing, it would be challenging for malicious actors to greatly affect pandemic sta-
tistics in any meaningful way. The down side, however, is that this approach is 
expensive and does not scale easily due to the need for health professional 
involvement.
Self Tests Interpreted Via a Cell Phone Mobile Application To decrease cost 
compared to telehealth, a cell phone mobile app could be used to capture test results. 
As with the telehealth appointment, the test authenticity could be verified against an 
online database of test identifiers, and location information from the cell phone 
could be added to localize the test. As with the telehealth scenario, the app would 
have no way to verify that the person using the app provided the specimen, or 
whether the test result was authentic, e.g., not manipulated by an unscrupulous user. 
14 VesselHealth,” At-home testing for COVID-19 antibodies”, https://vesselhealth.com/coronavi-
rus.html, retrieved August 2020.
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Further, compromise of the app or associated cloud resources via the usual range of 
cyber exploits could be used for large scale corruption or manipulation of data.
Self Tests with an Internet Connected Testing Device That Reports Results The 
final variant is a testing device that produces the results and directly communicates 
via the internet to report results. In this case, the authenticity and uniqueness of the 
test is guaranteed at the expense of complying with necessary data and patient pri-
vacy regulations. In this scenario, as long as the specimen being tested is authentic, 
results are not easily forged. On the other hand, as with the phone app, compromise 
of the web interface or database are possible.
While security, integrity, and validation for small scale testing may be easily 
solved with telehealth appointments, larger scale testing will require more complex 
software security arrangements to provide integrity and validation of test results.
7.5  Integrity of Public Bioinformatic Databases
Numerous public bioinformatics databases have been created.15 Researchers upload 
annotated data for global use and sharing with the research community. In addition 
to the unintentional introduction of errors into the databases, concerns have been 
raised regarding the intentional manipulation of the content.16 Regardless of source, 
database errors can be rapidly propagated through analysis, transformation, and 
integration of data.17
While deliberately malicious modification of data contributed to public data-
bases has not yet, to our knowledge, been detected, there may be significant motives 
for bad actors to do so. For instance, origins of outbreaks, which can be a political 
issue, can be determined from genomic sequences18 and modification of these 
genomic sequences in databases may be to the advantage of those seeking to dis-
credit other groups or deflect blame from themselves.
Preventing corruption of public databases has other important practical implica-
tions as well. For instance, sequence screening, such as that practiced by members 
of the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC), verifies that sequences of 
genes ordered by customers do not contain regulated pathogen sequences or other 
15 See http://www.oxfordjournals.org/nar/database/a/ for a partial listing.
16 J. Caswell, J.D. Gans, et al., “Defending Our Public Biological Databases as a Global Critical 
Infrastructure”, Front. Bioeng. Biotechnol., 05 April 2019, https://doi.org/10.3389/
fbioe.2019.00058
17 R.  Pool, J.  Esnayra, “Bioinformatics  – Converting Data to Knowledge”, National Research 
Council, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2000. https://doi.org/10.17226/9990
18 Liangsheng Zhang, Jian-Rong Yang, Zhenguo Zhang, Zhenguo Lin, “Genomic variations of 
SARS-CoV-2 suggest multiple outbreak sources of transmission’, medRxiv, https://www.medrxiv.
org/content/10.1101/2020.02.25.20027953v2, March 2020.
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potentially dangerous sequences.19 Thus, maintaining correct sequences for both 
pathogens and benign species is important.
Further, as shown in the IARPA funded FELIX program,20 determination of 
whether a DNA sample shows signs of engineering is performed by comparison 
with a non-engineered reference sample. If public databases are intentionally pol-
luted with engineered samples, engineering may not be detectable.
Methods and approaches used to detect and correct unintentional errors can also 
be used to detect intentional manipulation. Rigorous documentation of data prove-
nance can help identify unauthorized changes. Finally, ontology-based approaches 
can detect inconsistencies in the data and enable data curators to address anomalies.
7.6  Defending Against Cyberattacks on Laboratory Devices
The internet of things (IoT) enables “advanced services by interconnecting (physi-
cal and virtual) things based on existing and evolving interoperable information and 
communication technologies.”21 The digital revolution in the life sciences has intro-
duced smart laboratories that automate processes, link instruments and devices to a 
network, and offer new ways to create, store, share, and manipulate electronic 
pathogen and disease information. Unfortunately, malicious actors can exploit vul-
nerabilities arising from weak cyber and biosecurity policies and practices, as well 
as inadequately secured networks, networked laboratory equipment, automated sys-
tems, and electronic data and files. These vulnerabilities expose data to unauthor-
ized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction and ultimately 
threaten data confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Cyber adversaries include 
both state and non-state actors.22
Adversaries have targeted medical and laboratory devices with malware and 
exploited vulnerabilities in imaging equipment, and medical and point-of-care diag-
nostic devices.23,24 Additionally, it has been shown that malicious actors could use 
synthetic DNA sequences encoded with malware to gain control of the computers 
19 Gene Synthesis Consortium, “Home Page”, https://genesynthesisconsortium.org/, retrieved 
August 2020.
20 Adali, et al. “Integrated Decision-Making to Detect DNA Engineering in Yeast”,
IWBDA 2020, August 2020.
21 International Telecommunications Union. 2012. Overview of the Internet of Things. http:// 
handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/11559
22 Carlin, John P. 2016. “Detect, Disrupt, Deter: A Whole of Government Approach to National 
Security Cyber Threats.” Harvard National Security Journal 7: 391–436.
23 Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 2019. ICS-CERT Alerts. December 4. https://www.
us-cert.gov/ics/alerts
24 Enriquez, Jof. 2015. “Medjacking: How Hackers Use Medical Devices to Launch Cyber Attacks.” 




processing the sequence.25 These vulnerabilities can change network permissions to 
access a device, download sensitive patient information, alter settings, issue com-
mands, or interfere with the intended function of a device.
Any network access point provides an opportunity for adversaries to enter and 
compromise network components. Research demonstrates how unauthorized users 
have cloned radio frequency identification cards to gain physical access to labora-
tory facilities and used building ventilation control systems to access customer 
records and payment information.26 Network security policies and practices that 
permit individuals to connect personal devices (e.g., phones, computers, memory 
cards, etc.) expose a corporate network to potential vulnerabilities, such as untrusted 
content, lack of configuration control, and use of location services.27 In addition, 
adversaries can manipulate, copy, or destroy laboratory databases, including inven-
tory, sequence, and disease surveillance data. In June 2019, an Iran-based internet 
protocol (IP) address exploit targeted exposed systems running dnaLIMS, a web- 
based bioinformatics system, to gain control of the computer system and further 
penetrate the network.28
In a COVID-19 environment where resources are allocated and policies made 
based on statistical data derived from test data, compromised laboratory data can 
lead to serious negative consequences in terms of under or over response. Further, 
exploits can be automated so that a vulnerability in one model of a laboratory device 
can be used to attack that device wherever it is found throughout the world.
7.7  Protection of Intellectual Property
For quite a number of years, state actors in cyberspace have attempted to steal the 
intellectual property of companies and government facilities of competing states. 
Cyber experts have identified such actions from hacker groups such as ACT10, 
25 Ney, P, K Koscher, L Organick, L Ceze, and T Kohno. 2017. “Computer Security, Privacy, and 
DNA Sequencing: Compromising computers wtih synthesized DNA, privacy leaks, and more.” 
USENIX Security Symposium.
26 Radichel, Teri. 2014. “Case Study: Critical Controls that Could Have Prevented Target Breach.” 
(SANS Instiute Reading Room). Accessed January 8, 2020. https://www.sans.org/reading-room/
whitepapers/casestudies/case-study-critical-controls-prevented-target-breach-35412-study- 
critical-controls-prevented-target-breach-35412&usg=A
27 Simmons, Raphael. 2017. BYOD Security Implementation for Small Organizations. SANS 
Institute. Accessed January 7, 2020. https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/mobile/
byod-security-implementation-small-organizations-38230
28 Townsend, Kevin. 2017. Critical Vulnerabilities Found in Popular DNA Sequencing Software. 
March 10. Accessed November 2019. https://www.securityweek.com/critical-vulnerabilities- 
found-popular-dna-sequencing-software
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believed to be sponsored by the Chinese government.29 During the COVID-19 epi-
demic, government institutions and commercial biotechnology companies which 
have been involved in the search for a vaccine or other treatments for COVID have 
become new targets of cyberspace theft attempts.30,31,32
Other attacks in the biotechnology space have come from non-state actors. 
Different motives have caused hacker groups to attack private biotech firms.33,34 In 
one highly publicized incident, a consortium of hacker groups pledged not to attack 
health care providers during the coronavirus outbreak. However, a member of this 
consortium, CLOP, launched a ransomware attack on ExecuPharm, a U.S. firm in 
Vermont, claiming that while they did not attack health care providers, commercial 
pharmaceutical organizations were fair game.35 CLOP went one step further, and 
published personally identifiable information it found on the company servers 
including social security numbers, some from patient studies.
A number of steps have been advocated for improving the security of biopharma-
ceutical companies, especially those involved in COVID-19 medical countermea-
sure research.36 These include limiting patient data on servers, secure storage of 
backups against ransomware, and training of personnel in cyber hygiene.
Currently, both government entities as well as private corporations are involved 
in the development of COVID-19 treatments and vaccines involving extensive sci-
entific data and patient information. Should these facilities be compromised, or even 
29 Z. Doffman, “Chinese State Hackers Suspected Of Malicious Cyber Attack On U.S. Utilities”, 
Newsweek, https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/08/03/chinese-state-hackers-sus-
pected-of-malicious-cyber-attack-on-u-s-utilities/#5503d1aa6758, August 2019 (retrieved 
August 2020).
30 G.  Lubold and D.  Volz, “U.S.  Says Chinese, Iranian Hackers Seek to Steal Coronavirus 
Research”, WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-iranian-hacking-may-be-hampering-
search-for-coronavirus-vaccine-officials-say-11589362205, May 2020 (retrieved August 2020).
31 C. Corera, “Coronavirus: Cyber-spies hunt Covid-19 research, US and UK warn”, BBC https://
www.bbc.com/news/technology-52551023, May 2020 (retrieved August 2020).
32 D.E. Sanger and N. Perlroth, “U.S. to Accuse China of Trying to Hack Vaccine Data, as Virus 
Redirects Cyberattacks”, NYT, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/10/us/politics/coronavirus-
china-cyber-hacking.html, May 2020 (retrieved August 2020).
33 D. Bukszpan, “The cyberthreat that could derail the world’s race to develop a coronavirus vac-
cine”, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/12/this-cyberthreat-could-derail-race-to-develop-a-
coronavirus-vaccine.html, May 2020 (retrieved August 2020).
34 D.  Winder,” COVID-19 Vaccine Test Center Hit By Cyber Attack, Stolen Data Posted 
Online”,Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2020/03/23/covid-19-vaccine-test-
center-hit-by-cyber-attack-stolen-data-posted-online/#9c804ab18e55, March 2020 (retrieved 
August 2020).
35 Z. Whittaler, “Hackers publish ExecuPharm internal data after ransomware attack”,TechCrunch, 
https://techcrunch.com/2020/04/27/execupharm-clop-ransomware/, April 2020 (retrieved 
August 2020).
36 K.  Vermes, “COVID-19 Pandemic Leaves Pharmaceutical Companies Vulnerable to Cyber 
Criminals”, BioSpace, https://www.biospace.com/article/covid-19-pandemic-leaves-pharmaceuti-
cal-companies-vulnerable-to-cyber-criminals-/, May 2020 (retrieved August 2020).
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worse incapacitated, delaying the release of therapies, there would be global 
implications.
7.8  Discussion
In this discussion, we have illuminated a range of key cyberbiosecurity threats to 
infectious disease surveillance and outbreak management. While the COVID-19 
pandemic has made these concerns particularly acute, ongoing strategic investments 
are needed to better understand, mitigate, and defend against these and similar 
threats. The current pandemic illustrates well the high strategic value of such public 
health infrastructure, and where there is value, the remote access afforded by cyber 
methods creates the threat that a wide variety of actors will seek advantage through 
cyber exploits.
Here, we have discussed what we assess to be the most near-term and high- 
significance concerns around core public health functions. This is by no means, 
however, a comprehensive view of potential issues. Experience in other domains 
shows that we should expect to find other potential areas of vulnerability and poten-
tial attack surfaces. Cyber threats are always evolving, and there is no reason to 
believe that cyberbiosecurity will be different. Likewise, similar threats are likely to 
obtain in other areas relevant to public health and biosecurity, such as supply chain 
integrity or biological effects achieved through social media manipulation. 
Cyberbiosecurity concerns will not go away, and are only likely to continue to 
increase along with increasing biological capabilities and integration with informa-
tion systems. The safety of all will depend on increased attention to and investment 
in mitigating these issues.
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Chapter 8
Synthetic Biology Brings New Challenges 
to Managing Biosecurity and Biosafety
Andrew Jin and Igor Linkov
Novel biology technologies like gene editing and genetic engineering are creating a 
proliferation of breakthroughs in engineered biological systems that will change our 
world in areas ranging from medicine, to textiles, to energy. New developments in 
gene editing technologies, especially CRISPR-Cas9, have shown early signs of 
extraordinary potential in a variety of fields, including from basic research, applied 
biotechnology, and biomedical research. While the possibility of directly targeting 
and modifying genomic sequences in almost all eukaryotic cells could significantly 
improve standards of living, these technologies have the potential to pose serious 
biological hazards.
These potential threats have traditionally been categorized into biosafety and 
biosecurity concerns (Bakanidze et al. 2010). Biosafety mainly relates to the dam-
aging effects from a biological agent that unintentionally impacts workers and the 
environment. On the other hand, biosecurity risks refer to the potential misuses of 
synthetic biology, such as bioterrorism, biowarfare or bioattacks that could derive 
from the genetic engineering of organisms. Because both biosafety and biosecurity 
share many of the same mechanisms for adverse outcomes, we must consider them 
concurrently. For example, a laboratory worker who was infected by a harmful virus 
may spread the virus in a similar mechanism as a lab worker who intentionally 
released a virus. Biosecurity and biosafety concerns about both the intentional and 
unintentional release of harmful biological agents is not a new phenomenon, but the 
growth of synthetic biology as a less expensive and more accessible field has dra-
matically changed the potential risks of synthetic biology.
The existing risk management frameworks for biological hazards were originally 
developed for different biosafety and biosecurity considerations, prior to the recent 
acceleration of developments in synthetic biology (Trump 2017). The development 
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of biological technologies currently leaves us unprepared and vulnerable in the face 
of synthetic biology’s potentially negative environmental consequences. Strategies 
of risk assessment and resilience, or the ability to prevent and to detect and recover 
from harmful releases of genetically engineered organisms before they permanently 
alter the environment, must now be developed for robust twenty-first Century bio-
safety and biosecurity.
The existing risk-based management strategy applied to chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, and explosive hazards (CBRNE) is to either (a) manage threat 
(i.e., prevent the spread of such materials or eliminate the capacity to produce them 
through nonproliferation activities) or (b) reduce system vulnerability (i.e., foster-
ing resources and protocols that harden infrastructural and social capacity to mini-
mize the impact of such threats should they occur). Historically, these actions, 
derived from foundational principles of risk assessment, worked well in situations 
where the manipulation, use, and consequences of the hazardous materials were 
reasonably detectable and measurable. Further, CBRNE security principles focus 
more on hazardous substances that (a) are capable of development by a limited 
subset of actors, and (b) could be contained within a specific physical area upon 
release. Security policy against such hazardous substances has been one of preven-
tion, where malicious actors are deprived of the knowledge and tools to foster harm-
ful outcomes while others were prevented from incurring harmful accidents in their 
work. Given concerns of nuclear and chemical weapons as the dominating focus of 
CBRNE discussion, such principles were sensible for their time.
However, CBRNE strategies emphasizing the role of prevention and nonprolif-
eration are insufficient in protecting against modern biological hazards for three 
main reasons. First, security threats stemming from synthetic biology are funda-
mentally different from those posed by chemicals, explosive, or radioactive mate-
rial. For example, in the increasingly globalized and diversified field of synthetic 
biology, actors can use genetic engineering and editing technologies to alter or cre-
ate a variety of platforms, including viruses, microorganisms, multicellular organ-
isms, prions, and even cell-free systems (Gronvall 2019). In such circumstances, the 
threat in question is the engineered platform, not the passive propagation of materi-
als through the environment. Engineered biological systems have the capability to 
persist, multiply, spread, and mutate beyond experimental and/or intended environ-
mental deployment bounds, making it difficult to keep such systems under control 
or from interfering with the natural environment. Nuclear and chemical weapons 
are physically contained to the location of their use but engineered biological weap-
ons could sweep across entire continents.
Second, exposure and vulnerability to synthetic biology threats are difficult, if 
not impossible, to quantify at present. We cannot confidently predict which platform 
might be used to generate a biological threat or weapon. Likewise, we cannot know 
what the target of a biological attack will be, whether it be humans, important crops, 
livestock, native species, the environment, or other assets. Third, it is hard to predict 
the consequences of release as we do not know how the weapon will be deployed 
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against the target. The new ability to modify almost all eukaryotic cells means that 
any biological system could be a mechanism of disruption for such a weapon. As 
discussed in related literature, strategies of disruption could range from releasing an 
aerosolized spray containing the pathogen into the center of mass transport, to lac-
ing the feed of cattle, to sending a computer virus encoded in genetic material to a 
classified laboratory in order to hack into computers upon sequencing. Even if we 
were able to implement systems to capture all exposures and vulnerabilities of a 
biological attack on a specific system, the increasingly interconnected social, tech-
nical, and economic networks with which novel biotechnologies will interact fur-
ther makes risk analysis of many individual components cost and time prohibitive.
To remain in-step with the shifting biosecurity landscape, systemic capabilities 
for biosecurity governance must incorporate elements of resilience alongside exist-
ing tools of prevention and nonproliferation. In contrast to risk-based approaches, 
resilience-based approaches acknowledge that, given the broad uncertainty of the 
threat landscape in biotechnology, threat events are difficult to predict but inevitably 
will occur in some form. Figure 8.1 highlights the key differences between the tra-
ditional risk-based method and a resilience-based strategy. Unlike risk-based strate-
gies, resilience tracks both the impact of an attack as well as the system’s ability to 
recover.
Fig. 8.1 Traditional (risk-based) and recovery-oriented (resilience-based) strategies system 
response. Risk-based approaches help prevent and mitigate the release of biothreats, while 
resilience- based strategies improve system recovery (Trump et al. 2020c)
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8.1  Resilience as a Complimentary Philosophical 
Framework to Managing Potential Biohazards
Government officials and risk assessors are already grappling with the challenge of 
characterizing synthetic biology’s hazards and identifying countermeasures to miti-
gate possible harms. This is against a backdrop of an explosion of activity in the 
synthetic biology landscape and increasingly inexpensive and widely available tools 
and techniques available to execute synthetic biology. This explosion is co- occurring 
with increasingly complex and interconnected global systems of infrastructure 
where new biological technologies will interact with systems across sectors, includ-
ing the healthcare, agriculture, and energy sectors. The potential for an actor to 
engineer biological threats, either intentionally or unintentionally, is a real and pres-
ent threat. A lack of a robust risk assessment and recovery strategy adds a further 
dimension of concern that may be impossible to ameliorate using existing safety 
and security operating paradigms (Greer and Trump 2019).
A 2012 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on “disaster resilience” 
defines resilience as the ability of a system to perform four functions with respect to 
adverse events: (1) planning and preparation, (2) absorption, (3) recovery, and (4) 
adaptation. While this definition has largely dominated resilience literature, this 
definition may conflate risk and resilience, which are two fundamentally different 
concepts. In this definition, adapt and recover are resilience concepts, while with-
stand and respond are concepts related to risk assessment; as such, risk is clearly 
added as a component of the definition of resilience. While risk assessment quanti-
fies the likelihood and consequences of an event to identify critical vulnerabilities 
of a system and to harden vulnerable components of a system to avoid losses, 
resilience- based methods adopt a “threat agnostic” viewpoint. Thus, resilience is 
defined regardless of which specific threat hits the system. This is especially impor-
tant for synthetic biology where new threats vary in type (e.g virus, bacterium, pro-
tozoan), source (e.g. agricultural, pharmaceutical, bioweapon, etc), and adverse 
implications (e.g. environmental destruction, tainted agricultural products, adverse 
health impact, etc.). By developing threat agnostic resilience capabilities, resilient 
systems can absorb and recover from biosecurity and biosafety threats quickly, 
regardless of the specific nature of the threat.
Resilience is a philosophy as much as a methodological practice. Resilience 
emphasizes the role of recovery post-disruption as much as absorption of a threat 
and its consequences. Resilience is grounded upon ensuring system survival, as well 
as a general acceptance that it is virtually impossible to prevent or mitigate all cat-
egories of risk simultaneously, and before they occur. Methodologically, resilience 
practitioners seek to optimize limited financial and labor resources to prepare their 
system against a wide variety of threats—all the while acknowledging that, at some 
point in the future and regardless of how well the system plans for such threats, 
disruption will occur. The more conventional practice of risk assessment and man-
agement is concerned with accounting for systemic threats, typically undertaken on 
a threat-by-threat basis in order to derive a precise quantitative understanding of 
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how a given threat exploits a system’s vulnerabilities and generates harmful conse-
quences. Resilience complements traditional risk-based approaches by reviewing 
how systems perform and function in a variety of scenarios, agnostic of any spe-
cific threat.
Thus, resilience is not a substitute for principled system design or risk manage-
ment. Both system design and risk management will be integral to preventing the 
spread of harmful biological agents into the environment, which will be key in mini-
mizing biosecurity and biosafety risks of synthetic biology. Resilience is a comple-
mentary attribute that uses strategies of adaptation and mitigation to improve 
traditional risk management. Strategies to build resilience can take the form of flex-
ible response, distributed decision making, modularity, redundancy, ensuring the 
independence of component interactions or a combination of adaptive strategies to 
minimize the loss of functionality and to increase the rate of the recovery. To address 
these biosecurity and biosafety challenges, risk analysis should be used where pos-
sible to help prepare for and prevent consequences of foreseeable events, but resil-
ience must be built into systems to help them quickly recover and adapt when 
adverse events inevitably occur.
8.2  COVID-19 Pandemic as a Call to Action for Resilience 
in Biosafety and Biosecurity
On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization officially declared the corona-
virus disease 2019 (COVID-19) a global pandemic. COVID-19, an infectious dis-
ease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), is 
a clear indicator that we are unprepared for the potential widespread impacts of a 
biological hazard. The growing complexity and interdependence within various sys-
tems, such as transportation, public health, and economic systems, have made them 
susceptible to widespread, irreversible, and cascading failures. COVID-19 as a bio-
logical threat has shown potential catastrophic impacts of lack of resilience.
The COVID-19 pandemic is a key example where traditional risk analysis failed 
to accurately quantify the potential impact of a biohazard. While the possibility of a 
global pandemic has been a consistent concern for risk practitioners, the specific 
nature of the COVID-19 threat (e.g. physical symptoms, origins, rate of transmis-
sion) were likely not as predictable. Furthermore, the probability of a global pan-
demic occurring was not something that was cognizant on the minds of risk 
managers of the diverse sectors that COVID-19 would subsequently impact such as 
energy infrastructure, agricultural systems, or transportation. It is in such cases that 
developing resilient systems which can recover quickly from shocks, regardless of 
their sources of failure, is paramount to reducing the impact of a hazard.
Before the COVID-19 crisis, supply chains of goods and services emphasized 
and defined success through the efficiency in the operation, management, and out-
comes of various economic and social systems, largely driven by the incentives of 
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individual components. The COVID-19 pandemic revealed the importance of resil-
ience within these highly complex, nested, and interconnected systems that deliver 
goods and services. Resilience is foundational for systems to absorb and manage 
shocks and prevent failures from cascading from one system component to another. 
(Hynes et al. 2020) For example, lack of resilience in medical supply chains to pro-
vide both preventative and diagnostic tools likely exacerbated the pandemic, caus-
ing failures to cascade into other sectors such as the food supply system(Dyal et al. 
2020) and education(Viner et al. 2020). These failures elucidate the fact that miti-
gating hazards of a specific biotechnology, such as CRISPR-Cas9, on a specific 
sector requires cross-sectoral resilience to quickly respond to and absorb the adverse 
effects of failures before they cascade. Resilience requires an intersectoral perspec-
tive to understand key interdependencies between systems to enable them to quickly 
recover from adverse events and prevent cascading failures.
Given the high uncertainty and inability to fully predict or even characterize the 
wide universe of shocks and stresses that may challenge a given system over time, 
we argue that a systems theory serves as a beneficial resilience framework as it 
helps focus upon a given system functionality, agnostic of any given shock or stress. 
In other words, a systems-level approach to evaluating and enhancing resilience 
seeks to look internally at the structure and interrelationships of systems to review 
how impact or change to one node of a system generates cascading effects, in vari-
ous degrees, to other directly and indirectly connected nodes. Within the next sec-
tion, we explore how a resilience-based framework to adapting from the COVID-19 
pandemic can benefit our understanding of biosecurity and biosafety, as these 
adverse events similarly entail biologically-grounded threats and uncertainties that 
entail implications for society at large.
8.3  A Domain-Based Resilience Framework to Adapt 
to Biosecurity and Biosafety
Linkov et al. (2013) assert that the Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) doctrine can be 
used to organize the key domains of components in a resilient system in conjunction 
with the four stages of the event management cycle defined by the NAS: (i) (pre-
pare/plan, (ii) absorb, (iii) recover, (iv) adapt (Linkov et al. 2013). The NCW doc-
trine identifies four domains that create shared situational awareness and inform 
decentralized decision-making as follows:
 1. Physical: sensors, facilities, equipment, system states, and capabilities
 2. Information: creation, manipulation, and storage of data
 3. Cognitive: understanding, mental models, preconceptions, biases, and values
 4. Social: interaction, collaboration and self-synchronization between individuals 
and entities
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All four of these are key to biosecurity in the future. By understanding resilience 
recourses throughout these domains, we consider the wide breadth of characteristics 
and decision inputs that may factor into system performance. Each domain is influ-
enced in a different yet equally important manner when a critical or disruptive event 
arises, and success in one domain may not guarantee the same outcome another 
area. Without resilience all four components of these systems, a system cannot be 
resilient.
8.3.1  Physical Domain
The physical domain represents where the event and responses occur across the 
environment and is typically the most obviously compromised system in the midst 
and aftermath of an external shock or critical risk event. Physical elements can be 
represented by a portfolio of resilient engineering and design options that limit the 
exposure and damages given a biological threat. These engineering and design 
options include longstanding approaches of physical barriers and chemical reme-
diation to emerging solutions related to biological engineering. They also include 
the development of economically feasible tools and techniques for the passive and 
active detection of biosecurity threats that must be developed, as early detection is 
an essential component in a resilience-based biosecurity policy.
While synthetic biology introduces new threats to biosafety and biosecurity, it is 
also an enabling technology to solutions that allow the engineering of components 
of biosystems that are resilient to failure. For example, Chan et al. (2016) described 
two microbial kill switches as “engineered safe-guard systems” to give synthetic 
biologists the ability to couple cell survival with a specific input signal, or to require 
complex environmental inputs to control circuit function (Chan et al. 2016).
The physical domain also consists of infrastructural characteristics ranging from 
transportation (e.g., roads, highways, railways, airports) to healthcare networks that 
deliver services to the public and support private business activities. As such, the 
physical domain of resilience thinking generally includes those infrastructural fac-
tors that are most directly impacted by a hazardous event, where the other domains 
include outcomes and actions that are a response to damage to physical capabilities 
and assets. In the physical domain, the objective of resilience analysis is to bring the 
infrastructural or systems asset back to full efficiency and functionality for use by 
its original owner or user. Recent events have shown how insufficient reserves or 
reliance on the global supply chain of medical supplies can make individual coun-
tries less resilient to potential biohazards when they rely on imported personal pro-
tective equipment and medical supplies (Ranney et al. 2020).
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8.3.2  Information Domain
The information domain is where knowledge and data exist, change, and are shared. 
The field of synthetic biology has used open-sourcing platforms as a critical compo-
nent to aid in new technology development. While these open-data resources allow 
for the quick dissemination of information regarding different biological systems, 
they also create opportunities for the dual use research of concern (DURC), in 
which scientific research can be used for either beneficial or malevolent purposes. 
In 2001, a group of Australian researchers engineered a strain of the mousepox 
virus, obtaining a new and more lethal strain which contributed to the understanding 
of poxviruses. However, this new strain could be used to engineer strains of the 
poxvirus that were far more lethal and transmissible for humans. (Gómez-Tatay and 
Hernández-Andreu 2019).
Similarly, the open-sourcing of biotechnologies opens up a wide range of con-
cerns with “do-it-yourself” (DIY) synthetic biology. Biotechnology is becoming 
increasingly accessible to a larger number of people. This is especially true for 
synthetic biology, which aims to simplify genetic procedures and enable access to 
science for students. Such accessibility is exemplified by the international 
Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition for students and by practic-
ing synthetic biology techniques and methods by non-professionals (DIYbio). It is 
unlikely that regulatory devices such as professional codes, export controls, or clas-
sification will be effective in the context of a deskilled, de-professionalized com-
munity of practitioners, nor is it likely that such regulatory devices could even cover 
the wide range of use cases for synthetic biology (Evans 2015).
One potential solution could be to expand information system responses in bios-
ecurity and biosafety by learning from other DURC concerns, such as in cybersecu-
rity. Within cybersecurity, a market has developed for the production and distribution 
of software exploits, with buyers sometimes paying over USD 100,000 for exploits 
and software vendors offering bounties for the disclosure of underlying vulnerabili-
ties. This practice that is generating a transnational debate about control and regula-
tion of cyber capabilities, the role of secrecy and disclosure in cybersecurity, and the 
ethics of exploited production and use (Kuehn and Mueller 2014).
Informational resilience during adverse events also requires quickly assembling 
knowledge about the threat and its recovery. However, key challenges exist in how 
to manage the release of data with concerns about privacy and data secrecy. For 
example, throughout the COVID-19 pandemic agencies have had to carefully con-
sider questions about how to prevent reidentification of anonymized health data 
while balancing the need to disseminate data for researchers to improve understand-
ing of the pandemic (Piller 2020). Big data collection and use has recently empha-
sized the particularization of data more so than the aggregation and generalization 
of data, and key questions have mounted concerning the legality, data quality, dis-
parate data meanings, and process quality (Wigan and Clarke 2013). While the use 
of digitally available data and algorithms for prediction and surveillance of a poten-
tial biohazard (e.g. using cell-phone data to identifying people who have traveled to 
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areas where the hazard has spread or tracing and isolating the contacts of effected 
people) will be paramount importance in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, 
it is equally important to use these data and algorithms in a responsible manner, in 
compliance with data-protection regulations and with due respect for privacy and 
confidentiality (Ienca and Vayena 2020). A key need for synthetic biology practitio-
ners will be to manage the level of data particularization and dissemination.
8.3.3  Cognitive Domain
The cognitive domain refers to the frameworks that utilize the information and 
physical domains to make decisions and includes perceptions, beliefs, values, and 
levels of awareness, which inform decision-making. Along with the social domain, 
the cognitive domain is the “locus of meaning, where people make sense of the data 
accessed from the information domain” (Linkov et al. 2013). Such factors are easy 
to overlook or dismiss due to a reliance upon physical infrastructure and communi-
cation systems to organize the public in response to a disaster. However, percep-
tions, values, and the level of awareness of the public regarding the strategies to 
overcome shocks and stresses are essential to the successful implementation of 
resilience operations. In other words, without clear, transparent, and sensible policy 
recommendations that acknowledge established beliefs, values, and perceptions, 
even the best-laid plans of resilience will fall to disrepair. A robust accounting for 
the cognitive domain is particularly important for instances where policymakers and 
risk managers may have a disconnect with the local population, such as with inter-
national infrastructure development projects of health-based interventions.
A key need to resilience in synthetic biology is developing the appropriate oper-
ating procedures, scientific methods and tools, and analytical capabilities must be 
readily available to quickly identify, recover from, and remediate the release of a 
harmful engineered biological system (Kelle 2013). Rapid diagnostic tools are 
needed after a threat has been detected to absorb the threat. These diagnostic tools 
and approaches must be able to determine (a) the type and purpose of the genetic 
modification made, (b) who made the modification and where, and (c) what technol-
ogy or techniques were used to accomplish the modification. The clarity provided 
through the answers to the above questions will allow stakeholders and decision 
makers to better understand the present threat and prevent similar future threats. 
Proposed policy strategies address some of these questions, but capabilities are still 
lacking.
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8.3.4  Social Domain
The social domain represents interactions between and within entities involved. 
This includes the organization structure and communication for making cognitive 
decisions. Within the context of synthetic biology, this domain contains key stake-
holders throughout academia, industry, and regulatory domains. It also consists of 
the international organizations and governments which guide synthetic biology to 
maturity.
Within the field of synthetic biology, many individuals and organizations are 
actively tackling the biosecurity challenge. Many established synthetic biology 
organizations, such as the iGEM synthetic biology competition, mandate that orga-
nizational leaders and judges conduct rigorous reviews of the materials and planned 
experiments of each team with any concerns screened for potential hazards by a 
commercial partner; all of this is part of the competition’s guidance for participating 
students (Millett et al. 2019).
Another potential solution for stakeholder engagement for resilience assessment 
is the Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) approach to assess societal impli-
cations of emerging research to better align processes and expected outcomes with 
the needs and values of society. Where top-down governance proves insufficient, 
other actors such as universities, non-profits, and companies will need to act as 
gatekeepers and watchdogs to protect against nefarious actors. Top-down gover-
nance may then support such initiatives, which will require harmonization and com-
munication at the international level.
Within the context of adverse event response, resilience will require largescale 
national and international cooperation. In the context of the global COVID-19 pan-
demic, countries that had improved intragovernmental coordination due to past 
experiences with pandemic response such as 2002–03 in Hong Kong and Singapore, 
and the H5N1 avian influenza in 1997 in Hong Kong, were able to quickly devel-
oped plans to sustain routine health-care service, open lines of international coordi-
nation, and train staff to adhere to new prevention and control measures 
(Legido-Quigley et al. 2020).
The social domain also provides an area to which careful attention should be 
paid in overall community resilience. Social aspects of society have impacts on 
physical health (Ebi and Semenza 2008). Throughout both the HIV epidemic and 
the COVID-19 pandemic, both governmental denialism and unsubstantiated regard-
ing home remedies that could cure or prevent illness strongly influenced adverse 
outcomes (Mian and Khan 2020; Linkov et al. 2021). Even with strong public health 
leadership, other events, such as the democratic protests in Hong Kong, can erode 
the public trust of authority figures. (Legido-Quigley et al. 2020).
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8.4  Discussion
The domain framework outlined here ensures policymakers and risk managers 
acquire a holistic understanding of how a shock or stress could trigger consequences 
that were previously difficult to comprehend. These domains overlap highly and 
work together in a system. While much of the focus on synthetic biology has been 
on the development of biocontainment through engineering organisms, (Lee et al. 
2018; Chan et  al. 2016) these developments are just one portion of the physical 
domain that consists encompasses the larger ecosystem of biotechnologies.
Emerging technologies, like synthetic biology, often develop out of sight of 
social scientists and policy commentators because institutional incentives to advance 
science and technology usually do not create opportunities for inquiry and discus-
sion between developers, risk assessors, ethicists, and policy analysts at the early 
stages of research (Trump et al. 2020b). However, a key component of developing 
biosecurity and biosafety will be the co-development of the social science tools and 
frameworks that can elucidate the ethics, morals, and risk to health, are often rele-
gated to an afterthought and isolated within institutions or organizations. Biosecurity 
and biosafety resilience will require understanding the key stakeholders that make 
decisions in how we prepare for, respond to, recover from and adapt to stresses, and 
how those stakeholders utilize new information to make biosafety and biosecurity 
decisions.
Biosecurity policies and practices must be updated to accommodate the novel 
challenges associated with synthetic biology and acknowledge the globalized and 
diverse nature of its threat space (Trump et al. 2020a). However, biosecurity efforts 
remain mired in uncertainty about the capabilities of SB and its practitioners’ moti-
vations in the growing number of contexts in which it is applied. Two decades into 
the twenty-first century, governments are still imposing old rules on a new technol-
ogy, an insufficient strategy to provide security in the future. Given that such threats 
can arise at any time across the globe, scientists and policymakers have a narrow 
and closing window in which to develop systems-level prevention and recovery- 
based resilience strategy for twenty-first Century biosecurity.
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Chapter 9
Emerging Biotechnology and Information 
Hazards
Anna Cornelia Nieuwenweg, Benjamin D. Trump, Katarzyna Klasa, 
Diederik A. Bleijs, and Kenneth A. Oye
Biotechnology innovation has never been more accessible to individuals, compa-
nies, and (research)organizations. Advances in genetic engineering, declining costs, 
and improved education have improved access to biotechnologies. Such openness 
has provided many benefits as biotechnology has been used to address some of the 
world’s most intractable problems However, increased access to biotechnology 
tools and knowledge may also pose risks to humans, animals, and the environment 
(Meyer 2013; Kera 2014; Li et al. 2017; Oye 2012).
Biosecurity policies seek to limit risks of misuse of biotechnology and enabling 
sciences (Kelle 2009). Material resources such as funding, laboratory access, pos-
session of critical materials, and control over tools are critical components of the 
broader biosecurity equation but are often not sufficient. Both deliberate malevolent 
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and unintentional negligent misapplications of biotechnology require access to 
information, inspiration, and know-how as well as material resources.
This chapter focuses on how to foster access to critical knowledge for responsi-
ble practitioners and developers while limiting information access for malevolent or 
irresponsible actors. An overview is given of what information hazards mean within 
the context of the developing field of biotechnology and synthetic biology (which is 
defined as “apply[ing] standardized engineering techniques to biology and thereby 
creat[ing] organisms or biological systems with novel or specialized functions 
(Issues, U.S.P.C.f.t.S.o.B 2010)), and discusses why responsible actors need to 
appreciate the significance of information hazards.
The first half of this chapter classifies types of information hazards, discusses 
under which circumstances information may pose hazards, and suggest what can 
reasonably be done to communicate scientific advances while limiting the potential 
for information misuse. Biotechnology governance requires a balance of encour-
agement and education on one hand, and active and passive surveillance of poten-
tially abusable information on the other hand.
The second half of the chapter discusses practical problems associated with act-
ing on these concerns. These tasks are complicated by shifting stakeholder and user 
bases, as elements of emerging biotechnologies like synthetic biology are increas-
ingly accessible outside of conventional large governmental, university and corpo-
rate labs. Likewise, the global accessibility of biotechnology capabilities and 
education may reduce the ability of national governments to address information 
hazards from arising, especially in instances where national differences exist regard-
ing norms, values, and ethics of what forms of biotechnology research are 
permissible.
Though this chapter does not provide a definitive solution to concerns over information 
hazards, it describes the broad problem and provides directions on how such hazards may 
be better monitored and addressed in the near future.
9.1  What Is an Information Hazard?
Classifying what comprises an information hazard is an inherently subjective exer-
cise. The ability for biotechnology information to be misused is the product of not 
only the intellectual capacity possessed by the malevolent actor, but also their raw 
creativity and ability to imagine how a biotechnology or its enabling sciences might 
be engineered and crafted in a manner that is deliberately harmful. A manner which 
should at least be somewhat surprising to the broader scientific audience. On the 
other side of the coin, those who would surveillance and govern information haz-
ards do so while operating under respective political, institutional, and cultural 
frames and incentives that bias identification and interpretation of such haz-
ards (Lewis et al. 2019).
Though no definition or comprehensive guidance exists for biotechnology’s 
information hazards, scientists and governments have long been concerned about 
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how innovative or disruptive advances within various scientific fields might encour-
age or enable adversaries. As an operating definition, information hazards may be 
understood as the rate-limiting step that connects a normatively bad actor with the 
missing inspiration, knowledge, and processes to deploy scientific capabilities for 
harmful purposes (Bostrom 2011). Within such an understanding, that rate-limiting 
piece or pieces of information would be difficult or even impossible for the actor or 
organization to overcome within a set timeframe through independent research and 
development.
What makes the governance of information hazards so difficult is the varying 
forms that information hazards may take. The most intuitive example includes 
instances where a malevolent actor lacks some core competency or critical piece of 
intelligence to develop and deliver a hazardous material. Likewise, however, other 
cases may include malevolent actors which do have advanced basic and research 
capabilities to foster such threats, yet lack the inspiration, motivation, or direction 
to act upon that knowledge. Recent decades have largely focused upon the former 
example, although the latter is equally disconcerting for biotechnology given 
increasing levels of access to potentially dual-use scientific information to actors 
with limited institutional oversight from longstanding authorities.
Perhaps the most well-known exercise of governance of information hazards 
includes government secrecy programs, where certain scientific research was 
restricted in knowledge and access to approved parties only. Historically, for centu-
ries governments have kept tight control over scientific projects that might yield a 
strategic advantage in military situations. They were eager to use such scientific 
advantages as a force multiplier against their enemies yet concerned about losing 
such strategic advantage should knowledge of how the technology is developed or 
deployed be made available to other nations. Within the twentieth century, various 
governments have developed and maintain information classification systems, 
whereby sensitive intelligence with the potential to foster harm to national security 
is collected and protected in a range of secure information systems.
The Manhattan Project provides a clear example of information hazards. The US 
nuclear weapons program in World War II rested on advances in basic and applied 
sciences. The very existence of the program and core discoveries and scientific 
breakthroughs were held closely, with no public dissemination. Personnel with 
access to files were carefully vetted to prevent information spillage to adversaries. 
Information hazards then and now include the capacity to inspire or educate poten-
tial developers. Yet important differences exist (Aldrich et al. 2008).
Today, concerns focus on how easily information might be transmitted from 
secure research facilities and information storage systems to foreign governments 
and organizations. Until recently, the primary mode of transfer for such information 
hazards was either through theft or copying of physical paper documents, or the 
acquisition of certain scientific personnel with knowledge of the specific informa-
tion by means of bribery, kidnapping, or similar measures.
With the increasing maturity of high-speed Internet, prior barriers to the transfer 
of information hazards have been significantly degraded. The robust government 
classification systems continue to operate around the world, information hazard 
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spillage is an increasing concern. Prior information hazards, such as the Anarchist’s 
Cookbook, could spread globally through print media, yet lack the immediacy and 
far superior range that Internet dissemination has been demonstrated to have in 
virtually all countries.
Like many other emerging sciences like chemistry, nuclear physics, engineering, 
and computer science, biotechnology is rife with information hazards. Popular lit-
erature is riddled with examples of how a malevolent actor might manipulate a 
pathogen or deployed biological weapon whose consequences are sweeping and 
often irreversible. The difficulty of identifying and governing information hazards 
and biotechnology is that the core technical and scientific knowledge that might 
enable the creation of a weapon could also yield untold benefits to broader society 
(Lewis et  al. 2019; Casadevall et  al. 2014). This governance challenge is one of 
managing dual-use information, where the dissemination access to such informa-
tion requires an implicit trade-off between the benefits of technological innovation 
to medicine, industry, and various other fields, against the potential that it might be 
deliberately or negligently misused. This challenge is not a new one - the example 
of knives might be overly simplistic yet apt, they can cut food and be useful tools in 
a workplace, yet also be utilized for the explicit purpose of harm to humans or 
animals.
Biotechnology information hazards can appear in many forms, and will undoubt-
edly shift as technologies continue to progress in their sophistication and accessibil-
ity. They might include the genetic sequence of a particularly high-risk pathogen, or 
instructions regarding how to assemble, use, and customize equipment that facili-
tates more precise and targeted genetic modification. Likewise, it may include the 
inspiration for deploying biotechnology assets and capabilities in previously uncon-
sidered vectors or receptors of risk, the outcomes of which may have benefits and 
risks simultaneously.
9.2  When Do Information Hazards Matter?
If information hazards are a recurring fixture of human scientific progress, why is it 
that they matter so much now, and why specifically to biotechnology? As noted 
above, the Internet is an important consideration here, yet the advancements of bio-
technology in and of itself are influencing information hazards trade-offs in a man-
ner where the threat of a malevolent or grossly negligent actor is far more likely in 
the coming years than in decades past. With the continued refinement of biotech-
nologies like synthetic biology, information hazards have become increasingly cen-
tral to biosecurity for two reasons.
First, the ability to synthesize DNA has undercut the effectiveness of physical 
controls on materials to keep pathogens out of the hands of malevolent and negli-
gent actors (Oye 2012). Limits on access to pathogens on the select agents list and 
controls on the transportation of pathogens under the Australia Group guidelines are 
still of critical importance (Rappert and McLeish 2012; Kadlec et al. 1997; Danzig 
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and Berkowsky 1997). But the ability to synthesize pathogens from information on 
sequences provides a pathway around physical controls. This aspect of information 
hazards will become more acute as gain-of-function research produces information 
on how to edit or modify pathogenic sequences to increase infectivity and virulence 
(Noyce and Evans 2018).
Second, within the past decade, a keystone achievement of genetic engineering 
and synthetic biology centers around the de-skilling of certain portions of biotech-
nology research, enabling those with far less training and experience than in previ-
ous decades to conduct advanced biotechnology exercises (Mukunda et al. 2009). 
Historically, a significant limitation of information hazard transference to malevo-
lent parties included the reliance upon (a) professionals with the graduate education 
in a biotechnology-relevant field, and (b) considerable financial, technical, and 
overhead resources to execute scientific development.
To be sure, much of the advanced research that comprises synthetic biology still 
does require significant training, and certain exercises and tools are still inaccessible 
to many individuals and organizations around the world. However, this roadblock 
has diminished over time as the financial costs of conducting biotechnology research 
in certain sectors has decreased, and experimental control and efficacy has increased 
for those with a moderate degree of interest in trading. Likewise, as broader biotech-
nology becomes more globalized through improved training, sharing of information 
through popular media and academic publications, and global exchanges of scien-
tific ideas and commercial products, biotechnology research is being pursued 
in locations around the globe, including laboratories, institutions, companies, and 
schools that do not have a long-standing track record of compliance and oversight 
with respected institutional authorities (Millett et al. 2019).
As the benefit of skilled premiums is somewhat lessened through cheaper and 
more accessible biotechnology research strategies, many more individuals with 
various backgrounds, motivations, and interests in the execution of biotechnology 
research are gaining entry to the field. One popular field leading the way gene edit-
ing, the scientific potential of which is influenced by the decreasing cost of genome 
sequencing and synthesis on one hand, as well as simplified, relatively inexpensive, 
and increasingly precise tools and machines to facilitate gene editing experimenta-
tion. For the most part, this development should be celebrated, for it enables the 
development of biotechnology in more cost-constrained settings in a manner that 
improves educational opportunities while also furthering scientific curiosity and 
development. However, this leaves government decision-makers and other key 
stakeholders in a precarious balancing act.
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9.3  How Might Information Hazards Be Governed?
A critical challenge for the governance of information hazards includes the trade-off 
of: how can we best educate and train those who might assist with information haz-
ards management without surrendering excessive knowledge that may inspire a 
malevolent actor in the first place?
There are few straightforward answers to inform biotechnology governments for 
this problem. Most likely, information hazards governance will have to be an antici-
patory as well as an adaptive process, whereby potential information hazards are 
continuously evaluated accounting for the potential benefits if such information is 
further democratized against the potential threat that such information may be eas-
ily used for nefarious purposes. Examples include research into unknown human 
pathogens, as well as the deployment of engineered organisms to manipulate envi-
ronmental conditions for a predetermined purpose (e.g., ‘biomining’). In such cases, 
those with oversight roles and responsibilities will be required to consider, at a 
minimum, whether research in these fields has a discernible positive outcome that is 
a net improvement over conventional scientific capabilities or commercial products. 
Experiments requiring material from the Select Agent and Toxin List will likely 
always require some degree of oversight and information classification, including 
restrictions on how discoveries from such research are communicated.
For other experiments that do not include known agents or toxins of concern, the 
interpretation of what is and what is not an information hazard becomes far murkier. 
There are few ready-made answers, and the concern that research with information 
hazard potential may arise outside of government, university, incorporate labs thor-
ough and established oversight protocols and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) is 
increasing. The best advice for information hazards governance at-present therefore 
includes greater emphasis upon soft law mechanisms for oversight as well as 
increasing collaboration between top-down and bottom-up actors in the biotechnol-
ogy space. In decades past, biotechnology governance has been broadly informed 
by operating principles and codes of conduct that, though they have little legal 
enforcement, have considerable influence on the norms and expectations of various 
actors from differing institutions. One renowned example includes the Asilomar 
Conference on Recombinant DNA, which was initially formed in 1975 to discuss 
ethical and risk-based hazards stemming from emerging biotechnology research of 
the day. Comprised of dozens of industry professionals from a variety of institu-
tions, the Asilomar Conference helped to frame and anticipate future safety and 
ethics concerns that might arise as the field continues to develop, as well as to pro-
vide the basis for improved codes of conduct, as well as future regulatory codes and 
rules inspired by the precautionary principle. Further, efforts such as Asilomar help 
promote awareness and trust by the broader public that more effective biotechnol-
ogy governance is being discussed and constructed, potentially making consumers 
more amenable to such products as they reach the market.
Several illustrative cases exist, were publication sparked debate among policy-
makers and scientists. Perhaps the most famous case, is the H5N1 gain of function 
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experiments that focused on whether and which mutations would result in a virus 
capable of being transmitted to mammals (Herfst et  al. 2012; Imai et  al. 2012). 
Knowledge about the specific mutations leading to certain gain of functions can be 
easily misused by malevolent actors. The controversy of H5N1 gain of function 
experiments lead to a self-imposed mortarium by scientists (Fouchier et al. 2012) 
after details from two manuscripts on H5N1 were omitted on behalf of the National 
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (Casadevall and Shenk 2012). Additionally, 
the Dutch Government required the authors of the paper to file for an export license 
to prevent export of dangerous information outside of Europe (Enserink 2015).
By way of contrast, the International Genetically Engineered Machine 
(iGEM) competition provides a case of early and ongoing engagement with bio-
safety and biosecurity risks. This global synthetic biology competition engages with 
thousands of high school students, undergraduates, graduate students, entrepre-
neurs, and community laboratories annually. Student teams work closely with 
coaches and contest judges to ensure compliance with all legal requirements, as 
well as to monitor potentially hazardous or dual-use team projects. Judges and sup-
port staff are drawn from a number of institutions, including government, but with 
emphasis placed upon more bottom-up governance of the competition. iGEM serves 
as one successful example of how improved educational opportunities alongside 
respected and trusted authorities can both improve global education of synthetic 
biology and broader biotechnology research, yet simultaneously maintain oversight 
and awareness of interest and activities occurring outside of large government insti-
tutions, corporate offices, or academic laboratories (McNamara et al. 2014; Millett 
et al. 2019).
Other critical components of bottom-up information hazard governance includes 
responsibility and decision-making in the publication process. Globally, the pub-
lishing industry in virtually all fields has exploded in recent decades, with biotech-
nology as no exception. Like the democratization and globalization of biotechnology, 
this should be celebrated, but also reviewed for potential opportunities to improve 
overall governance. For emerging biotechnologies, this may include more rigorous 
training for editors and associate editors regarding how to identify potential infor-
mation hazards, as well as to select qualified and responsible article reviewers to 
make an appropriate determination. This challenges wrought with the difficult 
quagmire, whereby journal editors and reviewers must be given greater instruction 
about which information hazards to look out for, as well as possible examples of 
them, yet simultaneously not be given enough information that would comprise an 
information hazard in and of itself. Academic publication remains one of the easiest 
ways to transfer knowledge of scientific breakthroughs globally, with higher impact 
in prestigious journals having tens to even many hundreds of thousands of readers 
on a weekly to monthly basis. Identifying and training operators of those journals 
that have a reasonable potential to have paper submitted to their journal that may 
contain information hazard is an urgent need, particularly in standardizing how 
potential or confirmed information hazards material should be treated within the 
publication process as well as without. Such measures will likely only be a low 
fence to prevent spillage of information hazards, yet journal editors and reviewers 
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will likely be one of the first and possibly only lines of defense that many countries 
have with respect to information hazards governance on a day-to-day basis.
A long-standing challenge of biotechnology governance related to information 
hazards includes the construction of all offensive biotechnology capabilities (e.g., 
biological weapons). The 1975 Biological Weapons Convention prohibits the devel-
opment, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons, including all 
microbial or other biological agents and toxins as well as their means of delivery. 
The critical distinction includes a focus on offense of use, for which all experimen-
tation is to be prohibited. However, the Biological Weapons Convention makes 
exceptions for medical and defensive purposes in small quantities, leaving a win-
dow open for certain controlled experimentation to continue, provided that any 
quantities of biological material used and stored are justified in their permitted pur-
pose. The BWC’s restrictions have been generally successful in the decades that 
followed its passage, despite infamous examples of biological weapons programs 
continuing even after the host government signed the treaty. The important distinc-
tion for information hazards is that some research on certain biological material 
with a medical or defensive purpose will likely inherently have some offense of 
capability within the hands of a malevolent actor, making it critical to consider the 
level of oversight and information classification that should be applied to such 
cases. In addition, special consideration should be given to international research 
programs that include participation from one or more countries that are known 
BWC violators or are parties of concern, given the potential for any research or 
knowledge gained from medical or defensive experimentation to be utilized for 
other unpermitted purposes.
These and various other exercises that must come to comprise information haz-
ards governance must take on anticipatory and adaptive governing capabilities 
(Esvelt 2018). Anticipatory, due to the evolutionary nature of biotechnology 
research, where breakthroughs enable significant departures from one school of 
thought and into another, thereby fostering new opportunities for information haz-
ards and biosecurity threats to arise. Adaptive, due to the fact that risk assessors and 
various other decision-makers in the biotechnology governance process iteratively 
adjust their perception of a given biological threat over time, whereby new informa-
tion is gained and best practices are adjusted to accommodate for new practices on 
how the deployment of genetically altered material onto humans, animals, and the 
environment may generate unacceptable risk. Both anticipatory and adaptive gov-
erning procedures for biotechnology within a given country must include a multi- 
stakeholder approach to inform best governing practices in the years ahead.
9.4  Information Hazards: Where Do We Go from Here?
To date, thankfully, there has been no major disaster pertaining to emerging biotech-
nologies on the scale of Chernobyl or Fukushima Daiichi. This is due in no small 
part to many well-trained scientists, practitioners, and policymakers that have been 
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actively engaged with international biosecurity governance for several decades. 
However, as the pace of biotechnology innovation accelerates, existing hard law 
procedures and practices will be necessary but potentially not sufficient to fully 
capture shifting development capabilities and incentives in the development and 
commodification of biotechnology research and products.
This chapter’s intent was not to solve the question of the information hazard 
governance dilemma, but instead to highlight why it is particularly important for 
emerging biotechnologies like synthetic biology. Each year, more actors become 
interested and involved with emerging biotechnology research, including differing 
cultures and governments differing perspectives on ethical, legal, moral, and risk- 
informed best practices for biotechnology moving forward. Navigating these intri-
cate differences will be a considerable challenge, both for biotechnology intended 
for environmental deployment, as well as within human subjects’ research. One 
conclusion that can be drawn now is that top-down hard law mechanisms alone will 
be generally insufficient to bridge the gap between these differing national incen-
tives and research practices, as well as to adequately monitor the rapid growth of 
bottom-up biotechnology research.
Over the next several years, information hazards governance will likely become 
an increasing discussion point within broader biotechnology policy as well as 
expected practice within the lab. Continued innovation in the biotechnology space 
will see decreasing cost underpinning such research, such as with the dramatically 
decreased time and financial resources required to sequence and synthesize a 
genome, allowing many more actors to take advantage of such scientific break-
throughs. Future conversations about improving biotechnology governance must 
include improved education and awareness about such concerns in a manner that 
does not dis-incentivize responsible research, as well as testing and implementing 
anticipatory and adaptive governance bodies and operating practices that can keep 
pace with the accelerating rate of biotechnology innovation (Esvelt 2018; Trump 
et al. 2020).
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Biosecurity is a multi-disciplinary topic that covers areas of policy, public health, 
economics, and science. This chapter focuses on the technical scientific aspects of 
the current international biosecurity framework. We discuss these technical areas in 
terms time horizon. We begin this chapter with review of current technology within 
the international biosecurity framework and discuss weakness and opportunities for 
further work. We then focus on near-term technical developments and imminent 
opportunities to strengthen the existing framework. Specifically, we break down the 
range of issues into biological threat prevention, detection, and response. We discuss 
how technical tools can assist in policy development and the engineering cycle of 
Design, Built, and Test. Finally, this chapter describes a ‘futuring’ exercise 
conducted by the working group that created this chapter to explore broader longer- 
term issues in the biosecurity space.
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10.2  Current Technology
Much recent work within our current biosecurity architecture focuses on tracking of 
DNA sequences that are considered to be (or may be) hazardous. This framework 
can be further separated into two general categories: (1) Screening for hazardous 
DNA sequences prior to DNA synthesis and (2) DNA sequencing and repository 
screening for attribution of the source of physical DNA that already exists. This 
framework has been developed gradually over the past ten plus years by multiple 
organizations. It includes policies and technical tools implemented from stakeholders 
across industry, academia, and government.
While this collection of approaches has been developed by multiple parties to 
provide coverage of the broader biosecurity area, it currently exists as a fragmented 
framework that has a number of clear gaps, some of which are currently being 
addressed by a number of parties. These gaps include but are not limited to: laborious 
assessment of false-positive hits from security screens, no standard guideline for 
implementation of a universal tool (or set of tools), and no well-defined database of 
established threats or potential threats.
10.2.1  DNA Sequence Screening
10.2.1.1  State-of-the-Art
Companies across the world have been offering DNA synthesis as a service for 
recombinant DNA biotechnology for the past several decades. This technology has 
improved exponentially in recent years, and currently exists at a scale where many 
companies are able to produce custom DNA sequences for customers on the near 
mega-base scale. While this capability has dramatically enabled biotechnology to 
make a litany of breakthroughs across biology, it has also introduced a key question 
to the scientific community: are there DNA sequences that DNA synthesis providers 
should not provide to certain customers? And furthermore  – are there some 
sequences that should not be generated and provided to any customers?
The general answer to both of these questions by the scientific community is 
“yes”. This answer, however, is highly conditional based on a variety of factors. 
While the vast majority of scientists request DNA sequences that pose no known 
threat, sometimes sequences of known (or potential hazard) are requested for DNA 
synthesis. In this situation, there is a general consensus that there are some sequences 
that should only be provided to qualified customers and some sequences that should 
not be provided to anyone. Currently, a majority of large DNA synthesis providers 
screen orders for the presence of viral, toxic, or otherwise known hazardous 
sequences to avoid sending hazardous DNA to an unqualified end user. This process 
typically involves lookups using local alignment tools against a reference database 
of hazardous sequences.
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In 2009, five DNA synthesis providers founded a consortium to create guidelines 
for screening synthetic DNA orders, called the International Gene Synthesis 
Consortium (IGSC).1 IGSC provides its members guidelines for implementing 
synthesis screening and gives its members benchmark tests to assure that their tools 
meet the current screening standards. The consortium also meets regularly to discuss 
any needed updates to existing protocols. It is reported that approximately 80% of 
global DNA synthesis is provided by currently IGSC members performing synthesis 
screening. However, since IGSC itself does not manage a consensus software tool 
or database for all members and membership to IGSC is voluntary (and not a legal 
mandate), there is no unified implementation of these protocols and a lot of the 
nuanced decision making on whether or not to synthesize a sequence is still left to 
individual parties. No detailed guidance exists on how to handle specific edge cases 
where the threat potential of a sequence can’t be determined.
In parallel with IGSC activities, the US HHS published a screening framework 
guidance2 for all synthesis providers to use when developing their screening tools. 
This guidance was made with recommendations in mind from a US National 
Research Council report on the feasibility of identifying DNA sequences of 
concern.3 This guidance has been put to use by some non-IGSC DNA synthesis 
providers,4 but as with IGSC member tools, the details of how the screening is done 
specifically is left to the individual parties. Other large synthetic biology groups like 
the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition and 
Engineering Biology Research Consortium (EBRC) have their own biosecurity 
considerations that sometimes employ IGSC member tools, but do not currently 
widely use independently built DNA screening tools or have not published their 
own screening guidelines.
10.2.1.2  Next-Generation Tool Development
More recently, a number of other coordinated research efforts have been initiated to 
fill existing gaps in the global sequence-screening framework. These have included 
technical research programs, screening guidance updates, and attempts to develop 
an open-source tool for general use across the world.
In 2018, the US Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activities (IARPA) 
program announced the creation of two research programs to build new tools to 
identify DNA sequences that pose a safety hazard or have been engineered5,6 The 
1 https://genesynthesisconsortium.org/
2 https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/guidance/syndna/Documents/syndna-guidance.pdf
3 National Research Council. Sequence-based classification of select agents: a brighter line. 
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former, called Fun GCAT (Functional Genetic Categorization of Threats), aims to 
“to develop new approaches and tools for the screening of nucleic acid sequences, 
and for the functional annotation and characterization of genes of concern, with the 
goal of preventing the accidental or intentional creation of a biological threat.” This 
program includes development of both new computational and experimental 
technologies to identify known or novel DNA threat sequences. The latter program, 
called FELIX (Finding Engineering-Linked Indicators), aims to “to develop new 
experimental and computational tools to detect engineered biological systems”. 
Together with the technologies developed under the Fun GCAT program, this 
research initiative has spurned the development of new tools to identify existing and 
novel threats more efficiently and at a higher standard than the first wave of tools 
currently implemented in government, academia, and industry.
In parallel with the efforts to build better technologies for sequence screening, 
the IGSC issued updated guidance to DNA synthesis providers based on new 
information since 2010.7 This updated guidance has provided synthesis providers 
with additional recommendations on how to perform their sequence screening with 
newer data resources and recommendations on customer screening.
Finally, there have been recent efforts to use the most up-to-date guidance and 
resources to develop a universal DNA screening tool that could be used by and DNA 
synthesizer across the world. This effort has been spearheaded by the Nuclear 
Threat Initiative (NTI-bio),8 in partnership with the World Economic Forum (WEF) 
and the NTI Biosecurity Innovation and Risk Reduction Initiative. This group has 
established a working group to consider the technical requirements and 
implementation options for an international, common screening mechanism to 
prevent illicit gene synthesis. The group seeks to develop, update, and expand 
geographic buy-in for screening and convenes specialists from gene synthesis 
companies, experts from the synthetic biology community, and biosecurity 
professionals. The mechanism will consider DNA synthesis screening options for 
commercial providers, as well as producers of desktop synthesizers in the future. 
Central to the work of this group will be recommendations for making the mechanism 
common, globally accessible, and regularly updated based on advances in scientific 
understanding. NTI and WEF have subsequently released these recommendations 
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10.2.2  Attribution and Traceability
Screening DNA sequences prior to synthesis is the first technical protective measure 
used to assure that potentially hazardous sequences are not manufactured for 
unqualified end-users. But, another set of concerns is how to track and attribute 
DNA materials that already have already been produced, either by DNA synthesis 
or DNA assembly. We refer to this problem as the problem of attribution and 
traceability – specifically, can we determine which organization an engineered piece 
of DNA came from and what its engineering history might have been. While this 
area is currently less developed than screening prior to synthesis, there are already 
some tools and guidelines that have been established for this area.
In the past couple years, at least a couple have tools have been published with 
identifying the lab-of-origin of engineered DNA.10,11 There has also been a competi-
tion to test and improve these tools.12 The general methodologies use machine-
learning methods on large databases of DNA sequences to detect patterns of DNA 
that can be associated with certain research groups. This tends to be useful because 
DNA is often shared within labs and varies considerably across laboratories or even 
small groups within the same lab.
One difficult aspect in the attribution and traceability area is a non-perfect match 
between digital DNA information and physical DNA. Given that many software 
tools have been quickly developed in recent years with high variability in logging 
and tracking standards, there are perhaps many records of physical DNA in databases 
that might not actually physically exist anywhere. A key example of this problem is 
the iGEM Registry – it is deliberately open-source to allow people from all over the 
world to enter DNA sequence information, but many of these sequences were never 
actually physically built. Furthermore, in many cases, the history and real physical 
location of these DNA fragments might be unknown. This throws a hitch in the 
efforts for attribution, as it cannot be taken for granted that the data they operate on 
maps to real physical DNA sequences in a lab.
In parallel with tools to for attribution and tracing, updates to guidelines for syn-
thesis providers have included considerations for customer screening. Namely, the 
idea is that synthesis providers should not be sending DNA materials to unqualified 
users or institutions. For example, in 2006, a journalist at The Guardian was able to 
obtain a fragment of the Smallpox virus (Variola major) via having the DNA sent to 
their apartment.13 Since this initial oversight by some synthesis providers, it has 
been the policy of most synthesis providers to verify that DNA is only shipped to 
10 Nielsen, Alec AK, and Christopher A. Voigt. “Deep learning to predict the lab-of-origin of engi-
neered DNA.” Nature communications 9.1 (2018): 1–10.





10 Technical Aspects of Biosecurity: Screening Guidance, Attribution, and Traceability
146
qualified research institutions, but this is only the first step of the problem – the 
problem is further compounded by the fact that some researchers actively study 
infectious agents and develop vaccines. In this case, these scientists have a valid 
reason to use synthetic DNA in their studies, but this must be determined on a case-
by-case basis. One additional factor that complicates issues even further in some 
cases is that it isn’t necessarily clear what links any one institution’s or researcher’s 
are between academia, industry, or government. Between all of these factors, syn-
thesis providers often result to making complex judgment calls about whether or not 
to synthesize certain DNA for a particular customer and must invest internal 
resources to make these decisions.
Another complex issue on the horizon in this space is the development of bench- 
top DNA synthesizers. These devices would allow operators to synthesize DNA in 
house, reducing the need to order from a provider likely to screen an order. The 
details of how to manage biosecurity in this case are currently being heavily debated. 
While the manufacturers of these machines will add software to control for illicit 
DNA synthesis in some way, it is unclear what methods will be completely effective. 
In response, some government have implemented export controls on “Nucleic acid 
assemblers and synthesizers, which are partly or entirely automated, and designed 
to generate continuous nucleic acids greater than 1.5 kilobases in length with error 
rates less than 5% in a single run”.14 This problem is still in the early days and the 
solution is far from robust.
In spite of the complexities of attribution and tracing of DNA synthesis, there is 
some reason for optimism in this space – those who are interested in pursuing illicit 
DNA synthesis have historically resorted to the methods easily detectable by simple 
biosecurity measures. Since biology is still done largely by hand as opposed to fully 
automated systems, most biologists are not even aware of their habits and will 
probably naïvely make easy-to-catch mistakes if they decide to pursue illicit DNA 
synthesis. A naïve bad actor is unlikely to reinvent the wheel, and rather, simply 
order near full-length pathogen sequences that will get flagged in existing 
frameworks. A sophisticated bad actor would be very hard to catch under current 
standards, but most security frameworks in other domains (i.e. cyber-security) are 
geared towards catching naïve bad actors. While it is important for the community 
to quickly develop more robust policies and tools for attribution and control of 
materials, there so far haven’t been many examples of pressing issues of the existing 
framework.
14 Australia Group. “Control List of Dual-use Biological Equipment and Related Technology and 
Software.” (2020) https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/theaustraliagroupnet/site/en/
dual_biological.html
E. Appleton and P. Millett
147
10.2.3  Gaps in Existing Biosecurity Technology Framework
While we have described the formation of a technical biosecurity framework that 
has partial solutions for some of the problems identified in the DNA biosecurity 
space, there are some key shortcomings in the existing framework. Some of the key 
outstanding issues include:
• High false positive rate – false alarm rates in the approximate range of ~2% of 
screened orders are observed and must be examined by hand
• Pathogenic genes or gene fragments embedded in non-pathogenic host sequences 
will have low match scores and will be missed
• Matching is slow and requires significant computational power since each order 
must be matched to each reference pathogen
• Black list databases of pathogens may be dangerous to share with the public 
since they provide bad actors with a concise like of sequences of concern
• Human genes used to interfere with the metabolism will not be captured by the 
current guideline (e.g. the insulin gene expressed under a strong promoter)
These problems are generally acknowledged by the biosecurity community and 
are often debated in ongoing meetings and conferences. Each synthesis provider 
currently addresses these gaps in a different capacity, and some providers are not 
able to address some of these gaps at all for various reasons. Furthermore, there 
exist some more nebulous gaps that will need to be addressed at some point, even 
though they are not currently pressing issues. Some of these include:
• Dissemination of viral and microbial sequences that are not currently on select 
agents lists, but cannot be ruled out as not dangerous in a general sense
• The use of synthetic biology in virology and gene therapy fields (generally for 
vaccine development)
• Economic drivers running synthetic biology might be contrary to biosecurity
• Lack of consensus and standards on which parties should be screening DNA 
synthesis orders
• Widespread use of bench-top synthesis screening technologies fundamentally 
places a majority of the responsibility of using best biosecurity practices in the 
customer’s hands as opposed to larger institutions
• The growth of DIY synthetic biology and community labs
While there are many active conversations across the community about address-
ing these problems, there is no existing consensus agreement on these issues. 
Fundamentally, many of these issues boil down to that we do not yet have good 
generalizable ways to measure biological threats with clear, meticulous scientific 
methods. While standardization like the ISO standards15 suggested would be nice, at 
the moment it is too hard to really implement.
15 https://www.iso.org/standards.html
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Generally speaking, biosecurity can’t be taken for granted – it comes with costs 
that have to be built in, regardless of the provider. Funders or investors of synthesis 
technologies must support this and it is often not in today’s world. It has been sug-
gested that another route for incentivizing this technology development could be 
done via paying for liability protection and a regulatory framework to enforce fines 
and financial consequences of bad practices that result in illicit DNA synthesis. 
However, this idea is still far off from any form of implementation.
10.3  Imminent Opportunities for Technology Development
Thus far, we have outlined existing technical aspects of biosecurity framework and 
identified some gaps. We identified a set of imminent opportunities for additional 
technology development that would be beneficial in the short-term. We also noted 
that other gaps are likely to only be possible to address in the medium- to long-term 
future We break these opportunities into biological threat Prevention, Detection, 
and Response as general categories. We further disseminate these areas into more 
specific topics in each section (Fig. 10.1).
10.3.1  Biological Threat Prevention
Since biological engineering projects are now often done through cycles of Design, 
Building, and Testing, we discuss these imminent threat prevention opportunities 
below in that context. We identify the current approaches in these areas and suggest 
key ways in which new technology could be developed in these areas to strengthen 
biosecurity.
Fig. 10.1 Overview of areas for technology development in current biosecurity landscape. There 
is a need for technology development in all parts of the biosecurity workflow, starting from the 
prevention of future threat and ending with responding to bio-threats
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10.3.1.1  Design
The first part of the engineering process is the Design phase. This is when the bio-
logical engineer makes key decisions about what DNA sequences will be involved 
in a project and which function each DNA element is supposed to have. In this start-
ing step lies an opportunity to incorporate biosecurity features of synthetic DNA 
from the very beginning. In recent years, a number of software tools have been cre-
ated for synthetic biology that automate the design process,16 so there exists an 
opportunity to add tools specific to biosecurity in these frameworks.
Specification
The first step of a design process is an abstract design process, where the high-level 
design requirements are defined before a concrete design with specific real 
components are formulated. This step is called ‘Specification’. Some examples of a 
specification that have been used in synthetic biology include logic gate behaviour, 
toggle switch behaviour, and oscillatory behaviour – for these examples, the very 
high level intentions of a genetic construct are defined, but no actual DNA sequences 
are yet selected. This step is useful because it defines the overall purpose of an 
engineered system before committing to the actual components needed to create a 
fully designed system. This specification is then generally fed automatically into a 
downstream design tool that chooses and arranges components to satisfy the 
specification.
While some software tools for specification in synthetic biology already exist, 
there are not yet any tools specific to specification of biosecurity features. This 
working group concluded that it would be useful to have such a software tool 
created, and discussed features that would be ideal to incorporate in such a tool. We 
thought that integrating security considerations into desirable system properties 
such as ‘biocontainment’ features would be desirable. We also thought it would be 
an opportunity to specify whether or not DNA sequences of known threat status 
should be incorporated into designs, or not, and create a direct link to downstream 
design tools.
The creation of such tools can also lead towards creation of design standards 
with respect to biosecurity. While our working group decided that biosecurity 
specification standards were a good idea, it is less clear how they would be enforced. 
For other specification topics in the field, complying with a specification standard is 
voluntary best practice. In some limited cases, like within the iGEM community, a 
form of project specifications with security considerations are submitted to the 
central organization for approval before specific designs are made, but this is not a 
scalable practice. In principle, a decision tree could be deduced to help an engineer 
16 Appleton, Evan, et al. “Design automation in synthetic biology.” Cold Spring Harbor perspec-
tives in biology 9.4 (2017): a023978.
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determine if a specification should move forward or not, but most likely in the short 
term, complying with standards would have to remain a voluntary best practice.
Design Tools
After the specification step of design comes the selection of specific components to 
satisfy the specification. This is still most often done manually by a user in various 
software interfaces, but can also be done automatically with design tools. The output 
of this design step in a synthetic biology context is a complete DNA sequence. 
While current genetic design software generally does not screen the DNA sequences 
at this step for hazardous fragments, there is an opportunity in that step to perform 
an in silico screen in this design step for potentially hazardous sequences.
While the DNA synthesis and assembly step is a clear place to look for matches 
to known threats, design tools could be an ideal environment to perform modelling 
and analysis for potentially less obvious threat. In principle, whole-cell modelling 
could be developed to determine if over-expression of certain agents will disable 
cell metabolism via Flux Balance Analysis.17 Models could also be developed to 
predict if a specific protein resembles a hazardous agent or if a viral agent could 
pose risk to a specific model system or cell type.
These types of modelling approaches with a complete DNA sequence could be 
extremely valuable at mitigating biosecurity risk before synthesis, but it is known 
that very few groups are capable of making such models at this time. And even then, 
it’s hard to validate these models completely to the point that these design tools can 
be used reliably. Although there have been some powerful design tools recently 
published with highly successful design automation functionality for genetic logic 
circuits,18 building tools for biosecurity threats would be a bit more abstract and 
require knowledge of the environment and potentially a community of cells on top 
of whole-cell modelling. This could be simplified for in vitro cell-free systems, but 
it is general knowledge that one cannot directly apply knowledge obtained in in 
vitro systems to in vivo systems.
Selecting Chassis
Once a final DNA sequence for a design is determined, it must be determined which 
‘chassis’ (i.e. organism/model system) the DNA will be used in. Generally this 
information is already included in the DNA design, but when you consider the 
environment in which the DNA is introduced to a cell, additional considerations 
become relevant (especially biosecurity considerations). Furthermore, traditionally 
17 Orth, Jeffrey D., Ines Thiele, and Bernhard Ø. Palsson. “What is flux balance analysis?.” Nature 
biotechnology 28.3 (2010): 245–248.
18 Nielsen, Alec AK, et al. “Genetic circuit design automation.” Science 352.6281 (2016).
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some complete organisms have been designated as dangerous agents (i.e. Yersinia 
pestis) – while the organism has pathogenicity as a whole, a vast majority of the 
genes in these cells is harmless to humans. It would be valuable to create design 
tools that also consider the functionality of the chassis the DNA is implanted into – 
for example is it possible to add DNA to chassis that either makes a previously 
harmless chassis harmful or a previously harmful chassis harmless?
The simplest chassis is one that only uses cellular components, but no complete 
cell (i.e. ‘cell-free systems’). The use of these chassis can simplify the analysis of 
whether an agent is harmful, but if this DNA were to get inadvertently to a living 
organism, it would be hard to know if it could become harmful or not. The most 
complicated chassis use case is a future unnatural, engineered organism or an 
organism that is rarely used and poorly understood in the literature. In this case, it 
would be near impossible to say with certainty if a DNA sequence is harmful in 
these contexts. This can get further convoluted if one must determine which 
organism or type of cell is harmed, as not all biological threats to humans are direct 
threats to human cells (i.e. threats to agriculture). In summary, there is ripe 
opportunity to develop tools that consider the organisms DNA is used in when 
determining DNA threat status.
Tools to Enhance Tracking of Users and Research
Finally, in addition to the many purely technical opportunities that exist for biosecu-
rity development in the near future, there is also the opportunity to track activities at 
the design phase. Right now, all DNA threats are typically caught at the Build step, 
but if a user logs all of their design thinking, there is greater ability to warn a user 
of potential DNA threats before they start physical construction of the DNA. If their 
design was linked to databases where threat information can be automatically que-
ried, projects that accidently use hazardous DNA components can be mitigated ear-
lier. In the later future, if these types of tracking and logging were done at the design 
level, additional high-level adaptive management of new threat information could 
be incorporated seamlessly.
10.3.1.2  Build
After the design process, the next step of a biological engineering process is to strat-
egize the build step. In this case, our construction material is DNA. As discussed in 
this chapter, there are already some existing biosecurity frameworks that relate to 
DNA synthesis and assembly and some gaps. In this section, we discuss some 
detailed near-term opportunities for technology development and technical 
guidelines in the Build phase.
Over the past 10 years, there has been huge technological advancement in the 
DNA synthesis field and has caused a shift in DNA synthesis versus DNA 
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assembly.19 In the past, a majority of DNA building was done in labs via PCR ampli-
fication and DNA assembly. This was necessary for building large constructs, as it 
was only economical to synthesize short fragments of DNA called DNA oligonucle-
otides (i.e. ‘oligos’). However, because technology DNA synthesis of large frag-
ments has become so much cheaper, it is now often more economical to simply 
outsource synthesis of most fragments and only assemble these large fragments in 
the last step, as opposed to relying primarily on traditional molecular cloning. As a 
consequence, most imminent opportunities in this space fall under the purview of 
DNA synthesis as opposed to DNA assembly. The working group identified a 
number of concrete avenues for strengthening current screening procedures and 
practices.
Who Should Be Screening Synthesis Production in the Future?
One general gap identified in the prior section was a lack of consensus on who ide-
ally should be screening synthesis production. While the current system has the 
DNA producer (i.e. synthesis company, bench biologist, etc.) self-regulating using 
guidelines, as DNA synthesis becomes a more and more accessible technology, this 
might not remain the case. The two primary alternatives to self-regulation would be 
having licensed companies that provide DNA screening as a paid service or having 
government agencies commit resources to perform this service. Each of these 
alternatives has pros and cons, but both approaches generally require a centralized 
screening tool.
The benefit of having governments in charge of screening DNA orders is that 
they have a direct link to regulatory structure and no direct incentive for profit. It 
would also be advantageous from a centralization perspective – it could have one 
screening tool and one database and would not require verification that multiple 
screening tools and databases are screening correctly. Furthermore, a government is 
able to control exports of physical items (i.e. DNA). This could be a good mechanism 
for ensuring that hazardous DNA is not produced and exported, with legal 
punishment for violators. In addition, the government has access to additional 
information via state intelligence programs to perform customer screening (i.e. a 
government would have existing lists of individuals and organizations considered 
dangerous that it would not allow synthetic DNA to be delivered to). If done in an 
ideal way with neutrality towards the DNA synthesis producers and consumers, the 
government screening option could be a good solution. Unfortunately, in reality it 
might not be that simple. Currently this industry functions void of almost any 
regulation – adding regulation is always a messy process and each government has 
different attitudes towards business and science. Furthermore, a rogue state with 
19 Hughes, Randall A., and Andrew D. Ellington. “Synthetic DNA synthesis and assembly: putting 
the synthetic in synthetic biology.” Cold Spring Harbor perspectives in biology 9.1 (2017): 
a023812.
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control over the DNA synthesis industry could become a more general existential 
threat.20
Another alternative is having licensed companies providing screening as a ser-
vice to the DNA producer. While one such company already exists,21 more could 
exist in the future. Like with the government solution, this approach uses a 
centralized tool and database to perform screening, but is managed by a company, 
which has different incentives and concerns. One advantage of this solution is that 
it is consistent, but also is not directly tied to regulations, which allows the synthesis 
producers to operate with more freedom. The main complexity of this solution lies 
in intellectual property concerns  – namely that companies have interest in not 
divulging their IP to other companies under the concern that the company that is 
screening could in principle use sequence information from the screen for economic 
gain. This solution requires a high degree of trust between the companies producing 
DNA and those screening it. This proposed solution raises all sorts of liability issues 
that must be negotiated between all participating parties and could be more complex 
than a government-based solution.
A Stratified White List Approach for DNA Synthesis Production
After a clear decision is made on the future of which parties will be performing 
DNA synthesis screening, a general strategy on which DNA should and should not 
be allowed for synthesis must be formulated. Under today’s current guidelines, 
screeners use a Black List approach – all sequences are allowed except those that 
closely match DNA sequences designated as potentially hazardous. When DNA 
consumers make requests that are on the Black List, their orders are flagged and the 
DNA producer will follow up with the consumer to verify whether or not they 
should get the DNA. While this solution works well for sequences of known threat 
(i.e. fragments of the Smallpox genome), it is not able to handle new threats or 
threats which are not currently deemed hazardous enough to make the Black List. 
The result is that there is likely a large volume of sequences produced and distributed 
today that have some sort of threat potential. The Black List approach works well if 
the list remains static, but we know that in the synthetic biology space, this is not a 
realistic expectation.
The reverse of the Black List approach is a White List approach – a White List 
contains a large library (or generic definition) of sequences that cause no reason for 
concern. In a White List-centric approach, only things that give hits on the White 
List are allowed and anything not on it is not allowed. The primary difference 
between White- and Black-List approaches is how the ‘grey’ area is approached. In 
a Black List paradigm, things in the grey area are allowed and resources are spent to 
20 Trump BD, et al. Building biosecurity for synthetic biology. Molecular Systems Biology. 2020.
21 https://www.battelle.org/inb/threatseq
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confirm that they aren’t technically on the Black List. In a White List paradigm, 
things that are in the grey area are generally not allowed.
This working group proposed the idea of a ‘Stratified White List’ approach. In 
this framework, it is essentially a White List approach with exceptions for highly 
trusted partners. These highly trusted partners could be institutions with clear 
approval to work with specific hazardous sequences – depending on the research 
being performed, there would be different categories of White Lists. The proposed 
category breakdown of Stratified White Lists could have the following types of 
breakdowns:
 1. Basic molecular biology labs with institutional approval to do work in BL1 (or 
equivalent) with no declared intention of working on sequences that might 
pose threat
 2. Labs with permission to work on one specific agent or set of agents with estab-
lished threat status
 3. Labs with permission to work on a broad set of agents with known threat status
By default, all customers (new and existing) would be automatically placed in 
the CATEGORY 1 provided that they have proof that they are working in an 
established institution (i.e. not a private address with no specific permission to work 
with DNA) and would then need to pass some certifications to move into CATEGORY 
2 or CATEGORY 3. CATEGORY 1 would include labs at academic and industrial 
institutions and DIY community labs. This certification process would need to be of 
minimal burden to the customer, but make it clear that the customer has institutional 
approval to work with certain types of agents to be approved for higher categories. 
This process could potentially be tied to IGSC or managed in some part by a similar 
organization.
In general, the Stratified White List system would cover most examples of DNA 
to be produced, but there are a couple important edge cases that would require more 
thinking. First, certain mammalian genes (i.e. insulin) could be overexpressed in 
certain situations that make a gene on the White List cause harm to human cells. 
Second, this approach still does not solve the problem of sequences that are 
requested that match no known DNA sequence in the screening database.
While the Stratified White List approach gives a clear tiered system, one issue 
that could arise is how to deal with the use of middlemen or intermediary institutions 
giving access of higher-tiered DNA to those at a lower tier. For example, instead of 
a bench scientist ordering directly from a DNA producer, they might regularly order 
through a local supplier. Or, for example, a user at a high category clearance giving 
inactivated forms of agents to lower-category parties under the premise that the 
second party will not mutate the agent back into active form. To solve this problem, 
we would recommend an end-user certificate to validate that the party physically 
using the DNA is on the right category White List. While this proposed system does 
not completely solve this ‘middleman problem’, this problem is also unsolved in the 
current Black List approach.
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Functional Equivalence of Sequences
The current foundation for determining if a sequence should be built or not is 
founded on lists of known sequences of harm. However, it is broadly acknowledged 
that there is a much larger list of sequences that may be threats that are not currently 
on these lists. This is currently unaddressed in any screening framework, but there 
has been discussion of methods to assign functional equivalency of sequences – the 
task of determining if a sequence is ‘similar enough’ to a known threat to cause 
pause before DNA synthesis.
Discussions as recently as 200822 had deemed this scientific pursuit too challeng-
ing of a problem to seriously consider. At that time, it was thought that a nucleotide 
sequence similarity percentage of 80% could be useful to identify sequences of 
potential threat. This sequence matching approach had many problems, namely 
because sequence identity isn’t necessarily a good predictor of function, and was 
subsequently abandoned. However, in recent years, there have been huge advances 
made in machine learning in biology and an explosion of DNA production for 
genetics research. Moreover, at the time, a lot of sequence databases where new and 
therefore were sparse and contained errors. Now that vast, accurate databases of 
sequences exist and machine learning in biology has gotten off to a strong start, 
perhaps it is time to revisit the idea of building tools to predict functional equivalency 
not based solely on nucleotide sequence.
DNA Assembly and Smaller DNA Synthesis Providers
As discussed, a large shift in recent years has gone towards de novo DNA synthesis 
over traditional DNA amplification and assembly. However, DNA assembly of 
small fragments is still performed widely in the community too. While this DNA 
assembly is more time consuming and sometimes more expensive than DNA 
synthesis, it creates some problematic edge cases for the existing screening 
framework. First, since the current screening guidance only focuses on fragments of 
size ≥200 bp, one could order a bunch of small fragments of a hazardous agent and 
assemble them in a lab without being detected. Second, if a user already has access 
to some fragments of hazardous DNA, they can order oligonucleotides to mutate 
and assemble full-length agents. A near-term opportunity in this space is to build 
software tools that account for DNA assembly. Software could also be developed 
such that a DNA purchaser account could be flagged if they order a large set of 
small fragments that partially match a known dangerous agent or if an account 
suddenly logs ‘unusual’ ordering activity as is done sometimes with ATM 
withdrawals at financial institutions.
22 National Research Council. 2010. Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter 
Line. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/12970
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The DNA assembly problem is an important area to address since many types of 
parties still do this routinely. Organism design companies, automated platforms, 
cloud labs, CROs, guide RNA service providers, and other service providers 
regularly produce small DNA fragments in house. This issue will become even 
more pressing for bench-top DNA synthesizers.
Attribution and Tracing
Finally, while attribution tools have gotten off to a strong start, there are additional 
angles that might be factored into these tools to include lab-specific optimizations 
of codon optimization and synthetic biological parts usage patterns. The synthetic 
biology community often uses different codon optimization schemes for their parts 
and often re-uses combinations of characterized parts to build complex genetic 
circuits, so these additional dimensions could strongly aid existing attribution 
efforts.
In recent years, there has also been a widespread adoption of ‘DNA barcoding’ 
techniques for many areas of biotechnology and there could also be opportunities to 
institute a DNA barcoding system for DNA synthesis in certain capacities. This 
would require standardization and a consensus of how to do the barcoding, but it 
could be a useful way to program attribution into the DNA synthesis workflow.
10.3.1.3  Test
The final part of the Design-Build-Test cycle is Test – methods for obtaining and 
analysing data. While the Design and Build phases predict or assume a certain 
degree of functionality of an agent, in the Test phase, these qualities are scientifically 
determined. In the context of biosecurity, this is where the actual threat capability of 
any given agent is determined. In this situation, a lot of the technological focus is 
under what setting (both physical and biological) the testing of potential bio-threats 
is done, since it is dangerous to test potentially hazardous agents in an open, 
uncontrolled setting. Ergo, most relevant concerns with respect to testing revolve 
around containment.
Physical Containment
The first layer of containment is physical containment  – where certain types of 
agents are stored and worked with by scientists. While this is conventionally 
performed in physically secure labs with different levels of chemical and biological 
agent clearance, emerging DNA technology has made this problem more complex. 
Specifically, with the widespread use of synthetic DNA and incorporation into 
model organisms, do standard decontamination and waste procedures suffice for 
eliminating biothreats?
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In general, biological waste is either treated with bleach before being poured 
down the drain or sent for incineration (re-usable containers for research materials 
are autoclaved at high temperature and pressure). It is assumed that these procedures 
are broadly effective at containing biological threats, but given the stability of DNA, 
this generalization should be revisited in near-term research. It is known, for 
example, that standard sterilization techniques do not fully degrade double-stranded 
DNA fragments,23 leaving whole genes unmodified. While it is not known how 
much DNA would be needed to create horizontal gene transfer, there is a knowledge 
gap of ramifications of allowing DNA to escape labs via current sterilization 
processes. This working group identified the area of measuring levels synthetic 
DNA in waste collection and the general environment as an area of key opportunity 
in physical containment. As an extension, another area of imminent technology 
development would be using new technologies to set up a surveillance network to 
track when DNA fragments of interest are detected at specific physical locations. 
Such a surveillance network could ground many of our assumptions on the physical 
spread of biologics from laboratories.
Biology-Based Containment
A second layer of containment is biology-based containment. Biology-based meth-
ods contain organisms using programmed biological features. The key difference in 
this containment approach is that it allows engineered organisms in the environment 
outside of a controlled facility. While this is traditionally avoided, there could be 
large benefit of using engineered organisms in the environment for applications 
such as bioremediation where organisms could be used to clean the environment of 
toxic molecules or pollution.
One early biology-based containment method is the use of antibiotic resistance 
genes such that only bacteria with that gene could grow on a substrate. Later on, 
other approaches of biology-based containment were developed including using 
cell lysates (i.e. cell-free systems) and partial organisms (i.e. lenti-viral packaging) 
to control biological spread by removing parts of the biology used for replication. In 
more recent years, technologies such as recoding,24 kill-switches,25 and gene drives26 
have been introduced to engineer biocontainment such that organisms can be used 
in certain field applications without the ability to escape the controlled environment.
23 Yap et al. “Integrity of bacterial genomic DNA after autoclaving: possible implications for hori-
zontal gene transfer and clinical waste management” Journal of Hospital Infection 83 (2013) 
pp 247–249.
24 Lajoie, Marc J., et al. “Genomically recoded organisms expand biological functions.” science 
342.6156 (2013): 357–360.
25 Stirling, Finn, et al. “Rational design of evolutionarily stable microbial kill switches.” Molecular 
cell 68.4 (2017): 686–697.
26 Esvelt, Kevin M., et  al. “Emerging technology: concerning RNA-guided gene drives for the 
alteration of wild populations.” Elife 3 (2014): e03401.
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Kill-switch technology describes programmed mechanisms for a human observer 
to change the environment where an organism is placed in order to cause the 
organism to rapidly die. This has been engineered for both temperature and 
environmental triggers. Additional technology development for fine control of these 
mechanisms, using genetic logic gates27 or an engineered micro-biome28 could pro-
vide more sophisticated control of containment. Technology development in this 
area would have high near-term impact for biosecurity, as we think about how to 
introduce new, impactful biological applications, while taking proper measures to 
be able to control the spread of engineered organisms if they are not behaving as 
desired. It could also impact the desirability of biological weapons, should we 
develop capabilities to accurately confine engineered systems to specific locations.
A second new technology for biocontainment, called ‘recoding’, is a method for 
containing engineered agents by requiring them to use an alternate genetic code for 
survival. This has been done for E. coli, where these recoded bacteria, called rE. coli, 
require the addition of extra unnatural amino acids in the environment to survive, 
and thus cannot grow in environments that do not have an unnatural additive.29 
There is on-going work in the field to expand this technology into new organisms 
and at greater scale. Further near-term development in this area will lead to creation 
of organisms that are safe for use in the environment because they fundamentally 
cannot survive in natural environments. A key step will be experimentally 
demonstrating that this is true.
A third new technology, ‘gene drives’,30 has been proposed as a genetic mecha-
nism for control of population genetics. This technology uses engineered inheri-
tance to guarantee the passing of certain genes via sexual reproduction in eukaryotes. 
The result is that populations could, in principle, be culled or controlled using the 
gene drive mechanism. The advent of this technology has drawn in large- scale sci-
ence funding31 to determine if this approach is has efficacy on a large scale and 
develop technologies such as reversible gene drives to correct potential mistakes 
made. There have also been efforts to limit the spread of gene drives to specific 
locations.32,33 The primary model organism used thus far for gene drives is the mos-
quito, since suppression of mosquitos in certain regions could be used to supress the 
27 Tamsir, Alvin, Jeffrey J. Tabor, and Christopher A. Voigt. “Robust multicellular computing using 
genetically encoded NOR gates and chemical ‘wires’.” Nature 469.7329 (2011): 212–215.
28 Pacheco, Alan R., Mauricio Moel, and Daniel Segrè. “Costless metabolic secretions as drivers of 
interspecies interactions in microbial ecosystems.” Nature communications 10.1 (2019): 1–12.
29 Mandell, Daniel J., et al. “Biocontainment of genetically modified organisms by synthetic pro-
tein design.” Nature 518.7537 (2015): 55–60.
30 Esvelt, Kevin M., et  al. “Emerging technology: concerning RNA-guided gene drives for the 
alteration of wild populations.” Elife 3 (2014): e03401.
31 darpa.mil/program/safe-genes
32 Marshall et  al. “Can CRISPR-Based Gene Drive Be Confined in the Wild? A Question for 
Molecular and Population Biology.” ACS Chemical Biology. 13, 2 (2018) pp 424–430.
33 Sudweeks et al. “Locally Fixed Alleles: A method to localize gene drive to island populations.” 
Sci Rep 9, 15,821 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-51994-0
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spread of malaria and other diseases. This area is ripe for additional technology 
development and application to more species if it can prove controllable in current 
research efforts.
This working group discussed ways in which the existing methods could be used 
synergistically to create additional layers of biocontainment. For example, one 
could imagine a situation where artificial dependence on certain conditions and 
dependence on antibiotics triggers the expression of certain factors in absence of the 
antibiotic to kill the cells could be a two-component system. This type of containment 
system could exist between an animal and bacterium where they depend on each 
other and one dies out in the environment without the other. Other ‘xenobiotic’ 
biocontainment examples could be developed to create complex, layered levels of 
biocontainment in the near future. This type of path forward will require much 
greater inclusion of ecologists in relevant research areas. Even then, there will be 
some risk in such projects. Some reversion might be possible by use of kill switches 
and reversal drives, but it is likely that some changes will be permanent depending 
not only on the system but also the population size, where it is released, and the 
fitness of the organism in the environment it is released into.
Horizontal Gene Transfer
Finally, in hypothetical cases of genes escaping containment, we must consider how 
to mitigate horizontal gene transfer. In principle, horizontal gene transfer has a 
certain pace with which new DNA gets introduced to a new bacterium by chance. 
The new DNA often has only a limited beneficial metabolic function and will for 
sure not be toxic to the cell. Evolution may change the DNA into genes with a more 
central role in metabolism or increase expression, otherwise the DNA may be lost 
again. In a modern global world of today and the invention of many different 
antibiotic drugs, the selective pressure on the bacteria has never been greater and 
only the most pathogenic strains can survive. Thus the acquisition of gene cassettes 
varies greatly.
Bacteria employ a variety of mechanisms to transfer genes horizontally, such as 
transformation, transduction and conjugation. Natural transformation is a process 
by which cells take up naked DNA from the environment. It involves multi- 
component cell envelope spanning structures, such as type II secretion systems 
(T2SS), type IV secretion systems (T4SS) and type IV pili. In transduction, DNA is 
transferred with the help of bacteriophages and conjugation requires physical 
contact between a donor and a recipient cell via a conjugation pilus, through which 
genetic material is transferred.
So what is transferred? A broad spectrum of mobile genetic elements, such as 
plasmids, transposons, bacteriophages or genomic islands are transferred and can be 
found to account for a large proportion of bacterial genomes as evolution goes on. 
An example of selective pressure is the acquisition of copper resistance (along with 
resistance to arsenic and cadmium)  - comprising czc/cusABC and copABCD 
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systems in the kiwifruit pathogen Pseudomonas syringae pv. Actinidae.34 The patho-
gen infected the first plantation in Australia in 2010, and by 2016, 25% of all sam-
ples taken were resistant to the copper treatment.
With the development of modern molecular biology tools, endless new DNA 
constructs have been released into nature when biological waste is deliberately or 
by accident tossed down the drain. Resistance marker genes, plasmids with multi- 
host capabilities, and fusion proteins are a great source of DNA that can be taken up 
by other bacteria and which will make them even more pathogenic to human health 
than before.
10.3.1.4  Economic Drivers
While we have discussed here many areas of imminent technology development 
that could significantly bolster biosecurity practices, we must not forget the 
underlying economic incentives of DNA production, since economic drivers 
important to realising the potential of synthetic biology run counter to comprehensive 
biosecurity governance. Commercial applications inherently want to maximise 
profit and minimise overheads. Creating and implementing measures to prevent 
deliberate misuse add cost. This is a notable disincentive for large parts of the 
synthetic biology community to engage with biosecurity. Therefore, it is particularly 
important to streamline the financial and resource implications of biosecurity 
measures.
Furthermore, given its intrinsically interdisciplinary nature, many members of 
the synthetic biology community come from disciplines outside biology and 
biotechnology. As a result, they may not have been exposed to, or have a background 
in, biosafety or biosecurity. It is therefore important that biosecurity measures are 
accessible, supported by appropriate tools and resources, and adequately promoted 
among members of the community.
10.3.2  Detection of Biological Threats
Thus far, we have discussed numerous ways in which biological threats either are 
currently being mitigated or can be mitigated with technology development in the 
near future. However, there are also numerous opportunities to increase capability 
in the threat detection domain. In this domain, we assume that a biological threat 
has already been physically created in the environment and the question focuses on 
technology to detect it. In this context, we consider our ability to establish 
surveillance methods and rapidly diagnose biological threats.
34 Colombi, Elena, et al. “Evolution of copper resistance in the kiwifruit pathogen P seudomonas 
syringae pv. actinidiae through acquisition of integrative conjugative elements and plasmids.” 
Environmental microbiology 19.2 (2017): 819–832.
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10.3.2.1  Diagnostics
Current methods for diagnostics of hazardous agents can be summarized as a col-
lection of peptide sequencing, antibody-based diagnostics via ELISA or 
ImmunoPCR, and genome sequencing technologies. Generally speaking, peptide 
sequencing is most useful for protein threats like toxins, antibody screening is most 
often used for viral infections, and genome sequencing can be performed for both 
viruses and bacteria.
Of these technologies, the most rapidly evolving is genome sequencing. While 
some companies have made great progress on portable whole-genome sequencing,35 
there are still significant issues with the limit of DNA detection. Often there is not 
enough genetic material acquired in the field to make confident identifications of 
species and if the organism is modified, it makes that conclusion even more difficult. 
Some new microfluidic devices have aided this problem, but there is still a lot of 
room for improvement. Additional technological progress in microfluidic device 
development is a key area of opportunity to improve these DNA-based diagnostics. 
Another issue for these diagnostic devices is the comparison to reliable, non- 
redundant sequence databases. Historically, as large sequence databases have been 
built, a fair amount of inaccurate data and erroneous meta-data has been entered and 
so another opportunity to improve the diagnostic functionality is to clean up these 
databases to the point that they can be much more useful for immediate comparison 
with diagnostic devices.
One key area of diagnostic development for a variety of agents is cell-free sys-
tems. Cell free systems have been used for many years and are routinely produced 
by individual laboratories following their own recipe. Today the technology has 
advanced and the understanding of the important factors to make reproducible kits 
has enabled it to be used outside the lab.36
Toehold switches were developed in 2014 and utilized the preferential binding of 
DNA into a secondary structure if no target was present and it would unfold and 
bind to the target if it was present. A reporter gene would be activated upon unfolding 
and a signal could be detected. The technique can detect nanomolar and low 
micromolar concentrations due to the absent amplification step of target. It will 
generate signal detection in as little as 20 min and the maximum ON/OFF ratios 
ranged between 10- and 140-fold. Careful optimization of target region is needed to 
ensure maximum signal. An important advantage of paper-based distribution of 
synthetic gene networks is their potential for low cost (4–65¢/sensor) and relative 
ease to manufacture.37
35 https://nanoporetech.com/
36 Takahashi, M.K., Tan, X., Dy, A.J. et al. A low-cost paper-based synthetic biology platform for 
analyzing gut microbiota and host biomarkers. Nat Commun 9, 3347 (2018). https://doi.
org/10.1038/s41467-018-05864-4
37 Pardee, Keith, et al. “Rapid, low-cost detection of Zika virus using programmable biomolecular 
components.” Cell 165.5 (2016): 1255–1266.
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Developing the technique further, by using Cas9 and an isothermal RNA ampli-
fication step, the detection limit improved to low femtomolar range and had a sin-
gle-base resolution discriminating between American and African Zika type viruses. 
Other variants of the technology (Sherlock) use an isothermal RNA amplification 
step to get low attomolar sensitivity by using a different Cas13 protein. This protein 
will, via the CRISPR methodology, find its target and cleave it.38 Due to a build in 
collateral cleavage feature, the Cas13 protein will next degrade any mRNA it may 
find. Thus the provided fluorochrome - quencher reporter mRNA molecule will be 
degraded and a signal can be measured using a fluorescent reader. Yet again, other 
systems using cas12 can target DNA in the same way as mentioned above39 or by 
using a CRISPR-Cas9-triggered nicking endonuclease-mediated Strand 
Displacement Amplification method named CRISDA.40
A technology to be fully developed in the future is the biological transistor. It is 
the detection of an unamplified target gene via CRISPR–Cas9 immobilized on a 
graphene field-effect transistor. An electrical signal is generated if CRISPR detects 
its target and thus can positively identify a biological agent on the DNA level within 
15 min.41
With the invention of the methods mentioned here, a field deployable paper stick 
technology will be able to tell if a dangerous pathogen is present in a fast and 
reliable way. It is a huge step in the direction of being able to detect a biological 
attack on site, but still laborious work is still needed to extract nucleic acids from 
each sample and ID RNA is present, RNases are to be avoided at all cost to get 
reliable results.
10.3.2.2  Surveillance
Finally, as diagnostic tests are developed to be faster and more accurate, we can start 
to form systematic surveillance protocols. This can range from detection of 
immediate human health pathogens to analysis of field micro-biomes, detection of 
fungi and decomposers, and agricultural pathogens. While these other types of 
threats are currently too low priority to focus diagnostic efforts on, in the big picture, 
these areas really matter. In agriculture, there are already systems for tracking and 
regulating pedigree of lines of animals and plants, but as the technology for 
diagnostic DNA tests improves, it would be reasonable to develop the areas of 
38 Gootenberg, Jonathan S., et al. “Multiplexed and portable nucleic acid detection platform with 
Cas13, Cas12a, and Csm6.” Science 360.6387 (2018): 439–444.
39 Chen, Janice S., et al. “CRISPR-Cas12a target binding unleashes indiscriminate single-stranded 
DNase activity.” Science 360.6387 (2018): 436–439.
40 Zhou, Wenhua, et al. “A CRISPR–Cas9-triggered strand displacement amplification method for 
ultrasensitive DNA detection.” Nature communications 9.1 (2018): 1–11.
41 Hajian, Reza, et al. “Detection of unamplified target genes via CRISPR–Cas9 immobilized on a 
graphene field-effect transistor.” Nature biomedical engineering 3.6 (2019): 427–437.
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genetic surveillance of agriculture since it is a high-impact area of human wellbeing 
that is not directly human health focused.
10.3.3  Threat Response and Countermeasures
Biological countermeasures are typically biologics and small molecules used to 
detect, prevent, or treat biological and chemical insults. Biologics are composed of 
vaccines and antibodies. Vaccine development, while slow and laborious, is effective 
at producing acquired immunity and protection to a broad range of known diseases 
and weaponized agents. Recently, large-scale mining of human immune repertoires 
for antigen binders has been propelled by technological advances such as next 
generation sequencing (NGS) and given rise to the field of system-immunology. 
Coupled with bioinformatics analysis, we have gained significant insight into the 
diversity of antigen binders and the polarization of repertoires in response to 
challenge. Subsequently, it is now possible to mine these repertoires for protective 
monoclonal antibodies and deliver effective countermeasures. However, extant 
antibody discovery platforms suffer from a multitude of disadvantages that impede 
high-throughput repertoire interrogation and antibody discovery.
There are several large existing programs to develop medical countermeasures 
(MCMs) to new and existing biothreats such as p3, PRISM, and US AID, but these 
programs are beyond the scope of near-term biosecurity efforts to improve. While 
new synthetic biology tools will certainly lead to decreased development time to 
countermeasure delivery compared to traditional approaches, it is still relatively 
new technology and will take some time to be integrated into these large existing 
efforts to develop countermeasures.
One topic discussed at some length by this working group was how information 
on MCMs should be disseminated to the general public. Specifically, we discussed 
the idea of putting the latest technical information on new threats online. For 
example, each year there is a seasonal strain of influenza that circulates and vaccines 
are routinely developed to combat the new strain. To do this, the new viral strain is 
sequenced and a new MCM is created. Should these new viral sequences and 
information on countermeasures be publicly available information?
Historically this type of information has been available only to those actively 
working in the space. New sequence information is kept on a non-public database 
and companies that develop yearly MCMs for influenza get the physical strain in 
exchange for donating some vaccine free of charge for use in resource limited 
settings. However as they can access the data with the virus sequence, they do not 
have to ask for the strains anymore – the can simply synthesize the new strains 
themselves, make the vaccines from that source without the obligation to make the 
MCMs more generally accessible. Thus, the system relies on the good will of the 
companies to share benefits from their work.
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Furthermore, we have seen a much more open approach in response to the global 
COVID-19 pandemic – the DNA sequence for this threat42 and subsequent diagnos-
tic and countermeasure development has been rapidly published and made publicly 
available.43 This has led to rapid development of novel diagnostics and MCMs by a 
large swathe of companies (including some synthetic biology-based companies), 
giving tremendous opportunity for the biotechnology industry. But, the cons of this 
very open approach will take time to play out, as some risk has been taken by dis-
seminating so much of this information in a short period of time to mitigate a global 
crisis. Only after the dust settles with the on-going COVID 19-pandemic, will we be 
able to see whether or not there are clear negative consequences of this open 
approach.
10.4  Long-Term Opportunities for Technology Development
The discussion in this chapter has thus far discussed the existing technical biosecu-
rity framework and various areas for near-term improvement. Here, we have some 
additional discussion of long-term opportunities for improvement that are still too 
nebulous to attempt to mitigate with cutting edge technologies in the short 
term future.
10.4.1  Implications for Adaptive Risk 
Management Framework
Several aspects of technologies and products derived from synthetic biology create 
a need for an adaptive approach for risk assessment.44 Synthetic biology approaches 
are foundational, being applied to many different problems/areas and accessible to 
a wide range of people. Because of this, there is great uncertainty about what type 
of technologies might develop from synthetic biology. At the same time, new 
products and capabilities are being developed at a rapid pace. As a result, it is 
difficult to anticipate the potential threats posed by synthetic biology using a 
prescribed or static approach for assessing risks and bio-threats.
42 Andersen, Kristian G., et  al. “The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2.” Nature medicine 26.4 
(2020): 450–452.
43 Thao, Tran Thi Nhu, et al. “Rapid reconstruction of SARS-CoV-2 using a synthetic genomics 
platform.” BioRxiv (2020).
44 Oye, K. “Proactive and adaptive governance of emerging risks.
The case of DNA synthesis and synthetic biology.” Public Sector Governance of Emerging 
Risks, International Risk Governance Council (2012) https://irgc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/
FINAL_Synthetic-Biology-case_K-Oye_2013.pdf
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We were able to identify desirable features of an adaptive risk management 
framework. First, an adaptive risk management would need to use widespread 
monitoring and data collection practices. This would likely include large-scale 
measurement of known hazardous DNA and engineered DNA.  Secondly, there 
would need to be a systematic process for horizon scanning to identify new things 
that realistically might need to be measured. It is not feasible to have a single static 
list of concerns in a world where biotechnology is constantly evolving. Such a sys-
tem could look a little like monitoring data from subway filters45 with indicators of 
background levels of specific agents. First such backgrounds would need to be 
clearly established and there would have to be a mechanism to flag the presence of 
new, unknown particles.
10.4.2  Imagining the Far Future
Finally, the group carried out a future-casting exercise where participants imagined 
what the world might look in the long-term future (25–50 years). They considered 
the role synthetic biology (and its products) could play in that world. Such a future 
could be positive or it could be negative. This exercise involved scenario 
development, group work to identify specific biosecurity implications, and then 
back-casting to identify key technological developments that might be important for 
shaping the future.
Possible future applications of synthetic biology identified included:
• Enhanced diagnostics, such as those based on a comprehensive understanding of 
life processes
• Cheaper, faster and improved medicines (including at point-of-care), such as 
personalised medicine, smart wound healing materials, antibiotics, vaccines, 
other biologics (including to balance the metabolism)
• Human enhancement, such as brain/visor interfaces, augmented limbs, synthetic 
organelles to correct natural deficiencies (such as delivering insulin for diabetics) 
or communication with animals
• Microbiomes engineered to be self-balancing, offer improvements to perfor-
mance, health or a more robust immune system, or more efficient in processing 
and absorbing nutrients from food
• Adjusted plants, resistant to challenges from climate change and food shortages 
resulting from expanding human populations
• On going, near-real-time remote monitoring of health and the environment
• Chemically-induced exercise through the diet
• Enhanced food, including with a long shelf life
45 Grass, David S., et al. “Airborne particulate metals in the New York City subway: a pilot study 
to assess the potential for health impacts.” Environmental research 110.1 (2010): 1–11.
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• Improvements to the transport infrastructure, such as self-repairing or better road 
surfaces
• Changes to energy use, such as by increasing use of bio-lights
• Greater control over the environment, such as increasing biological diversity, 
through bioremediation, systems for reclaiming or making use of waste, 
controlling or removing pests and disease vectors, or perhaps weather control
• Cyber-genetics and enhanced immune surveillance
• Enhanced materials, such as materials that adapt to the environment, alternatives 
to, or new ways to recover rare earth metals
• Novel production capacities, such as directly from carbon and water, possibly via 
distributed production, to make things like food or high-value chemicals
• Point-of-use (distributed) manufacturing, such as through the use of well- 
characterized and reliable chassis organisms.
The group then split into three sub-groups based on common components of 
their visions of the future. The sub-groups then discussed relevant biosecurity 
issues, focusing on ways that a lack of, or adequate, biosecurity could have a notable 
impact delivering a desirable future. Intervention points identified included:
• The impact of business models in shaping integration of biosecurity and the 
importance of engaging the private sector on biosecurity early in technology 
development
• The importance of improved risk assessment and management of biosecurity 
risks to enable ecological or environmental uses
• Adaptive, flexible, proactive, and cooperative approaches to governance
• Involvement of publics and industry in biosecurity governance and 
decision-making
• Perception issues around military funding of synthetic biology
• Potential for subversion of neuro-electric interfaces, the importance of encryp-
tion, and the potential for cyber attacks to have a biological impact and to hack 
biological components to have a digital effect
• The possibility of biosecurity concerns to unjustifiably restricting progress in 
key fields (opportunity costs)
• The value of developing new capabilities to carry out applied risk assessment 
between the bench and field trials (pilot scale), such as through the use of isolated 
environments that can provide a baseline for studies
In the same small groups, participants then considered which technical interven-
tions could help address the biosecurity issues identified. These included:
• Rapid dynamic adaptive approach, surveillance system for environment
• Technology to identify the origin of a molecule or tag DNA bases (e.g. fertilizers 
have to be tagged - > biological tags like isotopes)
• ‘Biological encryption’ to counter bio-hacking of neurons
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In summary, the working group came up with a wide variety of potential future 
technologies and their related biosecurity risks. While most of the future technologies 
indeed had at least one clear biosecurity risk, the group had a mostly positive 
outlook on the future of synthetic biology and technical biosecurity.
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Chapter 11
The Soil Habitat and Considerations 
for Synthetic Biology
Robyn A. Barbato
Microorganisms serve as agents for synthetic biology. It certain instances, the tech-
nology is reliant on survival of the genetically-altered microorganism in the natural 
environment. This chapter offers insight into the soil system to improve the perfor-
mance of genetically-altered microorganisms in the natural environment. This chap-
ter covers the soil system, the fitness of genetically-altered organisms, and 
considerations for their survival and proliferation in nature. This chapter does not 
discuss the ecological consequences of survival in the natural environment or the 
regulatory considerations to distribute a genetically-altered organism in the environ-
ment. In addition to regulatory approval, both considerations should be critically 
reviewed before a genetically-altered organism is distributed in the environment.
11.1  The Soil System
11.1.1  Soil Properties
The soil environment is complex and heterogeneous. Soil is rock that has been bro-
ken down and weathered and is combined with organic matter which supports 
growth of organisms. The soil profile is composed of layers, termed horizons, which 
are distinct with depth from the soil surface. The O horizon generally comprises leaf 
litter. Because of the presence of plant roots and soil microorganisms, the top layer 
of the soil is the A horizon, which typically harbors a high amount of organic matter. 
Beneath that horizon is the B horizon, which can harbor materials that have leached 
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from the A horizon above it. The C horizon is located below the B horizon. The C 
horizon contains rock fragments that have partially weathered.
Soils are also laterally heterogeneous across the landscape. Soil forming factors 
influence the soil type present at a given location. In an attempt to characterize soils 
across the landscape, which includes their depth profile, the United States 
Department of Agriculture developed twelve orders of soil taxonomy, which include 
alfisols, andisols, aridisols, entisols, gelisols, histosols, inceptisols, mollisols, oxi-
sols, spodosols, ultisols, and vertisols.
The texture of the soil is determined by the proportion of three different types of 
soil particles, sand, silt, and clay, which vary by their diameter. Sand particles have 
a diameter ranging from 0.05  mm to 2.0  mm. Silt particles have a diameter of 
0.002 mm to 0.05 mm. Clay particles have a diameter of less than 0.002 mm. The 
surface area of these mineral particles is lowest for sand and orders of magnitude 
higher for clay mineral particles. Clay minerals in particular are influence biological 
and chemical reactions occurring in the soil, mainly due to their small size and sur-
face charge. The negative charge of clay minerals is an important factor in the soil 
cation exchange capacity, or the ability of the soil to exchange cations.
The combination of sand, silt, and clay particles determine the soil texture. There 
are 12 major soil textural classes that are identified in the soil textural triangle. 
While the texture of the soil can be informative for the combination of mineral par-
ticle types, the orientation of these particles in three-dimensional space is more 
meaningful for the resident microorganisms. The microorganisms live in the soil 
pores between the soil aggregates. Soil texture is an important factor in the location 
and type of soil pores present. Soil pores are spaces between the soil aggregates that 
may be filled with water, air, organic matter, microorganisms, and nutrients 
(Fig. 11.1). Commonly pores include macropores (greater than 75 μm), micropores 
(5–30 μm), and nanopores (<0.1 μm).
Important soil abiotic attributes include soil pH, soil temperature, soil water con-
tent, and soil cation exchange capacity. Soil pH is very important for how chemicals 
behave in soil and which organisms grow in or on soil. Often, forest soils are acidic, 




while soils located in arid regions are alkaline. Soil temperature influences the activ-
ity and rates of processes of organisms in soil. It is highly dependent on the amount 
of soil water due to the specific heat of water. Soil water potential energy of water 
held in the soil in relation to the energy of free water. Soil water potential includes 
matric potential (influence of capillary forces on the system), osmotic potential 
(influence of solutes on the system), and gravitational potential (influence of gravity 
to pull the water toward the earth’s core). Soil water potential is affected by soil 
texture. A water release curve is often developed for a type of soil to relate the gravi-
metric or volumetric water to the matric potential. Soil exchange capacity is the 
ability of the soil particles themselves to hold either cations or ions. The clay parti-
cles influence the soil cation exchange capacity, which in turn influence the types of 
chemicals which are available to nearby microorganisms.
11.1.2  Life in Soil
Soil is teeming with life and supports the growth of plants and animals. Within soil, 
there are microorganisms at a range of trophic levels which include as viruses, bac-
teria, archaea, fungi, and protists. At a given moment, approximately 10% of soil 
microorganisms are active. The remainder are in a resting metabolic state. There are 
approximately one billion bacteria in one gram of soil, which includes 1000 differ-
ent species. Microorganisms reside in the soil pore space. Important soil properties 
influence the number and types of microorganisms found in the soil.
Microbes live together in soil and do not exist alone. Therefore, ecological inter-
actions between soil microorganisms determine their survival and proliferation. 
Important ecological interactions in soil include commensalism, mutualism, sym-
biosis, competition, amensalism, parasitism, predation, and neutralism. The positive 
ecological interactions are when at least one group benefits from an interaction. 
Positive ecological interactions include commensalism, mutualism, and symbiosis. 
In commensalism, one microorganism functions and another microorganism gains 
from that function. Mutualism is a positive ecological interaction where both micro-
organisms benefit. Symbiosis is where two microorganisms benefit to the extent that 
they cannot survive without one another. Negative ecological interactions include 
competition, amensalism, parasitism, and predation. Microorganisms compete over 
substrates for growth and/or metabolism. They might be superior in their genetic 
capacity to use a substrate and/or physically faster to access it through motility. 
Amensalism is a negative ecological interaction where one microorganism sup-
presses the growth or function of another microorganism through the production of 
compounds. A classic example of amensalism is the production of antibiotics by the 
fungus Penicillium to kill nearby bacteria susceptible to it. Both parasitism and 
predation include feeding on living microorganisms thereby suppressing the host’s 
or prey’s ability to function. Neutralism is an ecological interaction where neither 
microorganism benefits from the interaction. These interactions are unlikely in soil 
and difficult to define in a diverse, heterogeneous environments.
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Life in soil is driven by the active microorganisms present, their access to sub-
strates, and their genetic capacity to make enzymes to break down the substrates. 
Soils are generally oligotrophic, which means that they are low-nutrient systems. 
Depending on their geographic location, they may experience vastly different con-
ditions throughout the day or the year. For instance, precipitation could dramatically 
change the water potential of a soil and in turn either create anoxic conditions and/
or cause a release of substrates from one soil pore to another. Diurnal temperature 
cycles could span beyond the temperature optimum for resident microorganisms. 
Therefore, groups of microorganisms develop survival strategies to thrive under a 
particular set of conditions. The development of new tools to survey microorgan-
isms will enable understanding of the spatial and temporal effects on microbial 
community composition and function in soils. The Earth Microbiome Project 
encouraged the collection of microorganisms in the field and offered a repository 
for the number and types of microorganisms present at a given location at the time 
of collection (Gilbert et al. 2010, 2014). Concurrently, soil samples are collected to 
culture microorganisms in the laboratory. The vast number, types, metabolic prefer-
ence, and growth requirements of the microorganisms make culturing challenging. 
Nonetheless, it is an important step to understanding the range of metabolism and 
growth of the organisms.
11.2  Fitness of Genetically-Altered Organisms
11.2.1  Fitness of Domesticated Microorganisms
There have been recent advancements in the field of synthetic biology that resulted 
in new genetically-altered organisms. Often, microorganisms such as Escherichia 
coli (a bacterium) and Saccharomyces cerevisiae (a yeast) are popular targets for 
genetic manipulation. They are common chassis, which physically house genetic 
components and provide resources (i.e. transcription and translation machinery) for 
the organism to function (Danchin 2012; Brophy et al. 2018; Westmann et al. 2018; 
Trump et al. 2018). This is largely driven by the depth of knowledge and research 
on these organisms. They have been domesticated in the laboratory through multi-
ple enrichments and manipulations. There is a wealth of information how their 
genetic material encodes for specific metabolism. Control of the growth and metab-
olism of these microorganisms through synthetic biology tools is extraordinary. 
These organisms have met the criteria identified to be an effective chassis which 
include that the organism grows easily, has a robust cellular envelope, transcription 
and translation can be controlled, their growth and metabolism is well understood, 
and they have low mutation rates (Foley and Shuler 2010).
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11.3  Considerations for Survival in Soil
11.3.1  Soil Conditions Influence Growth
Life in soil is stressful. The soil properties described earlier in this chapter influence 
the composition and function of soil microbes. Soil microorganisms are reliant on 
either narrow or broad conditions to proliferate and metabolize substrates. Soil 
properties such as water potential, organic matter content, particle size distribution, 
and temperature influence biological activity and collectively define the state of 
soils. Soil temperature influences soil activity, with warmer soils typically experi-
encing higher rates of processes (Lloyd and Taylor 1994; Hanson et al. 2000; Fierer 
et al. 2006). Soil moisture also influences soil activity (Fierer et al. 2003; Schimel 
et al. 2007; Xiang et al. 2008; Borken and Matzner 2009; Fóti et al. 2014). The 
optimal matric potential for microbial activity in is −33 kPa. When the soil is too 
dry, soil activity is reduced or stops completely (Manzoni et al. 2012). At this point, 
substrate diffusion is limited, and therefore there are no substrates bioavailable for 
nearby soil microbes. When a soil is too wet, the diffusion of oxygen to aerobic 
microorganisms is limited. Concurrently, anaerobic microorganisms (those which 
use compounds other than oxygen as electron acceptors) become active.
11.3.2  Microbial Adaptations
Microorganisms have adapted and continue to adapt to the soil conditions. Therefore, 
ecological niches defined by ecological interactions and physiochemical factors are 
occupied. Disturbance events such as physical soil manipulation or the addition of 
a chemical often change the niches available to groups of microorganisms. Absence 
of a disturbance, the ability of an introduced microorganism to gain a foothold in the 
soil system is less likely. Often, the introduced microorganisms are not adapted to 
the conditions and are quickly outcompeted by nearby microorganisms. Unless they 
fulfill a key ecological role, they are likely diluted out of the soil system until they 
become extinct.
11.3.3  Fitness of Microorganisms in Soil
As synthetic biology advances, important considerations need to be considered to 
ensure optimal performance in the natural environment. Domesticated organisms 
likely lack fitness under the stressful conditions of soil, as soil conditions often do 
not meet the metabolic needs of these organisms and indigenous soil microorgan-
isms are more adept to acquire substrates to survive. Though genetic expression and 
regulation of synthetic circuits are highly host-specific, the best candidates for 
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fieldable chassis are likely environmental microbes that have adapted to survive 
under dynamic conditions (Tanner et  al. 2017). In doing so, genetic engineering 
augments the process that natural selection has already optimized.
The high diversity in soil offers the opportunity to develop new chassis capable 
of surviving in the natural environment. There have been recent advances is the 
phylogenetic classification of soil microorganisms. Using sequencing technologies, 
the taxonomy of microorganisms in a given soil can be identified. Through culturing 
and phenotypic characterization, discoveries of novel microorganisms are possible. 
Because these microorganisms are originating from the environment they will be 
returned, they may be more adept to surviving the challenging conditions common 
to most soil environments. This implies that they retain the genetic advantages for 
survival under dynamic physical and chemical conditions.
11.4  Conclusions
The soil system is complex and heterogeneous in space and in time. Soils are highly 
diverse and present a source and a sink for new products for synthetic biology. 
Important considerations for survival in soil have been outlined in this chapter. 
Furthermore, these concepts can be extended to situations where genetically-altered 
microorganisms are added to the soil matrix to perform a specific function. Because 
soils are so heterogeneous, a singular approach is unlikely to be successfully applied 
to multiple soil systems. Understanding soils and the multitude of ecological inter-
actions occurring within them is key to promote the survival of introduced organ-
isms to that particular environment.
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Chapter 12
Foresight in Synthetic Biology 
and Biotechnology Threats
Cassidy Nelson, Ilker Adiguzel, Marie-Valentine Florin, Filippa Lentzos, 
Rickard Knutsson, Catherine Rhodes, Paul Rutten, and Annika Vergin
Abstract Rapid developments in the fields of synthetic biology and biotechnology 
have caused shifts in the biological risk landscape and are key drivers of future 
threats. From a security perspective, extending our understanding beyond current 
risks to include emerging threats in these and related fields can play a vital role in 
informing risk mitigation activities. Insights that are generated can be combined 
with other efforts to identify vulnerabilities and prevent undesirable outcomes. 
Emerging risks that may occur at some point in the future are inherently difficult to 
assess, requiring a systematic approach to examining potential threats. Foresight is 
a process to consider possible future scenarios. Comprising a range of methods and 
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techniques, foresight processes can offer novel insights into emerging synthetic 
biology and biotechnology threats.
This chapter offers an introduction to foresight, including definitions of key 
terms that could support a shared lexicon across NATO partners. An overview of 
different foresight methodologies, their potential applications, and different 
strengths and limitations are presented. As a key first step, an approach to selecting 
appropriate questions to guide foresight activities is suggested. Example questions 
for synthetic biology and biotechnology are highlighted. At the end of the chapter, 
the authors offer recommendations for the design of a foresight process, with the 
intention of providing a useable resource for NATO partners investigating emerging 
synthetic biology and biotechnology threats.
12.1  Introduction
The study of the future dates back to antiquity. Understanding what could lie ahead 
was of strategic importance to rulers and military leaders and was of great general 
interest to ancient societies and religions. While cultures developed different ways 
of thinking about the future that evolved over time, a historically common point of 
view was that there was one single predetermined future (Cuhls et al. 2012). The 
systematic study of different possible futures, and how these could be shaped by 
present actions, emerged as a new field of inquiry in the mid-twentieth century, in 
part due to pioneering work conducted by the Research and Development (RAND) 
corporation in Santa Monica, California (Kaplan et al. 1950; Helmer 1967). Since 
its emergence, the field of futures studies has undergone rapid expansion with the 
refinement of its conceptual underpinnings and development of different 
methodologies.
Today, futures work is undertaken by governments, militaries and scientific insti-
tutions, and other interested groups, with the aim of gaining actionable insight into 
possible emerging futures. In fields like synthetic biology and biotechnology that 
are undergoing rapid and continuous change, the ability to gain strategic insight 
from possible futures is highly relevant to policy development, risk assessment and 
threat analysis. It is particularly important to be able to identify the underlying driv-
ers, range of uncertainty, points of convergence, and potential opportunities and 
challenges in these developing fields, and how these might be affected by particular 
policy interventions. For all of these, foresight – a process of conducting futures 
work – can offer strategic insight.
Foresight has been defined in multiple ways. In this chapter, we use an under-
standing commonly found in the literature, which highlights that it is first and fore-
most a process that involves “systematically attempting to look into the longer-term 
future of science, technology, the economy and society” through which “one comes 
to a fuller understanding of the forces shaping the long-term future” (Martin 1995; 
Miles 2010). Foresight, therefore, differs from forecasting, in that it does not aim to 
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predict the future. Although the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably, 
forecasting is concerned with making “a probabilistic statement, on a relatively high 
confidence level, about the future” (Martin 2010).
Foresight can also be contrasted with hindsight, which is a systematic examina-
tion of the past. While the past offers useful information that can inform a foresight 
process, hindsight has access to outcome information that foresight does not. Care 
should be taken when combining these processes in order to avoid “observation 
selection effects” or biasing thinking towards historical occurrences (Fischhoff 1975).
Many additional terms specific to futures studies have been introduced and 
refined in the literature, with some confusion arising given shared and contradictory 
wording used in colloquial contexts (Trump et al. 2019). In order to use clear termi-
nology in describing futures research, with the aim of developing a consistent lexi-
con across NATO partners, a definitions list is provided below. This is followed by 
examples of foresight research conducted on the topics of emerging synthetic biol-
ogy and biotechnology.
The two subsequent sections provide an overview of different foresight method-
ologies and present an approach to foresight question choice, highlighting some 
specific questions for synthetic biology and biotechnology. Finally, recommenda-
tions for the design of a foresight process are offered, with the intention of provid-
ing a useable resource for NATO partners investigating emerging synthetic biology 
and biotechnology threats.
12.1.1  Foresight Terminology
Audience The individuals or organisations that are the intended recipient or end- 
user of the foresight process output. This might include, for example, government, 
business, military, civil society or broader public groups.
Backcasting Starting from a point in the future, analysing backwards in time the 
steps required for that future to occur.
Brainstorming A process in conversations or workshops used to develop a list of 
issues, drivers or ideas on a topic.
Cross-Impact Analysis An exploratory method to investigate the positive and 
negative effects between different interacting outcomes. It assumes that future 
events do not occur independently from each other, but rather the development of 
one influences the development of another.
Delphi Method A structured method used to gather and systematically prioritise 
expert views on the future.
Driver A key force or trend that is likely to have an impact in a relevant area.
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Fifth Scenario A method to add a new scenario to an already existing set of sce-
narios to improve the understanding of the impact of the factors and drivers.
Futures Studies Structured approaches used to explore possible futures.
Forecasting A process used to make predictions about the future, commonly 
involving the use of past data and analysis of trends.
Foresight A process which systematically attempts to examine possible futures 
and determine the drivers shaping the longer-term future.
Horizon Scanning A specific foresight technique used during investigation which 
serves as a basis for analysis.
Participants The people taking part in a foresight exercise.
Roadmapping A method to showcase how a range of inputs, such as certain tech-
nology trends or policy changes, may combine in future development of the area of 
interest.
Red Teaming A process by which an external and independent group challenges 
an organization by assuming an adversarial role, with the aim of identifying weak-
nesses and gaps that can be addressed.
Scenario Analysis A process by which a range of identified possible future events 
are examined by considering alternative possible outcomes.
Scenario Creation Building scenarios for the purpose of a foresight exercise. It 
can be subdivided into four or more phases, including: Investigation (e.g. Horizon 
Scanning), Analysis (e.g. Driver identification; Uncertainty Analysis; Cross Impact 
Analysis), Projection (e.g. Scenario Writing), Implications (e.g. Backcasting; 
SWOT analysis), Communication (e.g. Trend reporting) and Monitoring (e.g. Trend 
monitoring).
Scenario Construction A generic term that summarizes various methods for sce-
nario creation, with the end result being generation of generic scenarios which are 
transferred into narrative format for ease of communication.
Scenario Writing A method to create coherent scenario storylines in order to com-
municate them clearly to an audience.
SWOT Analysis A method of identifying the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities 
and Threats (SWOT) in an area of interest.
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Trend A general course, prevailing tendency or emerging pattern that suggests a 
change or particular trajectory.
Trend Analysis A process by which past data is examined and a pattern discerned.
Uncertainty Analysis A method used to identify key factors through analysis of 
possible impacts and their probability.
Wild Card An event that has a very low probability of occurring, but would have 
very high consequences.
12.1.2  Examples of Foresight for Biological Threats
While futures research is relevant to many fields, this chapter will focus on its appli-
cations to emerging synthetic biology and biotechnology threats. Conducting fore-
sight in these domains is highly relevant to governments, military institutions, and a 
range of industry, academic and civil society groups given the rapid speed at which 
developments are taking place. There are a growing number of ways in which syn-
thetic biology and biotechnology may pave the way to novel and high consequence 
risks while simultaneously offering new opportunities to address them (Hauptman 
and Sharan 2013). Foresight processes can help to avoid technological surprise and 
unexpected societal impacts, in part through identifying possible security threats 
before they emerge. When done well, insights from foresight exercises in synthetic 
biology and biotechnology can be used to inform action to avoid undesirable futures.
Foresight research for emerging synthetic biology and biotechnology issues has 
already taken place in a variety of settings. The following section highlights some 
recent published examples.
Using a scenario analysis ‘causes and consequences’ method, a 2013 study 
investigated reasons why an international Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) 
competition might hypothetically be closed down (Frow and Calvert 2013). The 
group quickly identified biosecurity and biosafety concerns, including synthetic 
biology competitors engineering pathogens with pandemic potential, as a possible 
reason. In another horizon scanning study looking at environmental threats to the 
UK, emerging biotechnology methods to genetically engineer pathogens were 
found to pose a ‘high’ risk of unintended consequences for biodiversity if released 
(Sutherland et al. 2008).
In one 2013 foresight study on emerging technologies, new gene transfer tech-
nologies and synthetically engineered biological agents ranked amongst the top ten 
risks, when prioritised by threat intensity and potential for misuse (Hauptman and 
Sharan 2013). The authors highlighted that security policy can be informed by 
adopting a long-range perspective where awareness would enable mitigation of 
threats that might otherwise be unaddressed.
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A 2015 Delphi study asked 63 experts from government, academia, industry and 
non-governmental organisations how they perceive the bioweapons threat (Boddie 
et al. 2015). It found a wide diversity of opinion, including on the likelihood of an 
attack in the next 10 years with significant difference between biological scientists 
and other participants. Use of biological weapons by nonstate actors, especially 
religious extremists, or covert use of biological weapons by a state, were seen as 
much more likely than overt use by state actors. However, in this study, the diversity 
of participant views led the authors to conclude that assessing risks that research 
would be misused will be challenging: “a red line for what is allowable and what is 
forbidden in the name of security may not be clearly defined, and the way forward 
will be nuanced and complicated, possibly requiring a case-by-case evaluation with 
guidelines agreed upon by the scientific and policy communities” (Boddie 
et al. 2015).
In a 2017 report, scenario development was used to assess the changing security 
landscape in light of new genome editing technologies (Kirkpatrick et al. 2018). In 
this study, plausible future scenarios were developed through a series of workshops 
involving subject matter experts and published research. Using this approach, the 
authors were able to examine the current vulnerabilities and risks and couple each 
scenario with policy options to address governance gaps identified.
A 2017 study used a modified Delphi technique to examine emerging issues in 
biological engineering (Wintle et al. 2017). Twenty-seven experts from a diverse 
range of backgrounds participated in a horizon scanning exercise and identified 70 
potential issues. Through voting and a workshop to systematically discuss the short-
list, 20 top-scoring issues emerged. These included issues highly relevant to syn-
thetic biology and biotechnology threats, including synthetic gene drive 
developments, accelerated defence agency research in biological engineering, 
including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Insect Allies 
Program, and the emergence of robotic ‘cloud labs.’
In 2018, a consensus study report by the National Academy of Sciences in the 
US proposed a framework for assessing concern associated with a new technology 
in the field of synthetic biology (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and 
Medicine 2018). The framework was comprised of four main components: the tech-
nology’s usability, the potential for use as a weapon, the requirements of actors and 
the potential for mitigation. Combined, this allowed for the ranking of synthetic 
biology-enabled capabilities by level of relative concern, with the highest being: 
recreation of known pathogenic viruses, biochemical production via in situ synthe-
sis, and modifying bacteria to be more transmissible and/or lethal.
The above research highlights the role that foresight studies can serve in identify-
ing novel threats in synthetic biology and biotechnology. The value in conducting 
formal, structured exercises comes from collating ideas and perspectives from a 
range of participants. Bringing together experts from diverse fields and backgrounds 
for a foresight study can enable identification of convergence points of technolo-
gies, which is highly relevant to synthetic biology and biotechnology threats. The 
following section will discuss in more detail different foresight methods, and high-
light their strengths and limitations.
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12.2  Foresight Methods
Since foresight emerged as an approach to futures studies, multiple techniques have 
been developed. Broadly, these can be divided into qualitative and quantitative 
methods (Fig. 12.1). It should be noted that often multiple methods are combined to 
examine a foresight research question. A general approach to foresight is presented 
below, followed by a non-exhaustive examination of common foresight methodolo-
gies, outlining their intended use, how they are applied, and their inherent strengths 
and limitations.
12.2.1  General Approach
While foresight methods vary widely, the majority share a common approach 
involving taking a range of inputs – such as historical data, published literature, 
technological trends or expert opinion  – and conducting a structured exercise 
involving analysis, interpretation and prospection (Voros 2003). The type of fore-
sight process selected will inform the tools that can be employed at this stage, which 
can include trend analysis, driver identification, and envisioning possible future sce-
narios. The output of a foresight exercise can be tangible or intangible, and might 
include identification of the range of next-step options, or general changes in think-
ing about the topic under scrutiny. Foresight processes should be set up so that the 
outputs can support action, for example by being able to directly inform planning, 
policy and strategy.
Fig. 12.1 Overview of some common forecasting methods
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12.2.2  Delphi Method
One of the first foresight techniques developed, the Delphi Method is still widely 
used today.1 This method employs a structured group communication process to 
allow future scenarios to be constructed. Using a multi-step approach, the Delphi 
Method allows for individual expert contributions and feedback with the aim of 
reaching participant consensus on all posted responses (Linstone and Turoff 1975). 
Carrying out a Delphi exercise requires planning and preparation, with the whole 
process taking weeks to months. The phases are outlined below.
Phase A: Participant Selection
The first phase consists of selecting and inviting individuals to participate in the 
foresight study. This phase is important because the outcome of the Delphi exercise 
will depend upon the knowledge and range of expertise of the participants. It is 
recommended to aim for between 15-35 specialist participants (Renzi and Freitas 
2015). Invitations should be sent to experts from a range of backgrounds, which 
might include technologists and representatives from civil society, the natural and 
social sciences, humanities, and the defence, intelligence and security services. 
Achieving diverse participation should bring the relevant expertise without biasing 
the outcome to a narrow perspective from one domain. Participant selection should 
be guided by the foresight research question and consideration should be given to 
ensuring cultural and demographic diversity.
Phase B: Questionnaire
After participants have accepted the invitation to take part in the Delphi exercise, a 
strategically formulated questionnaire should be sent to each individual. Questions 
should be clearly phrased and their objective transparent, but they should not be 
leading. Answers should be collated anonymously into a single document which is 
sent to all participants for review and comment, with the aim of reaching a consen-
sus on its contents.
Phase C: Future Scenarios
Following Phase B, the combined document is then used by the study organisers to 
construct future scenarios. Each scenario should be based upon the foresight exer-
cise theme, and the total number generated should be agreed with the expert partici-
pants. The scenarios should be built from the convergence of material submitted and 
be expanded upon in an iterative fashion with expert input. This phase can be con-
ducted remotely, or completed in a workshop format.
1 The Delphi Method was named after the Greek Oracle of Delphi, the high priestess of the Temple 
of Apollo who was said to be able to prophesize the future, although this foresight method’s reli-




Phase D: Result Analysis
The resulting scenarios should be analysed to understand their implications. In par-
ticular, actions that can be taken to steer towards desirable future scenarios or away 
from identified risks should be summarised explicitly. The results of scenario exer-
cises can be condensed into a report with the intended target audience in mind.
12.2.2.1  Strengths
The Delphi Method has a variety of strengths depending on how the exercise is 
prepared. Bringing together a range of subject matter experts from diverse but rel-
evant fields allows for the generation of multiple ideas that cover different perspec-
tives. Because participant opinions are initially solicited individually, groupthink 
can mostly be avoided. A consensus can be reached rapidly, and the ideas generated 
can be refined by experts in the later phases. Some of these viewpoints would be 
difficult to extract from the literature or other sources, and therefore this method is 
useful to generate ideas in an area where data is lacking. The Delphi Method is also 
attractive because it is relatively low cost to administer, especially when conducted 
remotely via email.
12.2.2.2  Limitations
This foresight technique is ultimately bound by how it is initially constructed. Poor 
selection of participants, questionnaire content, or route to later expert input, can 
limit the usefulness of its results. Because consensus is required in Phases B and C, 
the Delphi Method struggles when there is a wide range of differing opinions or 
conflicting views. The method is also prone to various biases, being constrained by 
the knowledge and opinions of the participants, and carrying the risk that the facili-
tator’s viewpoints and interpretation can dominate the analysis in the final report. 
The Delphi Method can also be quite time consuming, both for those leading it – 
with each phase lasting several weeks to allow expert input to be gathered – and for 
participants whose active involvement is needed throughout the process.
12.2.3  Horizon Scanning
There is ambiguity around the meaning of the term “horizon scanning” as it is often 
used interchangeably with “foresight” and “futures.” However, although some vari-
ation exists, amongst practitioners in the field horizon scanning is generally a well- 
defined foresight method. A standardized approach to horizon scanning is 
outlined below.
The UK Government Office for Science Futures Toolkit presents a ‘Three 
Horizon Model’ in which Horizon 1 issues fall within current policy and strategy, 
Horizon 2 issues are those that increase in importance in the medium term, and 
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Horizon 3 (H3) issues are new challenges and opportunities that have not yet begun 
to emerge, and whose drivers are difficult to spot (Government Office for Science 
2017). Horizon scanning activities are generally aimed at H3: There is no com-
monly accepted timeframe for this horizon; in some contexts horizon scanning 
work may look 5 years ahead and in others a 20 year gap may be considered.
The aim of horizon scanning is to identify and understand so-called “weak sig-
nals”. These are events, trends and developments taking place today that could 
shape H3. In most cases, it will not yet be clear what their impact will be on H3, 
which are the more and less important signals, and how they may evolve or con-
verge in the future.
Horizon scanning involves a group of participants who collect information and 
opinions, usually over the course of at least several weeks. Some horizon scanning 
exercises ask participants to perform “scans” at regular intervals (e.g. once a week). 
These scans are brief, often no more than one-page reports on possible signals to be 
considered. In a very open-ended exercise, participants are given the freedom to 
report on any signal they feel is relevant, based on any source of information. In a 
more constrained horizon scanning exercise, individual participants may be asked 
to consider particular issues, or monitor a specific source of information (e.g. a 
particular academic journal).
At the end of the exercise, all scans from every participant are compiled into a 
single document which synthesizes their findings and highlights recurring themes. 
Other approaches are possible; some horizon scanning activities adopt a phased 
structure, involving individual submissions first, and later collective refinement and 
prioritising of issues. In many organizations, the results of horizon scanning are 
used to inform further futures work, such as scenario exercises or a Delphi Method 
activity (see above).
12.2.3.1  Strengths
Horizon scanning exercises are relatively easy to organise, and can be performed 
without a physical meeting taking place between participants. They also enable a 
diverse group of stakeholders to be engaged in considering the future. Participants 
may range across disciplines and backgrounds, bringing together a variety of 
perspectives.
Another strength of horizon scanning is its emphasis on external stakeholders 
and sources; the technique is not reliant on in-house expertise or knowledge. Rather, 
the aim is to filter through a large volume of data, leveraging many stakeholders to 
distill a list of weak signals or identified issues that could influence H3. Horizon 
scanning is inherently inclusive; its aim is not to narrow down this list, so a large 
number of signals are usually considered and included. Subsequent phases may 




Although offering many advantages, the very wide net thrown by horizon scanning 
exercises is an important limitation to consider. Horizon scanning usually produces 
a large list of weak signals, but many of the signals identified may be irrelevant or 
unimportant. This can be mitigated by using a phased approach, or subsequently 
trimming the list with other futures techniques, e.g. to produce a set of scenarios for 
further expert elicitation.
Horizon scanning also relies to some degree on human intuition. In many cases, 
even for signals which will ultimately prove critical, there is little evidence available 
to assess their importance. It is important that those taking part in a horizon scan-
ning exercise, and those who will be using its output, understand and accept this 
limitation. It is inherent in the long-term focus of horizon scanning that many of its 
results will not be robustly evidence-based.
12.2.4  Scenario Analysis
Scenario Analysis is a useful method to identify the multiple ways situations in the 
future might evolve. This technique can help decision makers develop plans to 
exploit opportunities, reduce uncertainties and manage risks the future may hold. 
Additionally, the monitoring of indicators embedded in various scenarios can create 
early warning signals of likely future trajectories. Scenario analysis is recommended 
when a situation is complex or single predictions are too uncertain to trust.
If used in the initial stages of national policy formulation or long-term corporate 
strategies, scenario analysis can have a strong impact on decision making. This 
method provides a set of plausible and possible futures for which decision makers 
may need to consider. It is also useful as a tool for strategic planning processes that 
brings together decision makers or stakeholders with analytical experts to work on 
alternative futures for which they must plan. Engaging stakeholders and decision 
makers in the scenario analysis process can generate commitment for the projects, 
save time and produces more useable results.
Scenario creation, which surrounds the process of scenario analysis, can be sub-
divided into different phases, including: Investigation (e.g. Horizon Scanning), 
Analysis (e.g. Driver identification; Uncertainty Analysis; Cross Impact Analysis), 
Projection (e.g. Scenario Writing), Implications (e.g. Backcasting; SWOT analy-
sis), Communication (e.g. Trend reporting) and Monitoring (e.g. Trend monitoring). 
In order to create scenarios including implications at least the first four phases are 
required.
There are different techniques for generating scenarios, e.g.: Simple Scenarios, 
Cone of Plausibility, Alternative Future Scenarios, Explorative Scenario 
Construction with or without quantitative analysis. These methods have been 
referred to by various names in the literature.
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12.2.4.1  Strengths
The use of scenarios offers the possibility to describe many different possible and 
plausible futures. Comparing multiple scenarios in the analysis makes it easy to 
identify factors or drivers that are essential for future developments, whether desired 
or not. In addition, scenario analysis can be used to test assumptions about the 
future or even find and warn against critical developments.
A very important advantage of scenario analysis is the possible involvement of 
decision-makers and stakeholders in the scenario process. This promotes a high 
level of understanding for the various possible future developments and achieves a 
high commitment to the actual work.
12.2.4.2  Limitations
The results of a scenario analysis exercise can be misleading if the group of partici-
pants are too homogeneous with limited diversity, falling prey to groupthink. For 
the method to be successful, it is necessary to have creative thinking and prospec-
tion far into the future about a variety of plausible possibilities. If the participants in 
the scenario analysis do not fully engage with this step, this will severely affect the 
quality of the results. In addition, it is important that the analyst for the exercise is 
an expert in the analytic techniques and also has a deep understanding of the subject 
matter. This is critical to ensuring appropriate analysis of the quality of the key driv-
ing factors and the assumptions that are present throughout the exercise.
12.3  Foresight Questions
The formulation and selection of question(s) are very important components of the 
foresight process. Compared to approaching a topic broadly, well-constructed ques-
tions enable a tailored exercise. Not only should the question encapsulate the sub-
ject matter to be examined, but it should also lead towards actionable content in the 
final output. The following section covers an approach to question choice and lists 
specific questions that could be considered for emerging synthetic biology and bio-
technology threats.
12.3.1  Approach to Choosing Questions
For any given area of interest, there could be a range of questions that a group would 
like to answer about possible futures. Framing the question(s) carefully at the begin-
ning of the foresight process will help define the study’s aim and scope, and have an 
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important impact on the quality of the process. Questions should be designed such 
that they are:
• Framed in broad, rather than specific, terms
• Open and not too narrowly focused
• Stimulating discussion and thinking instead of leading to a particular endpoint
• Within a specific timeframe (e.g. in the next 15 years)
Participants in a foresight exercise should be made aware of the overarching 
question as early as possible in the process. The question itself need not overly con-
strain the final report or its conclusions; unanticipated areas of interest might arise 
during the process, for example. At the same time, questions should be formulated 
so that they avoid out-of-scope deviations that might hinder the topic of interest 
being fully addressed.
12.3.2  Questions for Synthetic Biology Threats
Concern about potential emerging threats associated with synthetic biology and bio-
technology and related fields can lead to a range of future-focused questions of 
strategic interest to national governments, military leaders, and a range of other 
groups. The focus of these questions could, for example, range from future risks 
associated with a particular form of biotechnology or a new synthetic biology devel-
opment, advancements more broadly in these fields, or on convergence of two or 
more trends within these and related fields.
Often it will not only be emerging threats which are of interest when seeking to 
apply foresight to synthetic biology and biotechnology. There is also great interest 
in more positive aspects of the transformative potential of these technologies and 
the ways in which developments might also help to address security threats. While 
some questions and the associated processes may focus only on one aspect, there 
will also be value to foresight processes which combine these. In addition to this, it 
is not only technological developments that will influence the future security 
impacts of synthetic biology and biotechnology, but also developments in eco-
nomic, social and political contexts, and changes to the policy and regulatory envi-
ronments. Questions can be designed that will incorporate some of these 
developments as well.
Some example questions in this area, formulated during the workshop, that may 
be of strategic interest include:
• Over a 15 year timeframe, what are the potential impacts of synthetic biology 
developments converging with other disruptive technologies?
• In the next 10 years, what regulatory and legislative gaps will be prominent if 
developments in gene-editing technology converge with a widespread availabil-
ity of low-cost desktop DNA synthesizers, enabling the capability of practically 
any lab to design, engineer and print pathogen genomes?
12 Foresight in Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology Threats
190
• If, in the next 5 years, a do-it-yourself synthetic biologist were to accidentally or 
deliberately release a contagious human pathogen, what impact would this have 
on the research community as a whole and Code of Conduct creation?
• Will current information controls, such as embargoes on publication of dual-use 
synthetic biology research, be suitable in 20 years?
• In the next 10  years, how will emerging DNA synthesis technology impact 
screening for potential synthetic biology threats?
• How will developments in delivery mechanisms of biological agents affect syn-
thetic biology threats over the next 5 years?
12.4  Recommendations
The use of foresight techniques to generate insightful and actionable information 
about emerging synthetic biology and biotechnology threats has great potential. To 
increase the effectiveness of foresight, careful consideration should go into process 
design, including the choice of methodological approach, questions and partici-
pants. Potential constraints on the resources and capacities of the organisers and 
participants should be taken into account at this stage as well.
The intended audiences and users should be aware of the limitations and inherent 
uncertainties of foresight in general, as well as the particular process used. In gen-
eral, the further out in time a foresight process is being used for, the more specula-
tive the results will be, with less resolution and a greater chance of unanticipated 
and wildcard events in the interim. It is particularly important for users to remain 
cognizant of the difference between foresight and forecasting; foresight does not 
aim to predict the future. Below, some recommendations on the foresight process 
design are provided, followed by specific considerations for emerging synthetic 
biology and biotechnology threats.
12.4.1  Foresight Process Design
Careful consideration should go into the preparation and design of a foresight pro-
cess. A deliberately constructed exercise will be more likely to deliver a relevant 
and actionable outcome for the intended end-users. The process should be designed 
keeping in mind the available resources and necessary timeframe. The target audi-
ence should be a key consideration and the foresight methodology should be made 
transparent to them with the limitations explicitly acknowledged.
Answering the following five questions will help in the foresight process design, 
and a worked example based on a synthetic biology foresight question, which was 
examined during the Lausanne workshop, is provided for illustration.
 1. For what specific purpose is foresight being done?
C. Nelson et al.
191
 2. What are the objectives?
 3. Who is the audience?
 4. What are their expectations?
 5. What process is required?
Example Foresight Question Over a 15  year timeframe, what are the potential 
impacts of synthetic biology developments converging with other disruptive 
technologies?
 1. For what specific purpose is foresight being done?
 (a) In order to avoid technological and societal surprise.
 2. What are the objectives?
 (a) To engage and inform key stakeholders;
 (b) To enable the development of appropriate governance mechanisms, for 
example through informed regulatory export control;
 (c) To gain insight into adversarial capability;
 (d) To drive the creation of new capabilities and realize emerging 
opportunities;
 (e) To identify key trends and early warning signals;
 (f) To understand and identify threats;
 (g) To avoid technological surprise;
 (h) To create conceptual connections to inform strategic action.
 3. Who is the audience?
 (a) Civilian population
 (b) Military leaders and Defense Department
 (c) Policymakers
 (d) Funders
 (e) First responders
 (f) Non-Governmental Organizations
 (g) Intergovernmental Organizations (UN, WHO, OIE)
 (h) Academic researchers
 (i) Intelligence and security services
 4. What are their expectations?
 (a) To generate specific, actionable recommendations;
 (b) To reduce uncertainty while also assessing and indicating the degree of 
uncertainty;
 (c) Raise awareness and engagement with possible futures;
 (d) Identify key possible future events, including their associated forks, nodes 
and branch points;
 (e) Identify possible interventions;
 (f) Encourage dialogue between stakeholders;
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 (g) Note: expectations may need to be managed, for example, explicit commu-
nication about foresight not being a tool to generate accurate predictions 
about the future.
 5. What process is required?
 (a) Delphi Method with horizon scanning component;
 (b) Identification of the key drivers and scenario analysis;
 (c) SWOT analysis;
 (d) Sharing of findings with the target audience.
12.4.2  Synthetic Biology Considerations
When designing a foresight exercise specifically for emerging synthetic biology and 
biotechnology threats, due consideration should be given to a number of factors. 
The participants involved in the exercise should be chosen for their expertise, but 
not limited to a certain discipline: the value in a foresight process is achieved 
through harnessing opinions from across domains, and even for technology-specific 
foresight questions, fields such as the social sciences and humanities and the secu-
rity community have important perspectives to add. In addition, the inclusion, from 
the design phase onwards, of foresight expertise will have great value for the proper 
execution of the process.
Emerging synthetic biology and biotechnology inherently have sensitivities that 
require consideration. For example, certain developments may be occurring within 
confidential industrial contexts, and concerns about dual-use applications may pre-
vent certain scientific findings from being openly discussed. In addition, security 
concerns and evolving threats are likely to be confidential in nature. All of these 
may skew the inputs going into a foresight exercise. However, this need not under-
mine the value of a well-designed process, that does not breach security concerns, 
for strategic insight. Foresight exercises at different confidentiality levels could be 
considered in the military context and combined for use by decision-makers.
For many fields, but for synthetic biology in particular, emerging threats are 
likely to arise at the convergence points of new developments. This highlights the 
importance of ensuring foresight exercises are designed to allow for broad thinking 
on how scientific knowledge and technology can enable threats and reduce the risk 
threshold level.
Foresight can have a significant impact on strategic decision-making and direct 
work within a wide range of military contexts and government institutions, but it is 
important to acknowledge that evaluation of a foresight exercise’s utility is inher-
ently difficult. Iterative processes that allow for the systematic re-examination of the 
outputs of a foresight exercise, both at regular intervals and as significant or unpre-





The ability to consider future scenarios in a systematic fashion is highly relevant to 
examining emerging synthetic biology and biotechnology threats. From both a gov-
ernmental and military perspective, extending understanding beyond current risks 
and being able to take proactive steps in addressing vulnerabilities. Mitigating 
emerging threats is preferable to being surprised by and reactive to technological 
developments. Insights gained also have value for a range of other groups and stake-
holders. Foresight offers a process by which to consider and explore possible future 
scenarios, and while any examination of the future has inherent limitations, if 
designed correctly, foresight exercises can provide strategically useful information 
for action.
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Chapter 13
Predicting Biosecurity Threats: 
Deployment and Detection of Biological 
Weapons
Kaitlin M. Volk and Trajan J. Gering
Understanding what kinds of biological weapons can be made with what sort of 
technology and by whom is an important component of biosecurity. An equally 
important component is understanding the different potential targets a biological 
weapon could be designed to attack, how the weapon would be deployed against 
these targets, and the available strategies to detect the creation and deployment of an 
illegal biological weapon. Understanding how a weapon could be deployed against 
specific targets affords decision makers a better picture of the current state and capa-
bilities of biowarfare and bioterrorism that need to be protected against. 
Understanding current detection capabilities allows for a more informed discussion 
on biosecurity tools, and, more importantly, allows for the identification of critical 
gaps and research needs to improve risk-screening, detection, environmental reme-
diation, and various other normatively beneficial and legitimate uses of emerging 
biotechnologies (Trump et al. 2020a). These two topic areas are discussed in this 
chapter.
13.1  Methods of Deployment
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) classifies disease transmis-
sion into two primary categories: direct transmission and indirect transmission 
(CDC 2011). Concerning direct transmission, individuals pick up the disease 
through direct contact with an infected person or from direct contact with an envi-
ronmental reservoir. This also includes droplet spread, in which the close-range 
spray of a sneeze or cough transmits a pathogen without the assistance of an inter-
mediate object. Examples of natural outbreaks spread primarily through droplets 
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include the COVID-19 virus and the plague (Carniel 2002; Linkov et al. 2021). 
Additionally, researchers in 2012 modified a strain of avian influenza to be trans-
missible between mammals via respiratory droplets (Evans and Selgelid 2015). 
While direct transmission with droplets would restrict spread to only close-range 
encounters, it has proven to be a highly effective mode of transmission particularly 
in densely populated areas like cities.
In indirect transmission, a pathogen from a sick individual is left on/in an inter-
mediate object and is transmitted to a healthy individual when they come into con-
tact with the infected object. The CDC delineates three categories of indirect 
transmission: vehicle, vector, and airborne. In vehicle-based transmission, inani-
mate objects like food, water, biological products (e.g. blood), and fomites (e.g., 
clothing and utensils) are contaminated with the pathogen. A number of bioterror-
ism acts that utilized vehicle transmission exist. Letters were used in the 2001 
anthrax attack that targeted media outlets and politicians. The Rajneeshee cult poi-
soned salad bars with Salmonella in order to influence a local election, using food 
as the vector for their biological attack. Researchers modeling a bioterror attack 
determined that terrorists could affect several hundred thousand individuals if 
they could cultivate and deploy enough biotoxin into a single milk-processing facil-
ity (Wein and Liu 2005). This is because the dairy processing industry is so heavily 
centralized. Many realms of the agriculture and food production industry are simi-
larly centralized, increasing the risk of the transmission of pathogens to consumers 
through the ingestion of contaminated food or drink (Sobel et al. 2002). Contaminated 
blood, medicine, and other inanimate objects could also be used as vehicles 
(Shinwari et  al. 2014), and the vehicle method could be particularly effective at 
attacking sequencing machines, as discussed further below (Faezi et al. 2019).
In vector-based transmission, organisms carry a pathogen and transmit it upon 
contact with humans (CDC 2011). Animal vectors are a common mode of transmis-
sion of natural outbreaks (e.g. mosquitos transmitting malaria and rats transporting 
the plague) (CDC 2011; Carniel 2002) and have been used in previous biological 
attacks (e.g., plague-ridden fleas released into China by Japan) (Franconi et  al. 
2018; Zilinskas 2017). Additionally, the majority of the novel human infectious 
agents that have emerged over recent decades have been zoonotic, meaning they 
were transmitted from animals to humans following a mutation (Franconi et  al. 
2018). Despite their proven effectiveness, little attention has been paid to animals as 
a means to start a biological attack, potentially due to the difficulty of obtaining, 
keeping, and releasing large amounts of any organism discreetly.
While much of the published biosecurity literature does not address specific 
modes of pathogen transmission, the airborne mode has received the most attention 
for its potential use in a biological attack (Yeh et al. 2013, NRC 1997, Anand 2018). 
In airborne-based transmission, pathogens are attached to dust or droplet nuclei 
suspended in the air. Concerns over the aerosolization of pathogens have existed for 
decades. The US Army Chemical Corps ran a series of experiments in the 1950s and 
1960s to understand patterns of aerosol dispersal of biological weapons over short 
distances in cities, medium distances in rural communities, and extremely long dis-
tances across entire continents (NRC 1997). Using planes, the Chemical Corps 
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dispersed zinc cadmium sulfide, Serratia marcescens, and Bacillus globigii over 33 
urban and rural sites and large swaths of land from ocean to ocean and border to 
border. These latter experiments are known as Operation LAC, standing for “Large 
Area Coverage,” and demonstrated that airborne biological weapons could cover 
extremely large geographical areas (NRC 1997). Japan, Iran, and Iraq at different 
times created bombs or missiles designed to aerosolize pathogens upon explosion 
(Zilinskas 2017). Similar concerns exist today with malicious terrorist or cult groups 
(Zilinskas 2017; Shinwari et al. 2014), in addition to concerns over the possibility 
of these groups using drones to remotely disperse pathogens (Anand 2018) or con-
cealed aerosol containers to release an airborne pathogen in crowded and confined 
areas (Yeh et al. 2013).
Overall, while a synthetic pathogen could be spread in a variety of ways, the 
airborne mode of transmission would likely be the most effective mode for a large- 
scale biological attack as it could be easily released by land or air, spread over a 
large area in a relatively short amount of time, and easily enter people’s bodies 
through respiration.
13.2  Targets
Four main categories that biological weapons could be engineered to attack were 
identified in the literature. These targets include humans, agriculture, technology, 
and the environment. The ease with which these attacks could be carried out, conse-
quences of the attack, and potential strategies to prevent the attack are presented 
below for each target.
13.2.1  Humans
Unsurprisingly, much of the focus on biological weapon production and defense 
have used humans as the target. A biological attack against humans could result in 
direct human deaths or illness, widespread fear and panic, economic loss, and costs 
related to the response and remediation of the pathogen (Elbers and Knutsson 2013). 
Human pathogens can be readily obtained from the environment or natural outbreak 
events and are found in laboratories of various security levels around the world 
(Gronvall 2015). Most of the work being done on synthesizing viruses from DNA 
ordered through DNA synthesizing organizations is done on human pathogens (De 
Vries 2017, Noyce et al. 2018, Berger 2019). With a few exceptions, including the 
U.S.’s use of biological weapons against plants in Vietnam, the majority of state- 
sponsored synthetic biological weapon programs have focused on zoonotic human 
pathogens, especially Bacillus anthracis and Yersinia pestis (Kelle et  al. 2010; 
Zilinskas 2017).
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The probability of an attack in the near future with biological weapons from 
state-actors, sub-state actors, and non-state actors seems to be admittedly low based 
on the low number of previous biological attacks, but the outcome of such an attack 
would be catastrophic and warrants preventative measures. Biological attacks will 
also become more likely as the cost and effort associated with synthetic biology and 
the creation of pathogens decreases. As demonstrated by natural outbreak events, 
pathogens have an innate ability to persist in a given location indefinitely, essen-
tially remaining dormant in human or environmental reservoirs between outbreaks. 
Thus, an initial biological weapons attack could have long-term and cascading 
effects unseen in attacks with more-traditional weapons (Plianbangchang 2005).
Many laboratories that handle human pathogens have protective measures com-
mensurate in level to the danger of the pathogens they are handling. Biosecurity 
levels range from 1, requiring the least amount of protective measures, to 4, requir-
ing the most. These regulations are put in place to reduce the risk of a pathogen 
being accidently released or of unauthorized personnel gaining access to the patho-
gen. However, not all laboratories around the world handling dangerous pathogens 
properly follow biosafety regulations, or take measures to reduce biosafety chal-
lenges via a ‘safety-by-design’ approach (Trump et al. 2020c). Outreach and sup-
port, both monetarily and intellectually, may be needed between countries to ensure 
all biological laboratories are properly protected. Biological journals also need to 
take responsibility for screening papers so that information that could be easily used 
by nefarious actors to create biological weapons doesn’t become readily available. 
This debate over the risk of publishing dual-use research and the role of academic 
journals is evident in the ongoing scrutiny of a publication detailing the synthesis of 
horsepox, a close relative to the smallpox virus (Noyce and Evans 2018; Yong 
2018), and is yet to be resolved.
13.2.2  Agriculture
Biological attacks against agriculture and livestock, also known as agroterrorism, 
would result in large negative consequences despite receiving less attention in the 
literature. Agroterrorism is defined as the introduction of an animal or plant infec-
tious disease to induce fear in people, threaten social stability, and cripple a nation’s 
economy (Yeh et  al. 2013). Animal and plant infectious diseases include both 
viruses, such as foot in mouth disease (FMD), rinderpest, and avian influenza; and 
bacteria, such as anthrax, brucellosis, and glanders (Yeh et al. 2012). While syn-
thetic viruses and bacteria are of the most serious concern currently, agroterrorism 
could be susceptible to larger multicellular organisms as advancements in synthetic 
biology are made on that front. Traditional agricultural pests or diseases, such as the 
Russian wheat aphid (Diuraphis noxia) or ring rot (Clavibacter machinanensis), 
could be modified to be more resistant to pesticides or environmental conditions, 
thereby increasing their potential damage (Anand 2018; Getz and Dellaire 2018).
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Agroterrorism lacks some of the cognitive and cultural shock of bioterrorism and 
has rarely been used in the past. One of the few examples of an offensive agroterror-
ism program is the Japanese Unit 100, which was dedicated to creating biological 
weapons for use against animals during WWII (Zilinskas 2017). Agroterrorism 
could be an easier and safer avenue of attack for the attacker (Elbers and Knutsson 
2013; Anand 2018). Animal and plant infectious diseases are often abundant in the 
natural environment, making them relatively easy to obtain. Would-be attackers can 
handle the disease with little to no threat to their own lives or the lives of those 
people they care about. For example, while the use of a human pathogen during war 
has a very high risk of spreading back to the home nation, agricultural pathogens 
will be more contained and less likely to backfire especially if strains of a crop or 
livestock specific to the attacked location are targeted. Farms are often unsecured 
and geographically dispersed, making it easy for attackers to deploy a pathogen. 
Livestock and crops are kept in highly concentrated areas and livestock are fre-
quently exposed to other herds or flocks during long-distance transport, effectively 
providing a built-in dispersal mechanism. Lastly, livestock often lack any resistance 
to pathogens that are prevalent in other countries, and veterinarians or agricultural 
officials are less likely to test for or recognize diseases that aren’t endemic to their 
region (Elbers and Knutsson 2013).
Overall, agroterrorism with a synthetic pathogen is an easier route of attack for a 
terrorist organization than a traditional biological attack against humans. A biologi-
cal attack against important crops or livestock could have devastating effects on the 
economy and social well-being of a country, as has been seen in natural agricultural 
outbreaks (e.g. the Irish potato famine in 1845 or the mass culling of pigs infected 
with African swine fever in Ukraine in 2012). The threat of a biological attack 
against agriculture could be reduced by preventing actors from acquiring agricul-
tural pathogens, increasing security on farms, developing early detection systems 
(including the education of farmers and veterinarians on foreign agricultural patho-
gen identification) and stockpiling livestock vaccines (Yeh et al. 2013; Anand 2018). 
Restrictions on the use of agricultural pathogens in synthetic biology experiments 
could also be applied in a way similar to those on human pathogens.
13.2.3  Technology
Synthetic biology has also been shown to be effective at attacking technology 
(Berger 2019; Ney et al. 2017). DNA is a relatively stable platform capable of stor-
ing large amounts of information. Normally this information is biological, but sci-
entists have begun to look at DNA as a way to store large data and datasets, including 
images, audio, and videos (Berger 2019). To demonstrate the capability of technol-
ogy to store and recover data from DNA, researchers at Harvard University recently 
used CRISPR-based tools to encode a GIF of a galloping horse into the genomes of 
living bacteria (Escherichia coli) (Shipman et al. 2017). However, if one is able to 
store data and code in DNA, then one should also be able to store malicious code. 
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In the same year that scientists at Harvard were storing GIFS in E. coli, scientists at 
the University of Washington were encoding malware into a segment of DNA to 
successfully gain remote control of the computer that sequenced the malicious DNA 
(Ney et  al. 2017). Many next-generation DNA sequencing (NGS) systems use a 
2-bit DNA encoding scheme to read and store genetic information – A is coded as 
00, C as 01, G as 10, and T as 11. The authors of the study encoded a straight- 
forward and commonly available computer bug and then transferred the computer 
code into the corresponding nucleotide sequence. They then bought this sequence 
from a gene synthesis company that creates synthetic gene fragments. Upon receiv-
ing the malicious synthesized DNA fragment and running the fragment through a 
sequencer and downstream analysis program, the authors gained full control of the 
computer attached to the sequencer.
It is important to note that the authors deliberately introduced a vulnerability into 
the analysis program they attacked prior to sequencing the malicious DNA. However, 
the authors of this study analyzed a number of NGS analysis programs and found 
that they are 11 times more likely to use insecure programming functions than non- 
NGS control programs (p  =  0.027, Ney et  al. 2017). They concluded that NGS 
programs do not follow best software security practices and need to be updated so 
as to be more robust against attacks. The authors were limited in the kind of mal-
ware they could encode into DNA because of current restrictions in the length of 
DNA fragments that can be sequenced and requirements for sequence stability. 
Advancements in NGS systems to sequence longer segments of DNA will increase 
the length and complexity of malware that can be encoded in DNA, and advance-
ments in synthesizing DNA could overcome current structural requirements and 
also allow for a wider variety of malware. Advancements in DNA sequencing and 
synthesizing are ongoing as researchers innovate in pursuit of beneficial synthetic 
biology applications.
With the encoding of malware into DNA, any laboratory or company that 
sequences DNA becomes vulnerable to an attack on their computer system. 
Attackers could target the human biobanks of companies like 23andMe or 
AncestryDNA to expose the genetic information of earth’s population. This could 
allow attackers to synthesize a pathogen that is fatal to a small subset of people with 
the targeted genetic sequence but is benign to the general population (Faezi et al. 
2019). Attackers could also target high-level laboratories that work with pathogens 
to crash their computers or gain access to confidential files. Malicious DNA could 
be sent directly to these sequencing services (e.g., a spit sample sent to an ancestry 
database) or introduced by spraying malicious DNA on surfaces that are likely to be 
swabbed for DNA analysis (e.g. a countertop during a health inspection or criminal 
investigation) or come into contact with the sequencing machine (e.g. rubber gloves 
or lab coats) (Faezi et al. 2019).
As advancements in NGS systems are made, updates to bring NGS software in 
line with best security practices should be prioritized to reduce the risk posed by 
malicious DNA (Ney et al. 2017). Sequencing companies should also take more 
responsibility in identifying suspicious DNA sequences and denying or reporting 
the order. One group of researchers had already started to develop a technique to 
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detect and exclude malicious DNA by checking the sequenced DNA against known 
sequences before it was fully processed (Islam et al. 2019). As this is a new emerg-
ing threat, more effort needs to be applied to increase security at every level, includ-
ing synthesizing DNA, sequencing DNA, analyzing sequenced data, and securing 
valuable genetic databases.
13.2.4  The Environment
To date, no literature that discussed using synthetic biology to directly attack the 
natural environment has been found. There is ongoing research focused on using 
gene drives and horizontal gene transfer in the open environment for beneficial pur-
poses, including modifying mosquitos so that they are resistant to malaria (Gantz 
et al. 2015) and modifying coral symbionts to be more resistant to coral bleaching 
(Cleves et al. 2018). There are inherent risks of releasing engineered organisms into 
the environment since the effects of such organisms on the local community are 
largely unknown. However, that debate has been ongoing for decades and is outside 
of the scope of biosecurity. Theoretically, it could become possible for malicious 
actors to utilize gene drives to purposefully collapse species critical to the function-
ing of an ecosystem without detection. However, the technique is complicated and 
still in its infancy. Gene drives would be particularly ineffective against long-living 
species with long generation times since it would take an exorbitantly long time to 
propagate the deleterious gene throughout the population through natural reproduc-
tion. Overall, biological attacks against the natural environment are a very indirect 
route of causing harm to an enemy. Humans and agriculture are much more likely 
targets since harm can be inflicted almost immediately and research in engineering 
these sorts of pathogens is more robust. Advancements in synthetic biology that 
enhance the capabilities of gene drives or other methods that could be deployed 
against the natural environment should still be tracked as this could become a target 
in the future.
13.3  Screening Techniques
Effective biosecurity should be able to identify when (a) a biological weapon is 
being produced in order to prevent its full production and deployment and (b) a 
biological weapon has been deployed in order to attribute the attack and to start 
remediation. Current screening methods and gaps are discussed below for both of 
these phases.
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13.3.1  Pre-deployment: Gene Synthesis
Production of a biological weapon with synthetic biology has the potential to be 
identified and prevented as soon as a nefarious actor tries to purchase DNA frag-
ments from gene synthesis companies. Many U.S. companies conduct background 
checks on people placing orders and compare the ordered sequence against libraries 
of listed pathogens as advised by the U.S.  National Institute of Health (NIH) 
(Gronvall 2015; Ahteensuu 2017). If an ordered sequence too closely matches that 
found within the genome of a listed pathogen then the order isn’t fulfilled and 
authorities may be contacted. However, not all gene synthesis companies follow 
these steps, and the same recommendations are not in place in other countries 
(Gronvall 2015). The International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC) is one entity 
trying to fix this issue by alerting all member companies if one company receives a 
suspicious order. This prevents malicious actors from simply ordering from another 
member company if they are denied. However, members of IGSC make up a minor-
ity of companies that synthesize DNA but do represent the majority of the market 
share (Frazar et al. 2017). As a growing number of smaller businesses performing 
gene synthesis open with increased ease and decreased cost of synthesis, security at 
this level could become more of a concern. Effort should be made to create similar 
legislature/recommendations as the NIH in other countries for gene synthesis com-
panies, or to incorporate more of these companies into the IGSC.
Even with the IGSC and national recommendations, however, there is no formal 
or widely accepted method for prioritizing and listing pathogens (Salerno and 
Hickok 2007), and the current list of pathogens is not comprehensive (it does not 
include many agricultural diseases). The list will quickly become insufficient as 
synthetic biology progresses, and the process of screening gene sequences will 
become more complicated (Elbers and Knutsson 2013). For instance, scientists 
have created strains of yeast that can produce opiates and biological toxins 
(Cirigliano et al. 2017), but it would be illogical to categorize yeast as an agent of 
concern since it is usually benign and a key research organism. Additionally, mali-
cious actors could hide and later extract desired sequences in a longer sequence or 
split the sequence among multiple companies to avoid detection (Frazar et al. 2017). 
Using a list of pathogens to screen for dangerous orders also does not address the 
encoding of computer malware into DNA as discussed above (Ney et  al. 2017). 
Stronger international policies that require gene synthesis companies to run checks 
on people placing orders and the orders themselves could be enacted. The govern-
ment could also monitor the sale and movement of the equipment needed to cut, 
combine, and propagate gene sequences. The U.S. Department of Commerce cur-
rently maintains a list of equipment of concern, but almost none of this equipment 
relates to synthetic biology (Frazar et al. 2017).
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13.3.2  Post-deployment: Pathogen Detection
Once a pathogen is created and deployed, there are ways to identify that an outbreak 
is occurring and what engineered pathogen is responsible (Trump et  al. 2018). 
Pathogens are often identified using traditional molecular diagnostic methods dur-
ing natural outbreaks. Some techniques are specific for humans, animals, or plants, 
but all can be used for an intentional outbreak. Examples include basic and advanced 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) technology, fluorescence in situ hybridization 
(FISH), antibody-based immuno-assays, biochemical testing, mass spectrometry, 
and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) (Anand 2018; Krishan et  al. 
2017). ELISA has been suggested as a viable and rapid way of testing for patho-
gens/biotoxins released into centralized food processing plants (Wein and Liu 
2005). The majority of these techniques, however, must be processed in a laboratory 
and are constrained by the number of samples they can analyze. Some are also 
expensive, prone to false-positives, and insensitive to certain bacteria. Optical tech-
niques, such as immunofluorescence (IF), flow cytometry (FCM), thermography, 
and gas chromatography are useful in detecting diseases in plants (Anand 2018). 
These too are limited by sensitivity to environmental conditions during measure-
ments and some, like thermography, indicate that a disease is present but cannot 
diagnose specific diseases.
Synthetic biology can be used to create pathogens that circumvent standard 
methods of detection, meaning that existing diagnostic tools could return a false 
negative when analyzing a new synthetically-developed pathogen (Gronvall et al. 
2015). For example, the primary way of identifying Y. pestis was through the detec-
tion of antibodies to the F1 protein found on the outer membrane of the of bacteria. 
Knowing this, Russia successfully created a strain of Y. pestis that lacked the F1 
protein in the 1980s, thereby rendering traditional identification methods useless 
(Zilinskas 2017). This demonstrates that pathogens could be deliberately engi-
neered to avoid available detection techniques, which would delay detection and 
intervention and subsequently increase the outbreak severity (Gronvall 2015; 
Plianbangchang 2005). Synthesized pathogens’ ability to avoid detection strength-
ens the argument for ever-evolving detection techniques, in addition to stronger 
policies around the creation of such pathogens in the first place.
Advancements in the fields of biotechnology, nanotechnology, and information 
technology should improve detection techniques (Trump et  al. 2020b). Nano- 
phytopathology is an emerging technique for the early detection of plant diseases 
(Anand 2018). Software programs utilizing crowdsourced data and evaluations are 
also becoming popular for detecting and mapping diseases, and could be used to 
identify biological attacks against both agriculture and humans (Anand 2018; 
Berger 2019). The first biological surveillance platform for human outbreaks, 
ProMed Mail, was created in 1994. It works by sharing and monitoring media, offi-
cial reports, online information, local observations, and more to identify symptoms 
or signals that a new or unusual disease outbreak or toxic exposure is occurring 
(Berger 2019). This program is still alive today and includes over 70,000 members 
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in 185 countries that review reports and engage in discussions on infectious dis-
eases. A number of similar text analysis platforms that compile and analyze data-
bases to identify biological attacks or natural outbreaks have also been launched. 
These platforms are all affected by the people reviewing the data, the type and lan-
guage of data sources, region of incidents, and types of cases collected. For instance, 
the text analysis platform HealthMap identified the 2014 Western African Ebola 
outbreak a week before WHO declared the outbreak, but a failure in human modera-
tors to recognize the trend identified by the platform caused delay (Berger 2019). 
Syndromic surveillance can also be used to detect a disease outbreak. Syndromic 
surveillance uses market data (e.g. the number of eggs being produced, amount of 
over-the-counter medication being bought, spike in searches about abdominal pain 
being) to detect when trends differ from the baseline that could indicate a human or 
agricultural disease outbreak (Elbers and Knutsson 2013; Berger 2019). Overall, the 
groundwork for early detection systems exists but can be greatly improved upon in 
the future as advanced computing capabilities increase.
Real-time sensors embedded in the environment that passively monitor for 
pathogens would be the ideal way of quickly recognizing a biological weapon attack 
(Shinwari et al. 2014). Biosensors use a recognition element, usually biological in 
origin, to bind to some component of a pathogen of interest in order to recognize 
and report that the pathogen is present (Sapsford et al. 2008). These reactions occur 
in specialized and highly sensitive bioprobes within biosensors. Unlike traditional 
ways of detecting pathogens, which can take days to complete in a laboratory, bio-
probes can recognize specific pathogens within minutes in the field (Kim et  al. 
2015). One sensor could contain multiple probes focused on specific pathogens and 
recognize a pathogen from its size, DNA sequence, specific chemical reactions, 
antibodies, antigens, phage response, or aptamer binding (Petro et al. 2003; Kim 
et al. 2015). Since pathogens can be modified to avoid specific modes of detection 
(e.g., the exclusion of certain plasmids or antigens) (Zilinskas 2017), multiple 
probes using different means of detecting a single pathogen could be included in a 
single biosensor to increase security (Sapsford et al. 2008). However, screening for 
specific agents has its limitations, as discussed previously, so biosensors that could 
recognize novel pathogens or DNA against the natural background would be ideal. 
Detectors will likely become more accurate and useful as pattern recognition soft-
ware and nanotechnology advances, as both of these would help to screen out back-
ground environmental contaminants, minimize false positives, and decrease 
detection time (Petro et al. 2003, Kim et al. 2015).
13.4  Conclusion
A biological attack utilizing a synthetic pathogen could prove disruptive to various 
receptors – making it critical to consider how to prevent, avoid, or ameliorate such 
challenges before they arise (Malloy et al. 2016; Trump et al. 2020d). The threat of 
attacks using other methods of deployment against less traditional targets (e.g. 
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technology or the environment) should not be ignored. Increasing synthetic biology 
capabilities will increase the risk of more complicated biological attacks against all 
discussed targets, but will also increase our ability to detect pathogens in the envi-
ronment with biosensors. A large focus, however, should be on preventing the cre-
ation of a synthetic pathogen in the first place, which can be accomplished through 
increased monitoring and regulation of gene synthesis orders, synthetic biology 
equipment, and distribution of sensitive information.
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Chapter 14
Promoting Effective Biosecurity 
Governance: Using Tripwires to Anticipate 
and Ameliorate Potentially Harmful 
Development Trends
Benjamin D. Trump, Stephanie Galaitsi, Miriam Pollock, Kaitlin M. Volk, 
and Igor Linkov
14.1  Introduction
Synthetic biology is a new, rapidly growing interdisciplinary field which seeks to 
use engineering techniques to alter and construct new biological components, 
devices, and systems. The rate of synthetic biology development and research has 
increased over the past two decades in both industry and academia (Ahteensuu 
2017). Applications include medicine (new vaccines, delivery of therapeutics, and 
treatments), energy (biofuels), environmental remediation, food production, and 
general industry (detergents, adhesives, perfumes) (Evans and Selgelid 2015; 
Gronvall 2015). While synthetic biology heralds advances in these fields, its tech-
niques could also be adapted for malicious purposes and used by terrorist organiza-
tions, rogue actors, or hostile nations to create dangerous pathogens, invasive 
organisms, or other disruptive biological agents (Yeh et al. 2012). Such potential 
makes synthetic biology a dual-use research area of concern (DURC) as the same 
techniques can be used to benefit or harm people, animals, environments, technol-
ogy, or nations (Getz and Dellaire 2018). To cope with threats arising from synthetic 
biology’s dual-use nature, biosecurity is needed to prevent, detect, and attribute 
biological attacks.
The rapid development of synthetic biology is lowering barriers to access its 
technological capabilities. While organizations seek to develop and formalize effec-
tive governance strategies for managing the technology’s risks to humans and the 
environment, an increasing number of independent actors are engaging in the tech-
nology (Trump et al. 2020). Existing biosecurity policy practices have left gaps in 
biosecurity effectiveness for synthetic biology. Such gaps require an iterative 
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response to influence countries and organizations away from harmful or nefarious 
synthetic biology research applications.
In biosecurity, triggering mechanisms that signal when a nation, sub-state actor, 
or individual is on the path towards biological weapons development and deploy-
ment can be part of this response. These mechanisms, called tripwires, are actions, 
events, or breakthroughs that impel a country toward either  enabling or moving 
away from biosecurity threats. They can include both bottom-up and top-down sig-
nals. Bottom-up tripwires include information hazard (the release of information by 
an individual, company, or academic institution that could be used by a malicious 
actor), profit motivation, and partnership with entities of biosecurity concern 
(whether low or high). Top-down tripwires also include information hazard, as well 
as internal or external conflict that could motivate a nation to develop and use bio-
logical weapons to maintain power, a public health crisis that could cause biosecu-
rity and biosafety regulations to be relaxed in search of a treatment or cure, and 
geopolitical alignment with a nation of some degree of biosecurity concern.
14.2  Biological Weapons in History
Biological weapons have been used since ancient times. These ancient weapons 
included scorpion bombs (terracotta pots filled with deadly scorpions and thrown at 
the enemy), crushed toxic hellebore plants, and arrows tipped with poison (Mayor 
2003). As states sought new ways to generate advantages over their opponents, they 
developed increasingly advanced biological weapons. In 1925, in large part as a 
response to the devastating use of chemical and biological weapons in World War I, 
the Geneva Protocol was passed, banning the usage of biological and chemical 
weapons in wartime. Nevertheless, many states continued their biological weapons 
programs. During World War II, for instance, Japanese units deployed bombs filled 
with plague-ridden fleas in China as a part of their biological weapons program.
In 2001, in the worst biological attack in US history, letters laced with Bacillus 
anthracis spores, or anthrax, were sent through the U.S. Postal Service (DOJ 2010). 
The so-called “Amerithrax” bioterror attack resulted in five deaths, 22 infections, 
the prophylaxis of over 30,000 people, and hundreds of millions of dollars in decon-
tamination expenses, as well as around $6 billion in lost revenue and new security 
measures (DOJ 2010). After a lengthy investigation, it was determined that one 
man, acting alone, had been responsible for the attack. This illustrates the enormous 
destructive potential of bioweapons (FBI n.d.; Ellis 2014).
Many countries, including the US, UK, and Russia, were developing biological 
and chemical agents for warfare until the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and on Their Destruction was signed in 1972 (“BWC”). Since 1970, there 
have been 35 confirmed cases of biological weapon deployment (Franconi et  al. 
2018), with the majority of research and weapons production being pursued by state 
actors. However, synthetic biological weapons are expected to become a larger 
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concern as the field advances and as malicious sub-state or non-state actors pursue 
and adopt these weapons (Gronvall 2018).
For almost 50 years, the BWC has been the gold standard for watching for and 
preventing state-sponsored biological weapons. However, advancements in syn-
thetic biology have decreased the time, money, and skill needed for an individual or 
organization to participate in the field, leading to the development of pathogens by 
smaller sub-state and non-state actors who are not restricted by the BWC (Evans 
and Selgelid 2015). Some interested individuals and small companies interested in 
synthetic biology have set up labs in their homes using household items and equip-
ment or kits ordered over the internet in a movement now known as “DIY Bio” or 
“garage biology” (Ledford 2010). Additionally, while chemicals have a set structure 
and formula that makes them easier to identify and govern, advancements in syn-
thetic biology allow for the creation of novel types of biological weapons that are 
not explicitly prohibited by the BWC but instead exist in a sort of “gray zone.” This 
increased accessibility of synthetic biology and difficulty in categorizing synthetic 
biology products creates a threat space that is not fully captured within the structure 
or implementation of the BWC.
Synthetic biology raises the possibility that pathogenic bioweapons could be 
designed, developed, and deployed in new ways that diverge from the disease- 
causing characteristics of naturally occurring pathogens. Traditionally, only known 
pathogens found naturally in the environment, such as B. anthracis and Y. pestis, 
were developed as biological weapons because of the inherent infectious character-
istics that readily enabled such organisms to serve as weapons. However, as syn-
thetic biology continues to expand capabilities to create and modify biological 
weapons, there is an increasing need for biosafety and biosecurity assurances for 
humans, animals, plants, and the environment. The following sections examine the 
current and future state of research on five categories of agents, or “platforms,” that 
could be used as biological weapons: viruses, microbes, multicellular organisms, 
cell-free systems, and prions.
14.3  Promoting Responsible Research in Modern 
Biotechnology: Tripwires as a Framework 
to Understand Red-Team Capacity and Intent 
for Nefarious Deployment of Technology
States will pass through a series of broad stages on the path to developing and 
deploying biological weapons. There are characteristics typical of states and actors 
at each stage, and these characteristics can serve as tripwires to identify if a group 
is poised to become more or less of a biosecurity threat. We identify four stages: (1) 
the indication of an interest in synthetic biology, (2) the achievement of scientific, 
technological, and engineering capacity for synthetic biology, (3) the development 
or acquisition of synthetic biology weapons, and finally, (4) the deployment of 
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synthetic biology weapons. Stage 1 is further broken down into top-down and bot-
tom- up initiatives, while Stage 3 is broken down into homegrown development of 
weapons and acquisition from external sources.
This section concludes with a discussion on technological tripwires, or advance-
ments in the techniques and technology used in synthetic biology which will drasti-
cally increase what people are capable of doing with synthetic biology. A summary 
of different tripwires can be found in Table 14.1.
14.3.1  Regime Characteristics that Could Lead to Synthetic 
Biology Weapons Development and Their Tripwires
This section provides a preliminary process model, developed through the distilla-
tion of various country profiles, of the steps leading to the deployment of synthetic 
biology weapons. This process model lists the outward signs a country can project 
in its path to weapons development, and proposes actions that might be taken to 
Table 14.1 Categories and descriptions of tripwires that can be used to indicate when a nation, 
sub-state group, or individual is becoming more or less of a biosecurity threat
Top-down
Information Hazard The release of information by a nation that could be used by a malicious 
actor, or the suppression of bottom-up information hazards
Conflict Internal or external conflict that motivates a nation to develop and use 
biological weapons to maintain power
Public health crisis A natural epidemic that causes biosecurity and biosafety regulations to be 
relaxed in search of a treatment or cure
Geopolitical 
alignment
Establishing relations with a nation that has a record of biosecurity 
compliance or incompliance
Bottom-up
Information Hazard The release of information by an individual, company, or academic 
institution that could be used by a malicious actor
Profit motivation The perception that money can be made through the use of synthetic 
biology
Partnership Joining with a high or low biosecurity threat entity in new partnerships, 




Synthesis of nucleotides into the desired sequence




Editing and inserting desired sequences into targeted sites of a genome
Protein engineering Designing and producing proteins and other biomolecules in a laboratory 
with natural or unnatural parts
B. D. Trump et al.
213
engage with countries at each stage of the process. Figure 14.1 shows an example 
process model, in the form of an event tree, which might be used by the US.
This section also lists potential tripwires that can be used to identify when a 
country is moving into a new stage and becoming more or less of a biosecurity 
threat. These can include alterations in a nation’s (a) incentives to engage in Dual- 
Use Research of Concern (DURC), (b) degree of security and control over institu-
tional and individual activity in the synthetic biology space, and/or (c) potential for 
a militarization of synthetic biology and its enabling technologies.
14.3.1.1  Stage 1a. Bottom-Up Initiative: Independent Actors Indicate 
Interest in Synthetic Biology
Corporate, academic, and other non-governmental actors may have incentives to 
pursue the development of synthetic biology. In this stage of the process model, the 
economic incentives can indicate the value of various non-weapon applications of 
synthetic biology, including in the fields of energy, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, 
and medical applications. Thus, any monitoring of the synthetic biology domain 
during this stage will require an understanding of any influential economic fields 
that could benefit from synthetic biology development, particularly fields with high 
Dual-Use Research of Concern (DURC) applicability. Profit motivation is a large 
tripwire for signaling a bottom-up interest in synthetic biology. If individuals or 
institutions perceive that a profit can be made through the use of synthetic biology, 
then they are more likely to become interested.
Bottom-up actors interested in developing synthetic biology may also be respond-
ing to an impetus other than economics. For example, academics who studied 
abroad may wish to continue their research by opening a synthetic biology labora-
tory in their home country. Without the direct input of the government, bottom-up 
development is more likely to be directly related to the ambitions and profits of 
small academic or commercial entities, both of which have low incentives to 
Fig. 14.1 Demonstrative synthetic biology biosecurity event tree
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prioritize weapons development and high incentives to be transparent about their 
work (especially during the beginning stage when they might be acquiring impor-
tant partners or support).
Information hazards are a tripwire to watch for groups moving from an interest 
in synthetic biology to achievement of synthetic biology capabilities (Stage 2). An 
information hazard can be defined as: “A risk that arises from the dissemination of 
(true) information that may cause harm or enable some agent to cause harm.” Such 
a hazard may arise through data spillage of classified and/or sensitive information 
related to scientific and/or technological capabilities to acquire, engineer, test, and/
or build DURC-related research and products. Typically, an information hazard is 
seen as the “critical cornerstone on the bridge from inspiration to actualization” of 
a biological weapon or harmful engineered biological product  (Esvelt 2018; 
Kirkpatrick et al. 2018).
In order to address this, some countries have a strong culture of “self- governance,” 
whereby teams of scientists proactively tackle DURC concerns before, during, and 
after the completion of a research project. However, other states (in particular, many 
East Asian and Southeast Asian nations) lack this custom, instead expecting biose-
curity management to come from powerful government officials who have limited 
knowledge of  or expertise in the research being performed. The publication of 
DURC with little legitimate commercial and/or social utility (i.e., the recombina-
tion of extinct human pathogens) should be monitored, and actions to reduce the 
occurrence of such publication should be taken at the institutional, editorial, or state 
level. New partnerships or mergers between companies and/or universities, or the 
creation of research consortia, the membership of which comprises representatives 
from multiple nations, could indicate the risk of a bottom-up information hazard 
leading to a nation gaining synthetic biology capabilities. Monitoring should be 
conducted to see if the new partnerships or mergers include members who would 
increase biosecurity (e.g., watchdog NGOs and/or participants with an established 
record of compliance with the BWC) or decrease it (e.g., participants with a record 
of noncompliance).
Countries currently developing bottom-up initiatives in synthetic biology include 
Iran, where academics have begun attending international topical conferences, 
Saudi Arabia, where the King Abdullah University has a program in synthetic biol-
ogy, and Ukraine, where several universities offer coursework in synthetic biology.
Bottom-up initiatives in synthetic biology do not indicate a lack of support from 
the governing regime, only a lack of coordinated efforts. Bottom-up initiatives can 
also provide impetus for top-down initiatives (Step 1b).
14.3.1.2  Stage 1b. Top-Down Initiative: Regime Indicates Interest 
in Synthetic Biology
A coordinated top-down effort to support synthetic biology research can emerge 
from a governing regime independent of whether bottom-up activities are already 
occurring. Because synthetic biology is a DURC technology, any regime publicly 
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signaling its interest in developing synthetic biology capabilities has potentially 
taken an early step on the path of synthetic biology weapons development. The 
funding and other incentives made available could hypothetically be used to direct 
research in a way that benefits the government itself, including through weapons 
development. However, many products of synthetic biology are not and cannot be 
used as weapons: interest in synthetic biology does not necessarily indicate nefari-
ous intentions or the desire to develop a weapons program. Accordingly, the eco-
nomic context of research ambitions and their relationship with other regime 
ambitions is highly relevant to any evaluation of the government’s intentions. 
Monitoring of countries in this stage should relate the synthetic biology ambitions 
of the regime to other stated ambitions, such as exports they may seek to expand. In 
this way, profit motivation is also a top-down tripwire for indicating when a regime 
is likely to become interested in pursuing synthetic biology.
Information hazards are also an important tripwire for a top-down initiative mov-
ing from interest to capacity. For synthetic biology, Esvelt and Kirkpatrick et al. 
note the importance of states as protectors against information hazards that could 
inspire rogue militaries, terrorist groups, companies, or even individuals to learn 
and pursue synthetic biology research. Increasingly, however, the capacity for cen-
tralized governments to regulate biosecurity information hazards is becoming pro-
hibitively difficult due to the globalized and increasingly diversified nature of 
synthetic biology research (Trump et al. 2020).
14.3.1.3  Stage 2. Achievement of Scientific, Technological, 
and Engineering Capacity for Synthetic Biology
Following an expression of interest and subsequent investment in synthetic biology, 
groups or individuals within a country may successfully develop synthetic biology 
applications. During this stage of synthetic biology development, monitoring should 
occur. Academic publications as well as commercial patents, products, and pro-
cesses are worthy of being monitored, as they can all facilitate greater understand-
ing of a country’s internal synthetic biology capabilities. Exchanges of human 
capital are another source of information, though this may be more difficult to 
observe or monitor, especially within corporate structures. It is, however, possible 
that although corporate profit motivations cause actors to conceal specific details of 
their work, the overall capabilities are still evident in the final products.
Tripwires that would indicate a country at this stage as being more or less of a 
biosecurity threat include public health crises and geopolitical alignment. Public 
health crises can take the form of epidemics, sustainability crises, pollution, or other 
events where public health is directly threatened by a catalyst. Whether targeting 
humans, animals, crops, or the natural environment, epidemics represent the most 
visible and urgent of public health crises relevant to biosecurity. In such crises, 
states are incentivized to bend or relax established rules and norms regarding bio-
logical safety in search of vaccines, treatments, and cures for the disease. Such a 
relaxation of biological safety standards could become a biosecurity concern. The 
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pressure and financial incentives to foster interventions for public health crises can 
drive institutional actors to ignore biosecurity rules, share sensitive information that 
may be applied to DURC, or otherwise facilitate the development of DURC prod-
ucts and materials that would otherwise, in non-emergency situations, be more 
closely scrutinized.
Geopolitical alignment refers to the alliances, agreements, or participations to 
which a state voluntarily commits itself. The development of shared scientific 
research or collaborative agreements between states can signal movement in the 
strength of a state’s biosecurity intentions and enforcement capabilities, both 
directly and indirectly. Tripwires relating to geopolitical alignment include direct 
participation within collaborative security agreements like the BWC, which would 
indicate a state’s biosecurity threat is reduced, or indirect partnerships with other 
states that have a strong or weak biosecurity record. The potential increased capa-
bilities and reduced biosecurity-biosafety standards indicated by this tripwire repre-
sent a hazard that can benefit non-state actors as well.
During this stage, monitoring should encompass laboratory construction, 
whether private, academic, or governmental, with special attention to features in 
construction that suggest clandestine laboratory spaces, as well as any synthetic 
biology funding sources and their disbursements. The exchange of human capital 
between countries with different competence levels can help indicate the direction 
of research and future capabilities, and the quality of both bottom-up and top-down 
biosecurity initiatives will reveal the ease with which researchers could skirt biose-
curity guidelines, regulations, and laws for their own benefit. Finally, the published 
outputs and marketed products will provide insight into the level of synthetic biol-
ogy capabilities within the country. Economic incentives, including potential clients 
for weapons exports, should continue to be monitored.
14.3.1.4  Stage 3a. Active Development of Synthetic Biology Weapons
Once competence in synthetic biology is achieved, it is possible that some synthetic 
biology research may be directed into national laboratories for state-funded weap-
ons development purposes. These laboratories do not have the same transparency 
practices as academic or corporate actors, and it should be assumed that such weap-
ons development will not be reported to the international community. Monitoring of 
countries in this stage may include tracking the flow of experienced human capital 
from for-profit or academic sectors into government sectors, with special attention 
to gaps or abrupt decreases in publications. This could indicate clandestine syn-
thetic biology development under regime funding, which could indicate offensive 
purposes.
Additionally, independent actors may pursue weapons development outside of 
their government institutions, if provided the correct incentives by patrons. Given 
access to sufficiently powerful technology, independent actors may harness it for 
nefarious purposes if the benefits would be useful or worthwhile to them and exceed 
the benefits of abiding by existing biosecurity frameworks. Similarly, profit 
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motivation could also lead countries and sub-state actors to develop biological 
weapons at the behest of a partner nation or client, making profit motivation a trip-
wire for entering this stage.
A state’s record of internal strife and recent or ongoing external conflict can be 
used as another tripwire for a state or sub-state actor’s willingness to develop a syn-
thetic biology weapon or to move to Stage 4, the deployment of such a weapon. 
While a past record of such conflict can help characterize a state’s likelihood to 
embrace biological weapons, its position in ongoing or potential conflict in the near 
term serves as an especially significant tripwire of concern. External conflict, or 
active combat between two or more states, is a tripwire of concern as it incentivizes 
a government to pursue force multipliers or scientific innovations that will provide 
an edge in combat. Such a tripwire is particularly enticing for middle income states 
that are currently fighting or may fight a state of comparable or even superior power. 
For example, Iraq under Saddam Hussein deployed chemical weapons against 
poorly-armed yet highly-motivated and organized Iranian forces (Ali 2001;  Szinicz 
2005). Iraq increased its use of unconventional weapons as the war dragged on and 
as conventional Iraqi armor, aircraft, machines, and weaponry were exhausted.
For external conflict, biological weapons represent (a) a first-strike capability, 
capable of crippling enemy health, armor, or agriculture, (b) a force multiplier, 
capable of providing an edge against a near evenly-matched foe, or (c) a survival 
mechanism to attack an enemy who has the upper hand in a conventional war, where 
the losing party becomes increasingly desperate to fend off attacks and ensure sur-
vival. Internal conflict includes, among other scenarios, civil war, riots, and other 
forms of civil strife or internal dissension. Chemical and biological weapons have 
been considered and/or deployed as a means of (a) instilling fear and control over 
parties in dissent against the regime, or (b) as a force multiplier to inflict mass casu-
alties against an overwhelming rebellious force. As an example of (a), the govern-
ment of Syria – which began to seek unconventional weapons in the 1990s – deployed 
chemical weapons as Syrian Government forces began to lose ground in the Syrian 
Civil War (Eisenkraft and Falk 2019; Diab 1997). An example of (b) is the apartheid 
government in South Africa’s active development, testing, and deployment of bio-
logical weapons to assassinate key anti-government figures and to serve as a weapon 
of last resort to quell a mass revolt against the government (Hay 2016).
Monitoring efforts for countries in this stage may include monitoring imports, 
exports, information transfers, and general geopolitical relationships with other 
governments, especially those engaged in belligerence elsewhere, either domesti-
cally or internationally. Efforts should also include monitoring whether a state or 
non-state actor has or will be challenged by a powerful force against which conven-
tional armaments may be insufficient to ensure survival, or if there is the potential 
for widespread civil strife or civil war. Sufficient indications of clandestine syn-
thetic biology development at this stage may necessitate active interventions rather 
than passive monitoring, though the monitoring specified in Stage 2 should also 
continue. Interventions could include overtures to encourage the state to join inter-
national biosecurity efforts like the BWC and UN Resolution 1540 if it has not done 
so already, or to submit to routine or supplemental monitoring according to the 
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circumstances. There are currently no countries that have publicly admitted to pur-
suing or possessing synthetic biology weapons capabilities.
14.3.1.5  Stage 3b. Acquisition of Synthetic Biology Weapons 
from an External Source
Countries or non-state actors without synthetic biology capabilities may choose to 
forgo developing domestic technological capabilities if they are able to acquire syn-
thetic biology weapons through other avenues. This requires access to competence 
elsewhere, either through existing relationships or through building new ones. 
Regimes possessing advanced technological capabilities may attract actors with 
inclinations to learn and then use these capabilities for violence, as was the case 
with the 9/11 hijackers who trained in U.S. flight schools.
With DURC technologies, weapons development can arise inadvertently through 
exploration of beneficial uses for innovations. In contrast, actors willing to invest 
only in weaponized outputs signal a lack of economic interest in peaceable applica-
tions for the technology, and for this reason their interest in the weapons applica-
tions may indicate a stronger propensity to ultimately deploy them. However, such 
weapons could also serve as a tool of deterrence against another regime, though this 
would necessitate publicizing capabilities at some point.
It may be difficult to determine when an actor who is aiming to purchase syn-
thetic biology weapons ultimately acquires them. However, regardless of how far 
along in the process of acquiring these weapons an actor is, situation monitoring can 
entail disincentives for armament, whether economic assistance or coercive or 
offensive actions. Such actors may be best identified through their relationships 
with competent synthetic biology developers, whose outputs, collaborators, and cli-
ents should already be being monitored according to Stage 2. If a particular vendor 
appears to be on the cusp of selling a weapon, engagement can involve encouraging 
the vendor to increase their biosecurity processes as well as public engagement with 
the deal, since the public may be uncomfortable with selling synthetic biology 
weapons, especially to the type of belligerent actors likely to seek them.
14.3.1.6  Stage 4. Deployment of Synthetic Biology Weapons
Whether weapons are produced domestically or acquired from external sources, an 
instigating event will likely need to occur before their deployment. History abounds 
with examples of events that have triggered offensive actions, including both acute 
events (the secession of the Confederacy, which started the US Civil War) and 
chronic events that built over time (as resistance to the Assad regime of Syria 
mounted, the regime deployed chemical weapons). The nuclear bombs that ended 
World War II in the Pacific were part of a larger Allied strategy, but the timing of the 
deployment was more determined by weapons development (Stage 3a) within an 
extended conflict than a single precipitating factor. Still, even if there is not an acute 
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precipitating event, a regime considering deploying weapons must both have capa-
bility and a belligerent relationship with another entity. Thus, any regimes already 
under surveillance or being engaged according to Steps 2 and 3 should be further 
engaged in the event of a conflict erupting.
We propose a specific profile for actors at risk of deploying synthetic biology 
weapons, which can constitute a means to identify them and evaluate their risk lev-
els. In addition to their geopolitical alignment, which determines whether they have 
access to the weapons and a reason to deploy them, such actors are likely to be fairly 
risk tolerant because the spatial and temporal effects of a synthetic biology attack 
are not currently well-understood. Non-scientist citizens are often averse to new, 
potentially harmful technologies, and regimes that give those citizens more voice in 
governance risk paying a high price for such weapon deployment. Citizens from 
regions that have already suffered the ill effects of scientific advancements may be 
especially averse to deployment. For example, Ukrainians and Belarussians, who 
were especially negatively affected by the Chernobyl disaster, and Kazakhis, who 
have suffered from above-ground nuclear testing sites, may be particularly averse 
when it comes to the deployment of shadowy, poorly-understood novel weapons. 
Similarly, countries exhibiting cautionary principles towards genetically modified 
organisms will be less likely to resort to synthetic biology weapons because of pre- 
established risk aversion.
However, the opinions of the population only matter if the regime in possession 
of the weapons is answerable to that population. A risk-tolerant regime may be one 
characterized more by authoritarianism than democracy, or it may be a group of 
non-state actors without demarcated constituents. Therefore, one metric to estimate 
the probability of synthetic weapons deployment could arise from examining a 
regime’s political participation and human rights record, which indicates its ability 
to ignore or dehumanize segments of the population. Another metric may be whether 
the regime’s rhetoric somehow presents itself as insular and separate from the tar-
gets of a potential weapons deployment. Reality is frequently subservient to percep-
tion, and in moments of high stress, actors who do not answer to a larger and more 
moderating population and are accustomed to dehumanizing their adversaries may 
deem the benefits of synthetic biological weapons to be worth the uncertain risks. 
Therefore, there is a spectrum of likelihood in weapons deployment that depends on 
various factors beyond weapons possession. Finally, decision makers will weigh 
these factors against the magnitude of the damage they anticipate if the weapon is 
not deployed. If they are facing a real or perceived existential threat, they may see 
no reason for restraint.
Should events proceed to the point where a regime considers launching a syn-
thetic biological weapon, active engagement will be urgently needed. This could 
include attempts to physically compromise the weapon and the deployment infra-
structure, or diplomatic efforts that assure the regime of a sufficiently positive out-
come to its conflict without launching the weapons. The latter strategy resembles 
that used by the US during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, in which the US quickly 
intervened on Israel’s side in order to sway the tide after Israel threatened to use 
nuclear weapons. Ideally, such a last-ditch effort would only be necessary after the 
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failure of many other efforts to diminish synthetic biology weapons capacity start-
ing from the time when the actor in question entered hostilities with another entity. 
This also raises the possibility that governments might threaten to deploy synthetic 
biology weapons in order to receive assurances. In these cases the information 
gleaned from earlier monitoring should be able to inform the actual veracity of the 
threat. Additionally, if sufficient actions are taken in earlier stages of weapons 
development, such a situation should not arise.
14.3.2  Key Enabling Technologies 
and Technological Tripwires
Many enabling technologies are key to further progress in synthetic biology. Just as 
synthetic biology enables potential misuse with dual-use studies or technologies, 
developments in the technologies or techniques outlined below also allow for dra-
matic growth of potential security threats by expanding the capabilities of synthetic 
biology, and therefore the abilities of actors. Understanding the key breakthroughs 
needed for the expansion of synthetic biology capabilities is necessary for regula-
tory agencies to anticipate and respond to potential and imminent threats. If regula-
tory agencies are aware of the relevant technologies and where key breakthroughs 
are likely to occur, signs of advancements in these technologies can act as tripwires 
and signal to defense agencies when new threats have emerged due to the now- 
enhanced capabilities of synthetic biology and malicious actors. It is important to 
note that as with nearly all aspects of synthetic biology, enhanced synthetic biology 
capabilities are not in and of themselves normatively “bad”; they will overwhelm-
ingly be put to beneficial uses. However, such technological advancements will also 
open the door to the creation of more complex or novel biological weapons that 
aren’t possible with today’s technology, and thus these advancements  should be 
monitored so that novel types of biological weapons can be continually anticipated 
and defended against as they are developed.
It is also critical to acknowledge the increasing usage and development of com-
puting power and Artificial Intelligence (AI) in scientific advances. Synthetic biol-
ogy harnesses these resources to improve many different aspects of product 
production, including fidelity and automation. With major advances in computing 
and AI, the capabilities of synthetic biology will also expand. While not explicitly 
mentioned above as a technological tripwire, computing power serves as an under-
current of development that cannot be ignored. Advances in these particular fields 
will produce the most radical changes in synthetic biology capabilities and can thus 
most easily serve as tripwires for observing the capacities of synthetic biology as a 
whole and subsequently the capabilities of any “malicious actors.”
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14.4  Conclusion
Building an effective biosecurity strategy to encompass twenty-first century syn-
thetic biology requires understanding the novelties synthetic biology creates in the 
biosecurity threat space, as well as the structural vulnerabilities it can exploit and 
the likely causes of inadequate biosecurity practices. Tripwires can be helpful in 
alerting monitoring groups and governments as to potential biosecurity threats. 
Synthetic biology’s novel biosecurity concerns arise from its broad scope, wider 
availability, complexity, and uncertainty over current and future capabilities. Critical 
developments such as gene editing via CRISPR vastly improve upon previous 
genetic engineering processes and may yield a revolution in human and environ-
mental health research, but may also cause substantial and irreversible harms.
Harms may also arise through the deliberate use of such techniques to disrupt 
human and environmental systems. Misuse of synthetic biology techniques requires 
two circumstances: (a) the spread of ideas, techniques, or knowhow to utilize syn-
thetic biology’s enabling technologies for irresponsible or nefarious purposes 
(“information hazard”), and (b) the ability to use such knowledge and tools to gen-
erate and disseminate harmful engineered organisms to vulnerable recipients. The 
tripwires we have outlined in this chapter aim to signal when these necessary cir-
cumstances have been or are close to being reached.
Synthetic biology advancements have already included the publication and dis-
semination of a methodology for synthesizing horsepox in a laboratory setting. 
Some critics say this information could support a nefarious actor to reconstitute and 
develop smallpox, or to synthetize other viruses. Additionally, the widely publicized 
recreation of the 1918 Spanish Influenza, which killed some 50 million people 
worldwide at the close of World War  I, could facilitate the synthesis process for 
actors wishing to cause harm (Tumpey et al. 2005). Even nonpathogenic approaches 
have been defined as dual-use research, ranging from the disruption of local ecolo-
gies via gene drives to the manipulation or destruction of inorganic materials.
These and dozens of other cases demonstrate the increasing ease by which an 
actor can acquire information and apply existing tools to deploy advanced genetic 
engineering applications with limited to no oversight. In 1975, the U.S. National 
Institute of Health (NIH) established compliance measures for genome engineering 
that were enforced through funding restrictions; however many synthetic biology 
innovators in the US  can now operate without NIH funding, approval, or even 
awareness, and the NIH does not oversee research in other countries. Today, the 
financial costs, time limitations, and skill requirements needed to wield synthetic 
biology tools have scaled down to become accessible even to high school students. 
Furthermore, the required baseline knowledge will further diminish over time as 
synthetic biology processes become more streamlined. While such broad access to 
sophisticated genetic engineering knowledge and equipment can accelerate scien-
tific breakthroughs, it also places the responsibility of biosecurity on a huge number 
of unsupervised actors across the globe.
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In 2018, the states-parties to the BWC noted that increased access to technolo-
gies such as gene editing, gene drives, and gene synthesis is being conferred to 
actors with limited or no oversight from established industry or governmental orga-
nizations, raising concerns about potential violations of the BWC. It is helpful to 
forecast and understand looming threats and potential mitigation strategies at vari-
ous scales, but international treaties are not structured to oversee bottom-up efforts 
related to the localization and globalization of synthetic biology below the national 
scale. One response may be the broadening of engagement from traditional over-
sight agencies like NIH.  Where top-down governance proves insufficient, other 
actors such as universities, non-profits, and companies will need to engage their 
gatekeeping and watchdog capabilities to protect against nefarious actors. Top- 
down governance may support such initiatives, which will require harmonization 
and communication up to the international level. Tripwires, in the form of a game 
theoretic approach, can be critical in identifying the range of timelines whereby 
nefarious deployment of biotechnology becomes realistic and actionable.
Using the lens of risk analysis, longstanding biosecurity policy practices appear 
to have produced gaps in biosecurity effectiveness for synthetic biology. These poli-
cies include (a) the framing of security as a cost or undesirable expense to be mini-
mized, (b) the siloing of scholarship and practice across disciplinary domains and 
between academia, government, industry, and civil society, and (c) the narrow fram-
ing of security issues that ignore technological developments occurring within a 
number of different countries, by new actors, and/or in adjacent technology fields. 
Each of these concerns could be addressed by policy solutions that both support 
technological development and mitigate security threats while facilitating public 
engagement in synthetic biology and investment in its products as they enter the 
marketplace. Policies for synthetic biology must be scalable, transferable, and 
adaptable in order to address its emerging technical and social challenges.
Advanced biological research is no longer overwhelmingly dominated by Europe 
and the US, and this may introduce different approaches to or priorities for biosecu-
rity. For instance, Russia’s Federal Research Programme for Genetic Technologies 
Development for 2019–2027 intends to “implement a comprehensive solution to the 
task of the accelerated development of genetic technologies, including genetic edit-
ing; to establish scientific and technological groundwork for medicine, agriculture 
and industry; to improve the system of preventing biological emergencies and moni-
toring in this area.” Similarly, Saudi Arabia is funding research related to the devel-
opment of microbial cell factories to produce fuels and chemicals. Meanwhile, the 
Singaporean government is investing considerable resources into the funding of life 
and environmental sciences research at Nanyang Technological University, the 
National University of Singapore, and the Agency for Science, Technology and 
Research (A*STAR). The Chinese Academy of Sciences is establishing an Institute 
of Synthetic Biology, which is tasked with the dual responsibilities of fostering 
roadmaps for the future development of Chinese synthetic biology while also estab-
lishing safety and security norms for researchers at Chinese institutions. There are 
no top-down efforts beyond existing mechanisms like the BWC or the CWC to 
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standardize global governance and usage of synthetic biology, and bottom-up efforts 
are not coordinated in their reach or messaging.
Relative newcomers to synthetic biology development may possess differing tol-
erances and constructions of risk than more established technology developers. The 
implications, though vast, can be grouped into two general areas. One includes 
diverging safety and security practices at various points of an international supply 
chain that forms the backbone of an increasingly globalized economy. Another 
includes the potential for small-scale experiments or national biosecurity policies to 
escape a given actor’s control and spill across political boundaries. While one coun-
try may find the environmental risk of a particular synthetic biology application 
acceptable, its spread across borders into another country may disrupt those local 
ecologies (i.e., crashing or hardening a particular species through genetic engineer-
ing) or expose vulnerable human populations to irreversible consequences without 
options for amelioration. The nature of certain synthetic biology applications (i.e. 
gene drives) makes it impossible for risk averse countries to wholly quarantine 
themselves from exposure to harms resulting from another country’s decisions. This 
is also an issue of equity because risk-tolerant countries will reap the rewards when 
beneficial technologies emerge, but risk-averse countries may be forced to bear their 
neighbors’ risks without any means to capture potential rewards.
An environment of competing and incongruent risk architectures causes indi-
vidual states, organizations, or industries to arrive at differing definitions of security 
threats or acceptable levels of loss in pursuit of a technology’s intended gains. For a 
technology as uncertain as synthetic biology, this policy divergence may set govern-
ments, companies, and other research organizations down vastly differing policy 
paths, and impede consensus in assessing the minutiae of technical risk concerns or 
assessment protocols, or ensuring security for anyone.
Effective global biosecurity will not happen quickly, nor will it be enthusiasti-
cally adopted by all national governments or non-governmental organizations. 
Incentives to misuse synthetic biology with harmful consequences remain high for 
certain negligent actors, as are the incentives to dual-use by nefarious actors, and the 
coming years may see such misuse affecting human or environmental health. 
Successful biosecurity implementation must be adaptable to quickly incorporate 
uncertainty as well as new capabilities. Urgent steps are required to place such 
notions into practice before a major threat incident, both to prevent the damage 
incurred by such an incident and to avoid subsequent policy changes which could 
limit or ban platforms of synthetic biology research entirely. Besides forgoing the 
benefits of the technology, such a ban could force development underground and 
further out of the reach of coordinated governance or risk assessment. By identify-
ing the social, economic, institutional, and technological tripwires that influence a 
state’s trajectory towards biosecurity research of concern, responsible parties can 
take steps to apply biosecurity to maximize technological benefits while minimizing 
its dual-use potential.
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